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COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

FOR

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

FOR THE PERIOD FY22-26

January 24, 2022

**Democratic Republic of Congo, African Eastern Central Countries 2
Eastern and Southern Africa Region
The International Finance Corporation, Middle East and Africa
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency**

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AEZ	Artisanal Exploitation Zones
AF	Additional Financing
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i> (French Development Agency)
ASA	Advisory Services and Analytics
AU	African Union
BCC	Banque Centrale du Congo
CAR	Central African Republic
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCDR	Climate Change and Development Report
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CEM	Country Economic Memorandum
CLR	Completion and Learning Review
CNR	<i>Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés</i> (National Commission for Refugees)
CO2	Carbon Dioxide
COVID-19	2019 Coronavirus Disease
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPIA	Country and Policy Institutional Assessment
CPSD	Country Private Sector Diagnostic
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CRESP	<i>Coordination des Ressources Extérieures et Suivi de Projet</i> (Coordination of External Resources and Project Monitoring)
CY	Calendar Year
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DE4A	Digital Economic Assessment
DHS	Data from Household Survey
DIME	Development Impact Evaluation
DPF	Development Policy Financing
DPO	Development Policy Operation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRM	Domestic Resource Mobilization
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSA	Debt Sustainability Analysis
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (United Nations)
EASE	Electricity Access and Services Expansion Project

ECF	Extended Credit Facility
EESSE	Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENCORE	Enhanced Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
E&S	Environmental and Social
ESIRT	Environmental and Social Incident Response Toolkit
ETD	<i>Entité Territoriale Décentralisée</i> (Decentralized Territorial Unit)
EU	European Union
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARDC	<i>Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo</i> (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FBO	Faith-Based Organizations
FC	<i>Franc congolais</i> (Congolese Franc)
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCS	Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations
FCV	Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
FI	Financial Institutions
FONER	<i>Fonds d'Entretien Routier</i> (Road Maintenance Fund)
FSAP	Financial Sector Assessment Program
FY	Fiscal Year
GB	Gigabyte
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCP	<i>Groupe de Coordination des Partenaires</i> (Partner Coordination Group)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEMS	Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GLI	Great Lakes Initiative
GLR	Great Lakes Region
GNI	Gross National Income
GOV	Governance
GP	Global Practice
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GRID	Green, Resilient and Inclusive Development
GRiF	Global Risk Financing Facility
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
GW	Gigawatt

HA	Hectare
HCI	Human Capital Index
HD	Human Development
HEIS	Hands-On Implementation Support
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HV	High Voltage
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGF	<i>Inspection Générale des Finances</i> (General Inspectorate of Finance)
INF	Infrastructure
InfraSAP	Infrastructure Sector Assessment
INS	<i>Institut National des Statistiques</i> (National Statistical Institute)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPF	Investment Project Financing
IPP	Independent Power Producer
ISIS	Islamic State
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JET	Jobs and Economic Transformation
KWH	Kilowatt Hour
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MFD	Maximizing Finance for Development
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo</i> (United Nations Organisation Mission in DRC)
MONUSCO	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</i> (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPA	Multiphase Programmatic Approach
MPO	Macro Poverty Outlook
MSMEs	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
MW	Megawatt
NAPA	National Adaptation Program of Action
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions

NEET	Not in Employment, Education or Training
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRGO	National Resources Governance Institute
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHS	Occupational Health and Safety
PBA	Performance-Based Allocation
PBC	Performance-Based Conditions
PDDRCs	<i>Programme de Désarmement, Démobilisation, Relèvement Communautaire et Stabilisation</i> (Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Rehabilitation, and Stabilization Program)
PDSS	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEIR	Public Expenditure Institutional Review
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PforR	Program for Results
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PLR	Performance and Learning Review
PNSD	<i>Plan national stratégique de développement</i> (National Strategic Development Plan)
PPA	Performance and Policy Actions
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRA	Prevention and Resilience Allocation
PSC	Peace Security and Cooperation
PSCF	Peace Security and Cooperation Framework
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSW	Private Sector Window
PSWG	Peace and Security Working Group
PV	Photo-Voltaic
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REGIDESO	<i>Régie de Distribution d'Eau</i> (National Water Utility Company)
RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
SCAP	Safeguards Corrective Action Plan
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SCF	Stabilization Coherence Fund
SDFP	Sustainable Development Finance Policy
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SEA/H	Sexual exploitation and abuse and harassment

SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SMM	Social Media Monitoring
SMP	Security Management Plan
SNCC	<i>Société Nationale des chemins de fer du Congo</i> (National Railway Company of the Congo)
SNEL	<i>Société National d'Electricité</i> (National Electricity Company)
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SOP	Series of Projects
SORT	Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool
SPF	State and Peace-building Fund
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPRP	Strategic Preparedness and Response Project
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSN	Social Safety Net
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Congo
STEP	Eastern Recovery Project
TA	Technical Assistance
TADAT	Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool
TF	Trust Funds
TPM	Third-Party Monitoring
TTL	Task Team Leader
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US	United States
US\$	United States Dollar
UXO	Unexploded Ordonnance
WBG	World Bank Group
WDI	World Development Indicators
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
YTD	Year to Date
ZEA	<i>Zone d'Exploitation Artisanale</i> (Artisanal Exploitation Area)

FY22-26 COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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FY22-26 COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Supporting a new social contract

1. **The last of the Congo Wars officially ended in 2003, yet the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not made significant advances in post-conflict stabilization over the past two decades.** Conflict and violence continue, particularly in DRC's part of the Great Lakes Region (GLR)¹, where there were 5,515 conflict-related deaths in 2021. Girls and women are the most adversely affected—more than half of women and girls aged 15 and older have experienced physical violence and/or Sexual Exploitation Abuse/Harassment (SEA/H). In parallel, DRC faces critical development challenges, as little progress has been made since the early 2000s.
2. **Poverty, measured at the international level of US\$1.90 a day, remains high at 73 percent (2020).** Moreover, the number of poor is growing, with 20 million more poor in 2020 than in 2003. Poverty reduction is hampered by high population growth—the population grew an average of three percent annually from 1961 to 2020—combined with weak economic growth, with a real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 1.6 percent over the same period. This has resulted in a 60 percent decline in GDP per capita in 2020 compared to its 1960 level. Additionally, the humanitarian situation is precarious: half of all children have not received routine immunizations, over 5.2 million people are forcibly displaced, 27 million people are food insecure, and there have been four Ebola outbreaks in the past three years.
3. **These daunting challenges are compounded by weak governance that precludes the country from benefiting from its vast natural resources.** An illustration of this natural resource “curse” is that while DRC holds half of the world's cobalt reserves, the most critical component in car and phone batteries, its paved road system is 30 times smaller than the average level in Sub-Saharan African (SSA). Furthermore, DRC hydropower resources are three times larger than the total installed capacity in SSA, but only one out of five Congolese has access to electricity. Similarly, 34 percent of households have access to basic water (19 percent in rural areas), despite DRC holding 52 percent of SSA's freshwater resources.
4. **The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic puts further stress on the health system and society at large.** As of January 11, 2022, there were 80,175 confirmed cases and 1,225 fatalities—the majority of which have been in Kinshasa. The vaccine rollout has been hampered by vaccine hesitancy and access issues. The COVID-19 pandemic has added enduring socioeconomic impacts, led to a slight increase in poverty in 2020, and put stress on an already weak health system.
5. **The four World Bank Group (WBG) strategies for DRC adopted since 2001 (two transitional strategies (2001, 2004), a 2008 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), and a FY13-16 CAS²) have all identified persistent constraints to DRC's sustainable development, e.g., conflict and violence, weak human capital, and pervasive corruption.** Furthermore, the four strategies have, to a large extent, proposed similar responses to these persistent development challenges, including investments in stabilization, human development, strengthening governance, and in fostering private sector development. From 2002 to 2017 (IDA13 to IDA17), US\$7.5 billion worth of IDA resources were committed

¹ The countries that make up the Africa GLR are Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.

² The FY13-16 CAS was extended to FY17 through a 2016 Performance and Learning Review (PLR). The preparation of a new WBG CPF was postponed due to delays in forming a new government following the December 2018 elections and COVID-19 containment measures. It was only after the establishment of a new government, in April 2021, that discussion around strategic development priorities and associated WBG support could be undertaken.

in DRC, with a heavy emphasis on rebuilding public infrastructure (roads, airport, railway, energy, water supply) that was destroyed by years of economic mismanagement and subsequent wars. The impacts of these investments, which, in practice, were not fully aligned with the vision of the strategies described above, were somewhat limited, particularly in strengthening institutional capacity and stimulating critical governance reforms. Furthermore, projects were typically implemented in several provinces, without a strategic geographic concentration. As a result, investments were spread thin across a large territory, limiting overall impact, and impeded effective implementation support. Staff safety and security concerns, as well as limited transport facilities, further affected the ability of World Bank to provide adequate supervision support. Significant fiduciary and safeguards issues, particularly relating to Gender-Based Violence (GBV), further hampered project implementation.

6. **Notwithstanding these significant and persistent challenges, there are indications that the social contract in DRC may be changing.** The government that was formed in the spring of 2021 is showing commitment to reform and to addressing ongoing challenges to development. This is manifested in the adoption, in October 2021, of the country's first conflict prevention and stabilization strategy and a new community-based reintegration and stabilization program in the eastern part of the country. There has also been progress in the implementation of the free primary education policy—the first high-level political commitment to reform and the provision of basic services since the collection of school fees began 40 years ago. In addition, the new government has restarted a program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), after the last program was interrupted in 2012 due to transparency concerns around large contracts in the mining sector. The recent appointment of a new governor of the Central Bank of Congo, a selection based on merit over connections, could signal a welcome direction toward open and competitive recruitment processes for key governmental positions.

7. **The WBG will support these nascent positive changes initiated by the government by applying principles that differ from past engagements in DRC.** The new principles are based on historic lessons learned, key analytical work and fragility analysis, including the 2021 Risk and Resilience Analysis (RRA), 2018 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), 2020 Country Private Sector Diagnostic (CPSD), and poverty assessments. The principles include rebalancing investments towards human development sectors, particularly education and social protection; targeting poor, vulnerable, and conflict-affected populations; strengthening implementation; and proactively identifying and addressing portfolio and country risks. Furthermore, all engagements aim to protect DRC's large, forested areas and address GBV. They incorporate guidance from key corporate strategies, including the 2020-25 Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) and FY16-23 Gender Equality, Poverty Reduction, and Inclusive Growth Strategy.

Applying new principles to WBG engagement in DRC

8. **Critical governance reforms will be integrated into all WBG engagements.** Engagement areas include core Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms at central and provincial levels; sectoral reforms for improved service delivery and sustainability and strengthened private sector participation, including governance of state enterprises in the water, electricity, transport, and mining sectors, as well as reforms aimed to increase transparency and strengthen demand-side governance. In the mining sector, World Bank engagement will initially focus on strengthening transparency and accountability, before exploring a deeper engagement aimed to address social and environmental issues in the sector. Across sectors, reforms will be promoted through investment operations with results-based financing modalities and potentially through Development Policy Financing (DPF)³, complemented by continuous high-level policy dialogue. Investment lending with results-based modalities is already being used in the education sector

³ DPF has not been used in DRC for nearly 15 years. Use of DPF will be subject to an adequate macroeconomic and policy framework and government track record and commitment to a substantive policy reform program.

to support implementation of the government's free primary education policy.

9. **There will be a significant shift toward the human development sectors, with a view to strengthening systems and access and quality of services.** This will translate into a significant increase in financing for the education and social protection sectors, which, in the past, have lagged the health sector. Engagements will support key reforms across the social sectors, making use, where possible, of results-based modalities. Operational engagements will aim to increase access to quality primary and secondary education—from the current 66 percent coverage level to a target of 74 percent in 2026—with a focus on girls. Routine vaccination coverage targets a minimum five percent expansion, and epidemiological surveillance will be strengthened. A registry for social assistance will be established, to target the poor and most vulnerable, with the goal of enrolling 1.8 million people by 2026 (from zero enrollments in 2021). Health initiatives will adopt results-based approaches that aim to address governance challenges and ensure sustainability through strengthening service delivery systems.

10. **This CPF proposes a renewed approach to stabilization by scaling up targeted social protection programs.** In the past, stabilization projects were mainly targeting ex-combatants through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) projects managed at the central level. In this proposed CPF, stabilization work will be undertaken with provincial authorities and focus on vulnerable communities, including refugees. The World Bank will support the government's efforts to establish a comprehensive, countrywide social safety net system that targets poor, vulnerable, and conflict-affected populations. This will include a specific focus on forcibly displaced and refugee populations and youth in Kinshasa to address exclusionary dynamics. The new approach brings investments close to US\$1 billion in social protection activities, benefiting a total of about 1.2 million people.

11. **This CPF proposes to move away from investments in the multi-modal system (roads, railway, and river transportation) across the territory, to focus on improving road connectivity in geographic areas that are most affected by conflict and violence.** Investments will improve the conditions and resilience of the two national corridors that run east-west (between the Atlantic and the Kasais) and north-south (along the Great Lakes), aiming to add 1,500 km of paved roads. This will add 50 percent to the total length of paved roads and connect the east-west and north-south corridors. Additionally, 4,000 km of rural access roads will be rehabilitated, connecting people, and providing access to markets. Moreover, there will be a strong emphasis on road maintenance, ensuring the sustainability of investments made. Digital connectivity will be prioritized: planned activities include the laying of 1,800 km of fiber-optic cables, mobilizing private capital and using a “dig once” approach. Investments will also be made to upgrade Goma and Beni airports (North Kivu), which are highly affected by continued conflict.

12. **As a joint World Bank-International Finance Corporation (IFC)-Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) program, the CPF promotes private investments in water and energy infrastructure, including off-grid and mini-grid (both production and distribution), to quickly increase people's access.** By adopting a new approach that will leverage private investment in these sectors, including IFC lending and MIGA guarantees, the WBG will assist in building and operating decentralized grids financed through Public Private Partnership (PPP) modalities. In the past, investments in water and energy infrastructure were oriented toward rehabilitating, with public funds, old and large public production infrastructure managed by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Examples of such past investments include the rehabilitation of turbines at the Inga dams to supply the mining Copperbelt, which is located 2,000 kilometers from the dams. Through this new approach, WBG engagements will aim to increase electricity access rates from 19 to 25 percent and access to water by 3 percent—from a low 17 percent. Further WBG engagement in the development of the Inga Falls, which, with a hydropower potential of 44 Gigawatt (GW), could transform the energy sector in DRC and beyond, will be considered if project and sector governance are significantly strengthened and fully transparent.

13. **WBG engagements will aim to protect DRC's rainforest, which is the second largest in the world and covers two thirds of the territory.** It stores the equivalent of 85 billion tons of carbon dioxide, which roughly equals three years of global energy-related Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) emissions. For many years, the World Bank piloted investments, such as shifting cultivation and providing alternative livelihoods to reduce the pressure on forests and address key drivers of deforestation in provinces surrounding Kinshasa. Under this CPF, it is proposed to scale up these approaches to strengthen the resilience of landscapes and communities in all provinces surrounding the country's forest. It is also proposed to use the DPF instrument to incentivize improved forest governance.

14. **In a country that ranks 149 out of 153 in the 2020 global gender gap index and where there is persistent and pervasive GBV, aggravated by fragility and conflict, all WBG engagements will be gender-informed, with a specific focus on addressing GBV.** In the past, the World Bank has applied a survivor-centric approach in Eastern DRC. Building on experience and following the retrofitting of 16 active projects to include specific SEA/H risk mitigation measures and comprehensive Grievance Redress Mechanisms (GRM), this CPF will add to this survivor-centric approach by moving toward prevention and behavioral change, with a focus on the most fragile and conflict-affected parts of the country. Investments in girls' learning and women's and girls' empowerment will include efforts to help girls transition into and stay in secondary school; access to Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) education and services; access to second chance education; and strengthening women's financial inclusion.

15. **These principles align with IDA20 priorities and support a resilient COVID-19 recovery.** The CPF proposes strong engagements in support of three out of the four IDA20 Special Themes. Over the CPF period, there will be increased support and financing for human development. Focus on GBV and girls' and women's empowerment align with the Gender and Development theme, and the CPF's overarching focus on stabilization supports the IDA20 theme on Fragility, Conflict, and Violence. Protection of the DRC rainforest aligns with the IDA20 special theme on climate change and is also aligned with the 2021-25 WBG Climate Change Action Plan. Support for the development of renewable sources of energy, the building of climate-resilient roads, and renewed focus on social protection are informed by the Green, Resilient, and Inclusive Development (GRID) framework 2021 for a resilient recovery from COVID-19.

Maximizing impact and systematically addressing risks

16. **DRC will access significantly more IDA financing during the five-year CPF period than during IDA13-17.** During the first fifteen years of engagement in DRC, the World Bank committed around US\$500 million in new lending annually, increasing to US\$1 billion under IDA18. With an IDA19 allocation of about US\$2.4 billion from the Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) and the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) under the Fragility, Conflict, and Violence envelope, plus additional resources from other IDA windows and regional IDA reallocations, annual commitments during IDA19 (FY21-22) will total around US\$2.9 billion. Allocations under IDA20-21 are not confirmed, though it is assumed volumes will be like those during IDA19. While IDA resources have significantly increased over recent years, a close to doubling of the population means the per capita IDA allocation for DRC remains low compared to other countries.

17. **Due to the dense tropical rainforest that covers the northern half of the territory, most of the Congolese people (60 percent) live along two main corridors.** One corridor runs along the southern edge of the forest from the southwest to the southeast, beginning at the Atlantic coast and ending at the border with Zambia. The other corridor borders the Great Lakes, from north to south (see Figure 13, Section VI – Maps). The two corridors represent the highest economic concentration and potential in DRC but are also rife with conflict hotspots. These axes effectively divide DRC into two types of regions: leading regions with high population density, some infrastructure, services, and transport, and lagging regions, with low population density, high poverty, almost no infrastructure, and extensive tropical rainforest.

18. **To address fragility, in support of socioeconomic development, and to maximise impact, the CPF proposes to focus implementation of some investment operations in these densely populated corridors which are home to a high number of poor people and represent conflict/fragility hotspots.** Additionally, refugee-targeted investments will be made in two densely populated provinces in the northwest. As the environment along these corridors and in the two provinces in the northwest (representing in total 28 percent of the territory and 67 percent of the population) is highly degraded, with little or no remaining primary forest, focusing certain investments operations in the areas surrounding the forest will ease pressure on the forest and therefore have additional positive environmental impacts. These engagements, which will complement investments with a national reach, will include investments in critical infrastructure (e.g., roads and energy), agriculture, and forestry, to the benefit of 61 percent of the country's poor.

19. **A geographic focus in the implementation of investment operations will strengthen policy dialogue with decentralized authorities and bolster the quality of World Bank supervision.** Concentrating the implementation of operations that have a distinct geographic footprint in fewer provinces can deepen the dialogue and collaboration with decentralized authorities. This approach will also allow for strengthened supervision support, bringing the WBG closer to the client. To facilitate supervision across the two corridors, WBG liaison offices have been established in Eastern DRC (Goma) and in the Kasai (Kananga). Overall, the World Bank will continue to have a large-scale geographic presence in DRC, except in the Copperbelt region, which is wealthier and sparsely populated. Other development partners also have a geographic focus in DRC, though every one of the 26 provinces is covered through programmatic interventions by one or more partner. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) have a strong cross-country footprint, including in the east, the Kasai (South), and the southeast. The European Union (EU), with a strong focus on biodiversity, targets lagging regions in center and northeast. Other partners adopted a thematic entry-point for their engagements, e.g., fragility, conflict prevention, and stabilization for Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU and the US are active on security sector reform, the EU on rule of law, and Sweden on civil society, humanitarian, and security issues. All partners provide humanitarian assistances nationwide.

20. **Under this CPF, risks to implementation and development impact will be systematically identified and analyzed and mitigation measures adopted with a focus on security, fiduciary, and GBV risks.** The World Bank security team has been reinforced, equipment such as armored cars purchased (Goma), communications with staff enhanced, and decision-making procedures adapted to the risks faced. Fiduciary risk assessments will be undertaken in sectors where funding is increasing sharply, such as for roads and agriculture. Hands on implementation support (HEIS) will be provided as needed and Integrity Vice Presidency services used in a preventive manner. WBG engagements will provide direct support to GBV survivors, while, in parallel, aggressively targeting prevention through behavior change interventions and building functional GRM systems, as is being done in the education sector.

21. **Given the lack of improvement in the daily lives of most Congolese over the past 20 years, many internal actors have lost confidence in the state and, by extension, in the WBG.** The World Bank is the only international institution that provides direct financial support to and through government systems. It is therefore critical to communicate proactively and strategically on what the WBG does and how, while rebuilding an environment of trust. This will be done through increased engagement and dialogue with media and civil society actors and regular updates on WBG multimedia platforms and social networks.

II. COUNTRY CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

2.1 Fragility and Sociopolitical Context

22. **DRC, the largest country in SSA at 234 million hectares⁴ with a population estimated at 89.5 million⁵ people, is a deeply fragile country.** DRC has a long history of conflict, political upheaval and instability, and authoritarian rule, which have led to a grave, ongoing humanitarian crisis. In addition, there has been a mass displacement of populations. These features have not changed significantly since the end of the Congo Wars in 2003. The structural drivers of DRC's fragility are deep-rooted and can be traced from the precolonial era to the colonial period and endure today. The most common thread through time is the quest of certain vested parties to exploit and benefit from DRC's immense natural resources. This has directly impacted the Congolese people—often through violence and conflict—and left a legacy of chronic underdevelopment. The underlying features of DRC's fragility and their impacts were analyzed in the 2021 RRA (see Box 1).

23. **DRC borders nine countries, and external interference has regularly contributed to conflict and instability.** Its borders include the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan to its North; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania to the East; the Republic of Congo to the West; and Angola and Zambia to the South. DRC also has a large inflow of refugees.

24. **The complex political context has hampered implementation of reform initiatives.** The peaceful transition to power after the December 2018 election was followed by a period of strained cohabitation when the former president's party held the majority in Parliament. To address this stalemate, President Tshisekedi conducted national consultations in October 2020. Allegiances in Parliament shifted as a result of these consultations, creating a new majority of 391 of 500 members supporting the president. In the spring of 2021, a new prime minister was named, and the cabinet was formed, opening the way to move forward on critical reform agendas.

25. **Demand for change is increasing, urging political leadership to break with the past.** Public reaction to the former president's delay of the 2016 elections, combined with an increase in social media usage in DRC, helped usher in a burgeoning civil society movement. Instead of a crackdown on freedom of speech, DRC has experienced a slow democratic shift. In parallel, the new authorities appear to be increasing accountability through the re-empowered General Finance Inspectorate (*Inspection Générale des Finances, IGF*), the government's financial oversight institution, which is undertaking an in-depth investigation into use of public funds. The authorities also appear committed to renewing the social contract through the introduction of free primary education and conflict prevention and stabilization.

26. **Enduring political instability and cycles of conflict have led to weak governance and institutions, hampering reform implementation, service delivery, and private sector growth.** This instability also breeds and reinforces corruption. The judicial system is heavily impaired, has limited access to and within conflict-affected areas, and is unable to mediate or resolve disputes in a manner that is perceived as equitable. With poorly paid and trained personnel, the security sector is considered unreliable, partial, and unable to protect the people. In the 2020 Transparency International Perceptions of Corruption Index, DRC ranks 170 out of 180 countries and scores a low 18 (out of 100) when gauging the perceived level of public sector corruption.⁶ In a 2017 poll, only seven percent of people surveyed in Eastern Congo said the

⁴ <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/#geography>. Population estimates for DRC vary, however, as the last census dates from 1984. Population estimations go as high as 116 million (World Bank, October 2021: Macro Poverty Outlook (MPO) estimate).


⁵ World Bank (October 2021): MPO (estimate, the latest census took place in 1984).

⁶ <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo#>

state represented the interests of the people⁷.

27. **Over the past decade, persistent violence has affected nearly 40 million Congolese⁸.** With 5,515 fatalities, 2021 was the first year since 2014 there was a decrease in total conflict-related fatalities in DRC – down from 6,041 in 2020, which was the most violent year in DRC since the official end of the Second Congo War⁹ (see Figure 1). It is estimated that more than 120 armed groups currently operate in the region—up from around 70 in 2015. Continuing conflict and violence affect women and girls the most, as widespread conflict-related sexual violence compounds other forms of GBV. Pervasive use of violence has also contributed to an erosion of social cohesion¹⁰. Volatile security situations in neighboring countries (Burundi, CAR, and South Sudan), and the presence of foreign armed groups further increase tension and risk of conflict and violence.

Figure 1: Conflict-related fatalities in DRC, by conflict and over time, 1997-2020



Source: World Bank based on ACLED data (January 2022)

28. **The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) is the largest United Nations (UN) mission globally, with about 16,000 personnel and an annual budget of around US\$1 billion.** In December 2020, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2556, extending the mandate of MONUSCO for a 12-month period, reaffirming MONUSCO’s strategic priorities for the coming year to protect civilians and provide support to stabilization and the strengthening of state institutions. MONUSCO is further mandated to work with international partners on reconciliation, democratization, and addressing the root causes of conflict. Despite its extension for 2022, MONUSCO is preparing for a gradual exit from DRC, though it is expected there will be MONUSCO presence in the three eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu throughout the CPF period.

29. **DRC is home to many refugees and internally displaced people (IDP).** It accounts for 12.1 percent

⁷ “Voices from Congo”, Report 13, March 2018.

⁸ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data.

⁹ The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), January 2022.

¹⁰ World Bank, 2021: RRA.

of IDPs globally, with 5.2 million people displaced¹¹. Following the 2016-17 Kasai crisis, the number of Congolese refugees in neighboring countries almost doubled—to reach close to 900,000 today. DRC also hosts about 535,000 refugees from other countries¹². This increasingly large number of refugees puts additional strains on already fragile host communities, where all refugees are in need of humanitarian assistance¹³. Refugees are concentrated in remote and insecure border areas and comprise a large share of the local population.

30. **The risk of violence may be especially pronounced in the run-up to the 2023 Presidential elections.** Historically, political tension has spilled over into violence in the capital Kinshasa and its surroundings. The risk of violence is aggravated by joblessness, political manipulation, and limited access to factual and transparent information. Eastern DRC is affected by ongoing conflict and violence and is marked by an increasingly politicized and fragmented security landscape. Recent post-conflict areas such as the Grand Kasai are at risk of a recurring violence due to the pressures of underlying conflict drivers.

Box 1: Drivers of fragility identified in the 2021 DRC Risk and Resilience Assessment

The 2021 RRA identifies six drivers of fragility, along three themes:

Governance: Driver 1: A governance system under the control of a small group of political elites undermines the potential for a social contract between the state and its citizens. Driver 2: A non-diversified economy tied to mineral wealth is kept in place by renegotiated political settlements based on competition for natural resource capture.

People: Driver 3: An increasingly young population trapped in poverty, exclusion, and trauma are excluded from economic opportunity and social mobility. Driver 4: A legacy of trauma from armed conflict has resulted in a normalization and commodification of the use of violence, including SGBV, that has eroded social cohesion.

Conflict: Driver 5: DRC deals with numerous local conflicts, and the fragmentation is exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems. Driver 6: DRC is inextricable from international conflict systems. Historically, other countries have exploited Congolese territory to fight proxy battles for political and financial gain, including through competition for access to land, minerals, and other natural resources.

31. **DRC is experiencing one of the gravest humanitarian crises in the world¹⁴.** The crisis is complex, multidimensional, and prolonged—with recurrent conflict, forced displacement, health epidemics, natural disasters, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. According to the UN, the estimated number of people in need of assistance is 21.8 million (December 2020), including 13.9 million with acute needs¹⁵. The most recent food security assessment estimated 27.3 million people as food insecure¹⁶. Additionally, 3.7 million people suffer from moderate acute malnutrition and another one million children are subject to severe acute malnutrition¹⁷. Cyclical epidemics and persistent diseases have overwhelmed a weak

¹¹ 2020 DRC Humanitarian Response Plan.

¹² The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Operational Update: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88229>.

¹³ OCHA (2020). *Democratic Republic of Congo, Strategic Response Plan*.

¹⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/casualties-conflict-7-urgent-humanitarian-crises-2020-early-warning-forecast>.

¹⁵ https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_2021-final_0.pdf.

¹⁶ <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1154108/?iso3=COD>.

¹⁷ <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1154108/?iso3=COD>.

health system while contributing to low life expectancy. There have been 13 Ebola outbreaks in the past forty years, five in the past three years. Significant developments in the prevention and treatment of the Ebola virus disease have recently been made with two licensed vaccines and two approved drugs for treatment.

32. **The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic puts further stress on the health system and has widespread impacts on DRC communities.** These impacts are underscored as DRC has the lowest epidemic preparedness index in SSA¹⁸. The first COVID-19 case in DRC was confirmed on March 10, 2020, in the province of Kinshasa. As of January 18, 2022, there were 82,306 confirmed cases and 1,225 fatalities—the majority of which have been in Kinshasa. Given the poverty and vulnerability of the Congolese people, COVID-19 poses the risk of increased tension that might escalate into violence. Congolese women and girls have been disproportionately affected by health impacts, socioeconomic impacts of containment measures, and from the increased risks of GBV, including risks of SEA and early marriage¹⁹. Vaccine rollout has been hampered by vaccine hesitancy and access issues.

2.2 Recent Economic Developments and Outlook

33. **DRC has been unable to convert its ample natural and human resources into sustainable economic growth and shared prosperity.** Due to abundant and diverse natural resources, a strategic location at the center of Africa, and a large and young population, DRC has considerable economic potential. However, the legacy of colonization, the lack of good governance, weak fiscal institutions, mismanagement of natural resources, and protracted conflict and violence have all contributed to limited progress in building human capital and infrastructure and resulted in economic underperformance and high levels of poverty.

34. **Economic growth in DRC is expected to rebound to 3.6 percent in 2021 despite pandemic-related uncertainties.** In 2020, the economy grew by 1.7 percent, despite the global slowdown, the impact of mobility restrictions to contain the pandemic on non-mining sectors, and lower government spending. With favorable global commodity prices and demand, the current account deficit shrank while consolidation efforts narrowed the fiscal deficit. Growth prospects for 2022 are favorable and poverty is expected to decline slightly. However, uncertainty around the pandemic and fears of further political instability continue to weigh on medium-term prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction.

35. **DRC relies heavily on extractives as a key driver of economic growth.** Copper and cobalt account for more than 80 percent of exports²⁰. This exposes the country to volatile global commodity prices and demand. The end of the wars in 2003 and reengagement of the international community, which also coincided with a recovery of mineral and metal prices globally, led to an expanding economy²¹, with GDP growth averaging six percent per year between 2003-2007. The channeling of private investments to extractive sectors, as well as poor sector governance, resulted in limited conversion of resource rents into productive public spending. In turn, this constrained diversification, and reinforced commodity dependence. Limited diversification led to continued growth volatility.

36. **Weak economic growth combined with fast population growth have led to a decline in per capita income and wealth, and persistently high poverty rates.** The population of DRC grew on average

¹⁸ World Bank: Africa's Pulse April 2020

¹⁹ CASS: The impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak response on women and girls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and REACH, *Indicateurs pertinents pour la réponse au COVID-19*.

²⁰ The balance of payment data/reports of the Central Bank of Congo (*Rapport de la Balance des Paiements et de la Position Extérieure Globale, Banque Central du Congo*).

²¹ GDP growth averaged 4.7 percent for 2001-2010 and 5.7 percent for 2011-2020.

three percent annually from 1961 to 2020. Consequently, GDP per capita in 2020 had deteriorated by 60 percent compared to its 1960 level—from around US\$1,000 in the 1960s to US\$414 in 2020. Growth has also been increasingly unsustainable, leading to persistently high poverty rates: between 2012 and 2020, there was only a slight decrease in the poverty rate—from 77.2 percent to 73.3 percent²² (using the international poverty line of US\$1.90) (see Section 2.3).

37. **A vulnerable macroeconomic framework combined with mismanagement of natural resource sectors and continued delays in key economic reforms have contributed to volatile growth performance.** Fiscal management continues to be a challenge, with inefficient budget allocations and the use of emergency procedures in budget execution and low domestic revenue mobilization. All of this has translated into insufficient productive expenditure and recurrent fiscal deficits. Efforts to reach fiscal consolidation were undertaken in 2017-2018²³ but were not successful. The fiscal position deteriorated further in 2020 with the pandemic. Revenues, already weak before COVID-19, declined further in 2020 to 9.8 percent of GDP, of which domestic revenue mobilization is estimated at only 8.7 percent of GDP. Expenditures in health and social protection increased²⁴, but lower revenues constrained total expenditures, which were cut from 12.9 percent of GDP in 2019 to 11.9 percent of GDP in 2020, with additional accumulation of arrears.

38. **DRC has maintained low levels of debt since receiving Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, and the risk of external debt distress is moderate.** External debt has remained among the lowest in SSA since the country's completion of the enhanced HIPC initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in July 2010. Overall public debt increased from 15.5 percent of GDP in 2015 to 22 percent in 2020²⁵ (with external debt representing 14.4 percent of GDP in 2020). The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)²⁶ assessed the country as facing a moderate risk of debt distress. Debt is expected to decline to 17.1 percent by 2030 as DRC limits non-concessional borrowing and domestic debt markets remain limited. Debt vulnerabilities are linked to the low level of revenues and exposure to external shocks related to the country's dependence on price-volatile mining exports.

39. **DRC's tax revenue base is narrow and does not allow the government to mobilize the revenues needed to finance operations and deliver basic public services.** Domestic revenues have stood at around 10 percent of GDP since 2016, one of the lowest in SSA, in contrast with DRC's large natural resource base. The tax-to-GDP ratio declined in 2020 (6.2 percent) and was lower than the average of 30 African countries in Revenue Statistics in Africa by 2020 (16.5 percent)²⁷.

40. **Better management of mining resources and revenues requires reduction of revenue losses with increased transparency.** The extractives industry is the principal driver of growth, yet revenues from the sector are considerably lower than what could be expected, with only a small proportion of taxes and royalties being collected. According to Global Witness, the State lost more than US\$750 million in mining revenues due to corruption during 2013-15²⁸.

²² World Bank, 2021: *Macro Poverty Outlook, Spring Meetings*, April 2021.

²³ Strict budgetary discipline led to overall fiscal surpluses in 2017 and 2018.

²⁴ In addition, education expenditures also increased markedly, due to the implementation of the free primary schooling policy.

²⁵ At end-2020, about half of the external public debt was owed to official creditors (33 percent to multilateral creditors and 19 percent to bilateral official creditors), and domestic debt, composed essentially of legacy arrears, is about one third of total public debt.

²⁶ Finalized in June 2021.

²⁷ <https://www.oecd.org/countries/democraticrepublicofthecongo/revenue-statistics-africa-congo-dem-rep.pdf>

²⁸ <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/democratic-republic-congo/regime-cash-machine/>

41. **Medium-term growth prospects are favorable as the non-extractive sectors begin to recover, and global demand for commodities remains robust.** Long-term prospects depend on deeper economic and governance reforms to diversify and support a more resilient and inclusive economy. GDP is expected to rebound in 2021 and 2022, growing at anticipated rates of 3.6 and 4.8 percent respectively²⁹, assuming a gradual recovery in global demand. Favorable commodity prices, particularly for copper and cobalt, would boost economic output and domestic revenues. Expansion of transportation and other services (such as telecommunications), along with increased agricultural production, would also support medium-term GDP growth, which is expected to reach five percent by 2023. Immediate reforms are critical to stability, which requires better revenue mobilization through tax policy to prevent further arrears or deficit monetization. Diversifying DRC's economy will be critical to reduce its vulnerability to commodity price movements and dependency on the growth performance of major trading partners, as well as to create jobs and more economic opportunities.

Table 1: DRC key macroeconomic indicators³⁰

SELECTED INDICATORS	2018	2019	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f
REAL SECTOR						
Real GDP per capita growth (annual %, real)	2.4	1.1	-1.4	0.4	1.5	1.9
GDP growth (annual %)	5.8	4.4	1.7	3.6	4.8	5.1
Agriculture	1.5	2.8	1.9	2.8	3.2	3.2
Industry	12.1	6.8	4.4	5.1	6.4	4.4
Services	1.3	2.1	-1.6	2.2	3.7	7.1
Inflation (annual %, period average)	30.6	4.7	11.2	10.5	7.0	5.0
FISCAL						
Domestic Revenue (% of GDP)	10.0	10.1	8.7	10.4	11.4	12.4
Grants (% of GDP)	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8
Expenditure (% of GDP)	11.0	12.9	11.9	13.1	13.5	14.3
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	0.1	-2.0	-2.1	-1.7	-1.2	-1.1
General Government Debt (% of GDP)	20.2	21.1	22.0	20.6	20.5	20.4
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS						
Export growth, f.o.b (nominal US\$, annual %)	37.2	-17.4	4.1	46.4	7.8	7.1
Import growth, c.i.f (nominal US\$, annual %)	31.0	-13.6	-8.7	53.8	7.2	7.3
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-3.6	-3.2	-2.3	-2.0	-1.8	-1.6
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	3.0	2.7	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.7
Official reserves (weeks of imports)	2.5	3.0	1.9	3.4	4.6	5.3
OTHER INDICATORS						
GDP (current LCU, million)	75,086	80,722	89,154	106,250	121,619	136,456
GDP (current US\$, million)	45,784	48,923	47,817	52,764	56,940	60,472
Population, total (million)	84.0	86.7	89.5	92.3	95.3	98.3

Source: World Bank, October 2021

²⁹ World Bank, October 2021: MPO

³⁰ Table abbreviations: LCU: Local Currency Unit; f.o.b.: free on-board price; c.i.f: cost, insurance, and freight

2.3 Poverty and Shared Prosperity

42. **DRC has the third largest population of poor globally and poverty remains pervasive.** While the poverty rate declined from 94.3 to 77.2 percent between 2005 and 2012 (using the international poverty line of US\$1.90), the latest World Bank projections put poverty at 73.3 percent (2020)³¹, an increase of 0.7 percentage points compared to 2019³². This recent increase is primarily due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has led to a decline in labor and non-labor income, interferences in goods and service markets, and disruptions in public services. COVID-19 and its associated impacts will likely also lead to an increase in inequality and in household vulnerability to shocks.

43. **With high population growth and subdued economic growth, the number of poor is increasing.** While the poverty rate has declined since 2005, the number of poor has increased—by about 1.5 million every year. With a population growth rate of more than 3 percent and a fertility rate of 6.2 children per woman³³, recent economic growth has not been sufficient to reduce poverty. Sixty million Congolese live in extreme poverty, which equals about 14 percent of the people living in extreme poverty in SSA³⁴. If this trend continues, DRC will, by 2030, have the second largest population of poor globally, after Nigeria³⁵.

44. **There are significant spatial disparities in poverty and the areas with the highest poverty rates do not have the highest number of poor.** The highest poverty rates in DRC are found in the central and northwestern provinces largely covered by forest (see Figure 2). These are provinces with low population density, highly limited infrastructure and access, weak service provision, and few economic opportunities³⁶ (see Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Section VI - Maps). The highest number of poor, however, are found in the provinces along the east-west corridor (Kongo Central to Haut-Katanga), including Kinshasa, and in the east bordering the Great Lakes (Ituri, North and South Kivu)³⁷. These provinces are the areas most affected by conflict and violence (see paragraph 92) but benefit from a higher concentration of productive infrastructure than elsewhere in the country (see Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Section VI - Maps). While all poverty indicators have improved in the northeastern provinces (North Kivu and the former Orientale province, which includes Bas Uele, Haut Uele, Ituri and Tshopo), the poverty gap and incidence has worsened in the Grand Kasai, and Maniema provinces: over 57 percent of the new poor from 2005 to 2012 were in the Grand Kasai area (Lomami, Sankuru, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental, Kasai) (see Figure 2)³⁸.

Figure 2: Poverty in DRC - poverty density (number of poor, in million) (left) and poverty rate (%) (right), per province (2017 estimated)

³¹ World Bank, 2021: *MPO*, October 2021.

³² World Bank, 2021: *MPO*, October 2021.

³³ *Institut National des Statistiques (INS), Enquête par grappes à indicateurs multiples, 2017-2018, rapport de résultats de l'enquête. Kinshasa, République Démocratique du Congo.*


³⁴ World Bank, 2018: *DRC Country Diagnostic: Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State*, Report No. 112733-ZR, March.

³⁵ World Data Lab Projections, 2021.

³⁶ Referred to as “lagging areas” in the World Development Report 2009: *Reshaping Economic Geography* (World Bank, 2009). “A lagging area is usually a remote part of the country with one or more of the following features: high poverty, low productivity and income, high unemployment, and stagnant growth...”

³⁷ Referred to as “leading areas” in the World Development Report 2009: *Reshaping Economic Geography*.

³⁸ World Bank (2018): *Democratic Republic of Congo Systematic Country Diagnostic: Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State*, Report No 112733-ZR.



45. **Kinshasa—the fast-growing capital city of around 15 million inhabitants—is home to about nine million poor citizens.** According to the national poverty rate³⁹, 17 percent of the new poor in DRC between 2005 and 2012 lived in Kinshasa. Poverty increased even further in the capital between 2012 and 2018—from 52.8 to 64.8 percent respectively (estimate), largely due to high inflation that led to a loss of purchasing power⁴⁰. This increase in poverty was coupled with an increase in inequality, the Gini index rising from 32.4 to 40.2 percent over the same period⁴¹. The effects of the pandemic are acute in Kinshasa, where most of DRC’s COVID-19 cases have been reported. There has been a significant rise in prices following the outbreak of the pandemic⁴². The level of unemployment is 39 percent⁴³, and 40 percent of young *Kinois* (Kinshasans) are jobless and out of school, suggesting high levels of youth disenfranchisement⁴⁴.

46. **There is a strong link between poverty and climate change in DRC.** Climate-related shocks, including floods, droughts, and related diseases such as malaria, cholera, measles, and Ebola outbreaks, are expected to increase in frequency and intensity over time⁴⁵. The poor and vulnerable will be more exposed to these impacts, with increased risk that more people fall into poverty. Rising food prices due to reduced agricultural yields resulting from climate change are expected to be a key driver of poverty⁴⁶.

³⁹ The national 2012 poverty line was FC 793,388 per annum for Kinshasa. Updating the 2012 poverty line based on inflation, the national 2018 poverty line was estimated at FC 1,396,363 per annum (World Bank, 2020, Monetary Poverty and Shared Prosperity in Kinshasa).

⁴⁰ World Bank (2020): Monetary Poverty and Shared Prosperity in Kinshasa, Washington DC.

⁴¹ World Bank (2020): Monetary Poverty and Shared Prosperity in Kinshasa, Washington, DC.

⁴² World Bank simulations based on the 2018 Kinshasa household survey.

⁴³ National Institute of Statistics (2014): *Enquête 1-2-3*.

⁴⁴ World Bank (2020): Profiling Living Conditions of DRC Urban Population: Access to Housing and Services in Kinshasa Province. The rates of NEET (not in employment, education, or training) are considered a good indicator of societal disfunction.

⁴⁵ <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/congo-democratic-republic/vulnerability>.

⁴⁶ <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/706751601388457990/pdf/Revised-Estimates-of-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Extreme-Poverty-by-2030.pdf>.

2.4 Development Agenda

47. **The 2018 WBG SCD provides a holistic overview of development challenges and opportunities in DRC.** The SCD argues that political instability, weak state institutions, elite capture, and predation have led to persistent poverty, despite DRC's remarkable natural resource wealth. It states that political instability has impeded the emergence of stable and accountable governing coalitions, which, in turn, has prevented the establishment of inclusive and strong institutions that work for the development of the nation. The diagnostic is a response to the lack of oversight and enforcement of and by government officials, weak coordination of public policies, and a lack of coordination among and with partners. More inclusive institutions should be a top priority.

48. **The SCD identifies five interrelated thematic areas in which interventions may deliver impactful development results:** (i) strengthen the resilience of the macroeconomic framework (see macroeconomic section 2.2); (ii) build inclusive institutions and strengthen governance (see context section 2.1); (iii) leverage natural resources and develop infrastructure and agriculture; (iv) build human capital and demographic dividends; and (v) leverage the resources and potential of the private sector.

Need to leverage natural resources

49. **DRC has the second largest tropical forest and carbon sink globally, sequestering the equivalent of three years of the world's energy-related carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.** About 67 percent of the country is covered by forests, including 145 million hectares of rainforests, storing the equivalent of 85 billion tons of CO₂⁴⁷ (global fossil CO₂ emissions totaled 38 billion tons in 2020⁴⁸). However, forest loss has accelerated in recent years (see Figure 6). In 2020, DRC lost 1.31 million hectares of natural forest, equivalent to 854 million tons of CO₂ of emissions, representing more than France's total carbon footprint, in 2019 (663 million tons of CO₂⁴⁹). Population growth, exploitation of natural resources, infrastructure development, and agriculture put significant pressure on the forest. Forest loss also puts tremendous pressure on the country's network of protected areas, which cover about 11 percent of the national territory⁵⁰. This loss has a significant adverse impact on rainfall patterns, water quality, and food security—in DRC and the wider Congo Basin. It is exacerbating climate change and presents a threat to biodiversity.

50. **DRC has 52 percent of all freshwater resources and 23 percent of internal renewable water resources in SSA⁵¹.** Internal renewable freshwater resources per capita are estimated at 12,213 m³/person (2017)⁵², significantly above the internationally recognized water sufficiency limit of 1,700 m³/person/year. Despite these considerable resources, current basic water supply access is estimated at 34 percent of households nationally—52 percent in urban areas and 19 percent in rural areas⁵³.

51. **DRC has 80 million hectares of arable and fertile non-forest land, of which only 10 percent is**

⁴⁷ Xu, L., Saatchi, S.S., Shapiro, A. et al. [Spatial Distribution of Carbon Stored in Forests of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sci Rep 7, 15030 \(2017\).](#)

⁴⁸ Crippa, M., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Solazzo, E., Monforti-Ferrario, F., Olivier, J.G.J., Vignati, E., Fossil CO₂ emissions of all world countries - 2020 Report, EUR 30358 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-21515-8, doi:10.2760/143674, JRC121460.

⁴⁹ Data Lab, *Commissariat Général au Développement Durable* (General Commission for Sustainable Development), January 2020.

⁵⁰ World Wildlife Fund: [https://www.wwf-](https://www.wwf-congobasin.org/where_we_work/democratic_republic_of_congo/protected_area_programme/)

[congobasin.org/where_we_work/democratic_republic_of_congo/protected_area_programme/](https://www.wwf-congobasin.org/where_we_work/democratic_republic_of_congo/protected_area_programme/)

⁵¹ Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGO) 2015. *Country Strategy Note: Democratic Republic of Congo.*

⁵² <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/#geography>.

⁵³ UNICEF: MICS survey 2017-2018 for the Democratic Republic of Congo.

under cultivation⁵⁴. There are about 16 million Congolese farmers, with an average landholding of 1.6 ha. The agriculture sector⁵⁵ accounts for about 20 percent of GDP and employs some 70 to 75 percent of the economically active population⁵⁶. Related agro-industries employ another 10 percent of the population. Rural households (accounting for 55 percent of DRC's total population) derive more than 80 percent of their income from agriculture. Jobs in agriculture tend to be informal, with low per worker value added (US\$338/year⁵⁷). Subsistence farming is dominant across DRC. Agriculture productivity has declined relative to neighboring countries, with cereal productivity at about 50 percent of the SSA average. This is mainly due to underinvestment at the farm-level—caused, in part, by insecurity and displacement, weak governance of public goods and services, and little market access.

52. **DRC has unparalleled mining resources, with vast deposits of copper, cobalt, zinc, iron, and uranium (south); diamonds (west); and gold (north)** (see Figure 7). DRC's diamond reserves, estimated at around 150 million carats, are the second largest in the world⁵⁸. The copper reserves of Katanga, in the South, harbor some of the world's highest-grade copper deposits globally. Estimated at 70 million tons, these reserves are also the second largest globally⁵⁹, and DRC represents the fifth largest copper producer worldwide. Eastern DRC is dominated by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operators that feed illegal mineral supply chains and are associated with conflict (see Figure 8). Significant social issues are also associated with artisanal mining⁶⁰, including Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) measures.

53. **DRC holds about 50 percent of the world's cobalt reserves**⁶¹. It is a leading actor in the provision of new strategic minerals needed for technology, including electronics and rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, which are critical to decarbonize energy and transport. DRC is the largest producer of cobalt, providing an estimated 70 percent of global production. However, as highlighted in a 2021 World Bank DRC Cobalt Market Analysis, there is international alarm over reports of human rights abuses and exploitation of artisanal miners, including child laborers. In parallel, environmental liabilities associated with the sector are growing and are significantly understated by SOEs⁶². These practices could devalue the country's cobalt resources, turning DRC into a supplier of last resort.

Develop productive infrastructure

54. **Lack of mobility and accessibility are major issues across DRC's vast territory, and infrastructure gaps deepen the lack of government presence and provision of services.** Weak infrastructure and high transport costs isolate entire regions, particularly provinces with high forest cover, shutting them off from domestic, regional, and global markets, perpetuating weak service provision, poverty, and fragility. This is reflected in the 2019 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, where DRC ranked 140 out of 141 countries.

55. **DRC's multi-modal transport system, which is interlinked with neighboring countries, has collapsed.** Rail and road networks were mostly developed in connection with and to complement the river

⁵⁴ NRGO 2015. Country Strategy Note: Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁵⁵ Throughout this document, agriculture refers to crop, livestock, and fisheries.

⁵⁶ World Bank (2017): DRC Agriculture Sector Review.

⁵⁷ World Bank World Development Indicators (data for 2014).

⁵⁸ British Geological Survey 2014 – 2018, February 2020.

⁵⁹ British Geological Survey 2014 – 2018, February 2020.

⁶⁰ The World Bank estimates that for each miner directly involved in artisanal mining, four to five persons indirectly rely on the sector. Consequently, artisanal mining contributed to the livelihoods of eight to ten million people in 2008, representing up to 16 percent of the Congolese population. World Bank (2021). DRC Mining Sector Update.

⁶¹ <https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2021/mcs2021-cobalt.pdf>

⁶² World Bank (2021). DRC Mining Sector Update.

network with logistics platforms at points of contact between rivers, roads, and rail. Waterways constituted the backbone of the transport system in DRC, with a navigable network of more than 25,000 km (see Figure 9). Weak governance in transport SOEs, deteriorating infrastructure, and the absence of multi-country transport strategies have prevented the development of a vibrant waterway transport system and resulted in a lack of safety for the transport of people, goods, and services⁶³. While DRC has one of the most extensive rail networks in Africa, with close to 3,500 km of rails in the south, connected with Zambia and Angola, and 400 km between Matadi and Kinshasa (west), the railways are in a state of disrepair, suffering from dilapidated infrastructure, weak management, and high operational costs.

56. **With the collapse of water and rail, road transport accounts for more than 90 percent of freight transport in the country.** DRC's road network (national and provincial roads) is, about 58,000 km⁶⁴, but does not connect the east to the west (see Figure 9). Most of this network is either in bad condition, or impassable - only 5 percent (2,915 km) of these roads are paved, with about 14 percent in good condition (8,360 km). National and provincial roads are complemented by about 87,000 km of local roads, many in poor condition, leaving large parts of the country isolated.

57. **Because of the country's size and lack of an interconnected transport network, air transport is the only effective mode to travel long distances.** There are 54 airports in DRC, of which five are international (see Figure 9). However, deteriorating infrastructure and lack or non-compliance with safety standards have recently taken a toll, resulting in a high rate of aircraft accidents.

58. **DRC's unique hydropower resources—estimated at about 100 GW—have the potential to provide large-scale and flexible renewable energy at a highly competitive cost.** The development of these resources, however, has so far been limited (see Figure 10). The Inga Falls alone has a potential capacity of 44 GW and could produce some of the least costly hydroelectricity in the world, at US\$2 cents/kWh (see Box 4). Despite this immense potential, the overall electricity access rate in DRC is a mere 19 percent,⁶⁵ making DRC the third largest population globally without access to electricity. There are, however, wide geographic disparities in access: while only 1 percent of rural dwellers have access to electricity, access in urban areas, such as Kinshasa, is as high as 45 percent⁶⁶.

59. **The generation capacity of the *Société Nationale d'Electricité* (the National Electricity Company, SNEL), which relies primarily on hydropower generation, did not significantly increase between 1990 and 2017.** A gradual deterioration of facilities has decreased available generation to 1,586 MW, 56 percent of installed capacity⁶⁷, which is less than 2 percent of the total hydropower potential. In parallel, the economy is becoming more energy intensive. As a result, there is an unmet electricity demand estimated at 5,000 GW hours (2018)⁶⁸ or 2 GW of generation capacity. There have been significant investments in energy distribution and transmission, the total high-voltage (HV) grid length increasing by 23 percent between 2012 and 2017. However, the grid has mainly developed along an HV transport line between Inga (southwest) and the Kolwezi mining region (southeast) and in eastern DRC along the GLR, leaving large parts of the country underserved. DRC's vast land areas with high-quality solar resources are becoming more competitive, and harbor significant potential for further electrification. In recent years, private initiatives for solar home systems or solar mini-grids have boomed in Eastern DRC, contributing to a significant increase in household access to electricity in the Kivus.

⁶³ <https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/darkened-waterway-tragedy-unfolds/>

⁶⁴ World Bank Group (2020): CPSD.

⁶⁵ World Bank, 2020: Increasing access to electricity in DRC – opportunities and challenges.

⁶⁶ Government of DRC.

⁶⁷ World Bank, 2020: Increasing access to electricity in the DRC – opportunities and challenges.

⁶⁸ World Bank, 2020: Increasing access to electricity in the DRC – opportunities and challenges.

60. **The DRC telecommunications sector suffers from lack of investment in physical infrastructure, with limited private sector investment to date.** DRC's mobile phone penetration and mobile internet penetration rates, at 43 and 22 percent respectively, are among the lowest in the region. In relative terms, DRC is the most expensive country for mobile data in Africa, with 1GB costing an average of US\$10.71, or 26 percent of the average monthly income in DRC in 2019. Mobile internet remains the preferred way to access broadband services, but it is constrained by low coverage rates for 3G (64 percent) and 4G (18 percent) services, as well as low mobile phone penetration rates⁶⁹. While a 1,700 km fiber optic network between Kinshasa and Kasumbalesa is operated through a PPP by Airtel, Vodacom, and Liquid (see Figure 11), private sector participation is limited. The recent publication (October 2021) of the 2018 Telecommunications Law in the official Gazette, however, establishes the legal framework for full liberalization of telecommunications—a long-awaited reform to help open the sector and attract needed private investment. This will also help accelerate key aspects of the connectivity value chain.

Build human capital and benefit from the demographic dividend

61. **DRC has little access to quality human development services, and human capital development has stagnated over the past three decades.** DRC's 2020 Human Capital Index (HCI) score was 0.37—below the 0.40 average for SSA—meaning that a Congolese child born today can expect to achieve only 37 percent of her potential, compared to what would have been possible had the child benefited from full, quality schooling experience and optimal health conditions⁷⁰. Stunting is high—at 42 percent among children under five⁷¹—and has remained stable from 2000 to 2020. While the HCI for girls is the same as the HCI for boys, there are gender-based differences and wide disparities within the country. The adolescent fertility rate, at 123 births per 1,000 women ages 15-19, is significantly higher than the 2023 Africa Human Capital Target of 83 births per 1,000 women⁷².

62. **DRC's education system is in crisis, underscored by poor environments in schools, a lack of teacher effectiveness, and low learning outcomes.** Furthermore, there are significant differences in accessing education across the territory. Low levels of learning in schools, coupled with the fact that 28 percent of the adult population has no formal education⁷³, translates into an unskilled labor force.

63. **School infrastructure is poor and disproportionately impacts girls.** Many schools lack safe sanitation facilities and running water. Only 30 percent of second graders in DRC have a reading textbook and 83 percent of primary school teachers have no more than a secondary degree. Prior to the implementation of the free primary education policy (2019-20), 4.9 million primary school-aged children were not enrolled in school⁷⁴. COVID-19 related school closings have led to further learning loss and pushed some children out of the education system.

64. **DRC's epidemiological profile, coupled by geographical and environmental diversity, raises alarm about health outcomes.** There is a life expectancy of 60 years (2017), and the leading causes of death—the same over the past decade—are malaria, lower respiratory infections, neonatal disorders, and tuberculosis (2017)⁷⁵. Infant and maternal mortality rates remain high; one in ten children die before the age of five. Malnutrition is the underlying cause of almost half of the deaths of children under the age of five and a 2019 infant mortality rate of 66.1 deaths per 1,000 live births is significantly higher than the

⁶⁹ World Bank, 2020: DRC Digital Economy Assessment.

⁷⁰ https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/hci/HCI_2pager_COD.pdf?cid=GGH_e_hcpexternal_en_ext.

⁷¹ INS, 2017-18.

⁷² World Bank HCI, 2020.

⁷³ Service Delivery Indicator Survey, 2019.

⁷⁴ Service Delivery Indicator Survey, 2019.

⁷⁵ IHME. 2020. Democratic Republic of Congo - <http://www.healthdata.org/democratic-republic-congo>.

SSA average of 51.7⁷⁶. About 5.6 million children under the age of five are stunted⁷⁷ and this has not improved over the past twenty years (stunting remains around 40 to 44 percent of children). Moreover, due to high population growth, the number of stunted children is increasing.

65. **DRC's immunization framework and system are weak.** Routine vaccination rates are currently at 53 percent⁷⁸—up from 30 percent three years ago—with an objective of reaching 80 percent by 2024 (based on the Government's Mashako plan⁷⁹). The government is facing challenges in delivering its nationwide COVID-19 vaccine program, with significant systemic issues compounded by strong vaccine hesitancy (a vaccination rate of 0.33 percent, January 18, 2022). The establishment of a sustainable system to deliver routine immunizations will be critical to building the country's human capital.

66. **Lack of sanitation contributes to poor health outcomes and poses a challenge in containing infectious disease outbreaks.** A mere 14 percent of the population has access to improved sanitation services (20 and 9 percent in urban and rural households respectively), and 18 percent of rural households still practice open defecation⁸⁰. Current basic water supply access is estimated at 34 percent of households nationally—52 percent in urban areas and 19 percent in rural areas⁸¹, and poor water quality continues to be a challenge across the country. Access to basic hygiene is also low, where 22 percent of households have access to basic hygiene services (30 percent urban and 15 percent rural)⁸².

67. **Social protection structures put in place following the war did not target the poor and vulnerable; they were used to support civil service reform and SOE restructuring (financing retirement and retrenchment efforts) and to compensate ex-combatants.** Protection coverage is estimated at 10 percent (2020), against the SSA average of 30 percent. While 73 percent of the working age population is living on less than US\$1.90/day, a mere 1.9 percent of the poor is covered by a Social Safety Net (SSN) Program⁸³.

68. **DRC has some of the largest gender gaps in the world.** The country ranks 151 out of 156 countries in the WEF's 2021 Global Gender Gap Index and 175th out of 178 countries in the 2021 UN Gender Inequality Index. Congolese women face significant barriers to economic opportunities and empowerment. There are substantial gender disparities in access to secondary education and above, where only 16.8 percent of women have completed secondary school—about half of the rate of completion for men. Women's labor force participation rate in DRC is estimated at almost 62 percent, most of whom work in agricultural production (about 70 percent), though women earn considerably less than men and own fewer assets. A 2021 DRC Gender Diagnostic Report⁸⁴ identifies three key constraints to persistent and significant gender gaps in DRC, namely control over land; voice and agency; and risk and uncertainty.

⁷⁶ October 2021 MPO.

⁷⁷ DRC DHS, 2014.

⁷⁸ *Enquête de couverture vaccinale chez les enfants âgés de 6 mois à 23 mois en République Démocratique du Congo, 2020. Ecole de Santé Publique de Kinshasa.* (Immunization coverage survey among children aged 6 months to 23 months in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2020. Kinshasa School of Public Health).

⁷⁹ The Mashako Plan, named for the late DRC Minister of Health, Professor Leonard Mashako Mamba, also known as the Emergency Plan for Revitalization of Routine Immunizations was created in 2018, as a direct response to the issue of low immunizations rates in DRC.

⁸⁰ INS, 2017-18.

⁸¹ UNICEF: Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.

⁸² INS, 2017-18.

⁸³ ASPIRE database: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire>.

⁸⁴ World Bank, 2021: DRC Gender Diagnostic Report.

69. **DRC's FCV context exacerbates gender gaps and contributes to continually high rates of GBV.** GBV is a pervasive and societal issue, which goes beyond the well-publicized, conflict-related sexual violence in the East. According to the 2013–14 Data Household Survey (DHS), 52 percent of Congolese women and girls have experienced physical violence, and 27 percent of women reported they had been victim to physical violence over the past 12 months. Most often the violence is at the hands of their husband/partner or a male family member, but frequently can be victim to teachers and police, soldiers, or armed groups. One percent reported that the perpetrator was a teacher. The profound shortage of female teachers—only 29 percent of primary and 10 percent of secondary school teachers are women—contributes to this situation.

70. **Social misconceptions that violence against women and girls is acceptable and societal norms preventing accountability have contributed to a surge in Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), where rates of conflict related SGBV correlate with the prevalence of conflict.**⁸⁵ During the wars, there were unprecedented levels of violence towards women, which is still used as a weapon of conflict.

Leverage the potential of the private sector

71. **DRC has one of the most challenging business environments in Africa and globally.** Limited infrastructure in energy, information and communications technology (ICT), and transportation, coupled with weak governance and a lack of regulation impede private sector development. There is low integration into national markets and value chains, and the country suffers from fragmentation of the internal market. Private investment remains low, with non-government investment estimated at 8.9 percent of 2020 GDP⁸⁶. High levels of informality hold back productivity, competitiveness, and job creation. See Box 2 for the main conclusions from the 2020 WBG CPSP, which examined the private sector within the economy, identified policy and sector issues, and provided options for growth and private sector development.

Box 2: Conclusions from the 2020 WBG Country Private Sector Diagnostic

The CPSP recommends three mutually reinforcing pillars for private sector development in DRC: (i) improve the management of high potential sectors based on sustainable exploitation of natural resources (mining, agribusiness and forestry); (ii) promote the participation of the private sector in “structuring sectors” (infrastructure, finance, and human capital); and (iii) improve governance and the business environment (good governance in policy formulation, taxation, commercial justice, and property rights, SOEs and PPPs). The CPSP identified the vast hydro-power potential and the mining sector as holding significant opportunities for development, together with untapped potential in the ICT sector, mainly linked to entrepreneurship.

72. **The Congolese private sector is comprised of extractive industries dominated by foreign investors and SOEs, low productivity agriculture, a small formal private sector, and many informal MSMEs - employing 89 percent of the working population.** Although DRC has attracted significant Foreign Direct Investment in extractive industries, there has been limited technology and productivity spillover. Among systemic constraints that limit Small- and Medium Enterprises (SME) growth and market access are access to finance, poor quality and high cost of inputs; lack of infrastructure; and unfair competition.

73. **SOEs control key economic sectors (ports, airports, railway, energy, water, mining, and**

⁸⁵ The Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (2019).

⁸⁶ IMF Country Report No. 21/168.

telecom), but weak governance and performance constrain growth. These SOEs are the largest formal employers in the economy. According to official estimates, the public enterprise portfolio had a book value of US\$16.5 billion at the end of 2016 (no data available since then)⁸⁷. Many SOEs suffer from operational issues, including low tariffs, technical and commercial loss, and overstaffing and are constrained by weak capacity. Longstanding efforts to strengthen management, governance, and efficiency of SOEs—including through the introduction of performance-based contracts, technical and financial audits—have not been successful.

74. **Challenges in the financial sector increase vulnerability to shocks,** with banking assets representing just 14 percent of GDP in 2018. Domestic credit to the private sector is only 7.5 percent of GDP (2020), compared to a SSA average of 17.3 percent⁸⁸. The sector is also concentrated, with 50 percent of banking assets held by three banks. About 25.8 percent of adults have an account at a formal institution (2017), compared to a SSA average of 42.6 percent⁸⁹. DRC's financial sector is in need of digital monetary connections, with no cross-border mobile services currently in operation. There are significant opportunities for the mobile money sector, which has a low penetration of 24 percent (2020)⁹⁰. Finally, significant exchange-rate depreciation brings a risk of insolvency to firms and individuals.

75. **DRC has a large potential for increased regional and cross-border trade, which could contribute significantly to economic growth and reduced poverty.** Insecurity, poor border control processes, weak infrastructure, and inefficient governance at the borders serve as significant barriers to the development of this potential. In 2019, DRC's exports totaled US\$8 billion, making it the 96th exporter in the world, stable since 2014⁹¹. DRC is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States, the Southern African Development Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. The country is also in the process of joining the East African Community. Despite conflict in the GLR, cross-border trade has continued to be an important source of goods, services, and incomes for conflict-affected populations. Small-scale cross-border trade in the GLR is dominated by women.

⁸⁷ World Bank, 2019: *Gouvernance des entreprises publiques* (Governance in public enterprises).

⁸⁸ In 2019 (pre-COVID-19), the percentages were 6.2 for DRC and 44.1 for SSA.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=CD>

⁸⁹ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS>.

⁹⁰ World Bank, 2021: DRC Digital Economy Assessment.

⁹¹ <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/cod>

III. WORLD BANK GROUP COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

3.1 Government Program and Medium-term Strategy

76. **The 2019-2023 National Strategic Development Plan (*Plan National Stratégique de Développement, PNSD*) places people at the center of government action to combat poverty.** Further, the PNSD lays out a vision for the country's development: to become a middle-income country with a diversified and inclusive economy within the next two decades. The plan is estimated to cost US\$25 billion and has five pillars: (i) human capital, social, and cultural development; (ii) good governance, state authority, and peacebuilding; (iii) consolidation of economic growth, transformation, and diversification; (iv) territorial development, reconstruction, and modernization of infrastructure; and (v) environmental protection, climate change, and sustainable development.

77. **The first peaceful political transition in 2019 and the 2021 government reshuffle offer new opportunities to address persistent problems.** While natural resources have not brought prosperity or poverty reduction to the Congolese people, there are current indications that today's authorities aspire to a more sustainable and people-focused development path—built on peace and stability with the potential of improving the state-citizen relationship. The changes are seen in the government's response to the ongoing security situation and measures put in place to stabilize the eastern part of the country, their response to corruption, focus on equality and improved service delivery for all.

78. **There is renewed commitment to ending the cycles of conflict and violence, addressing their underlying drivers.** The government, through the office of the President, has prepared and adopted (October 1, 2021) its first National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building (*Stratégie Nationale de Prévention des Conflits, de Stabilisation et de Renforcement de la Résilience des Communautés*). This strategy, which has benefited from cross-sectoral input—also from stakeholders outside government and from international partners—provides an anchor for the CPF and for PRA eligibility in terms of a strong government commitment to addressing drivers of conflict and violence (identified as factors of fragility in the government's strategy)⁹². It also represents a clear platform for emphasizing the alignment of the CPF focus areas with the key axes of the national approach to conflict prevention (governance, justice, security and stabilization, and socioeconomic inclusion).

79. **To address the surge in violence in the East, the President declared a state of siege (*Etat de siege*), starting May 6, 2021, in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu.** The *Etat de siege* was originally declared for a period of 30 days but has been extended several times—approved by Parliament⁹³. The government has also adopted (July 2021) a community-based reintegration and stabilization program (*Programme de Désarmement, Démobilisation, Relèvement Communautaire et Stabilisation, P-DDRCS*) and intensified its diplomatic relations with its neighbors in the GLR and beyond as part of their efforts to address the ongoing security situation.

80. **The government recognizes the importance of climate resilience for sustainable development but does not have a strategic climate change plan in place.** Environmental protection, climate change, and sustainable development constitute one of the five pillars of the 2019-23 National Strategic Development Plan. Ahead of the November 2021 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

⁹² The process of developing the strategy was led by representatives from the President's offices and included representatives from the Prime Minister's office, key line ministries, and decentralized leaders.

⁹³ The 2006 Constitution gives the executive the right to declare a state of emergency. Under the current arrangements, provincial administrations are made up of a military governor and police vice-governor reporting to the Ministry of Defense. The provincial and civilian administration continues to operate.

Conference of the Parties, the government updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement. The current NDC commits to a 17 percent reduction of national emissions by 2030 and to devoting 17 percent of the national territory to protected areas and national biodiversity conservation parks⁹⁴. Strong forest and ecosystem management, access to clean energy, and livelihood security are priorities.

81. **The government is implementing critical reforms that aim to strengthen access to and quality of key services.** The free primary schooling program launched in September 2019, allowing three million additional children—an increase of 30 percent—to enroll in primary schools across the nation during the 2019-20 school year (from a baseline of 7.7 million children in the 2017-18 school year)⁹⁵. The government intends to accelerate progress toward free universal health care. The official publication of the telecommunications law opens the long-distance fiber optic sector to private investors. In turn, this will make internet services more affordable and hence more accessible.

82. **Efforts are being made to establish frameworks to address the significant gender gaps.** The government has ratified several regional, sub-regional, and international legal instruments on gender and human rights. The 2016 Family Code removed several discriminatory provisions and paved the way for improving gender equality, including reforms that offer protection against GBV and measures that aim to strengthen women's economic empowerment such as property rights, access to finance, and paid maternity leave. The government also adopted a 2017-21 National Gender Policy that aims to increase gender equality and social empowerment.

83. **The government is fighting corruption.** This is exemplified in several concrete actions, including recent investigations by the *Inspection Générale des Finances* (General Inspectorate of Finance, IGF) into government spending during the Ebola and the COVID-19 responses, spending under the President's 100-day program, and SOE operations. As a result of these investigations, several high-level leaders have been prosecuted and imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement. IGF investigations into SOEs have uncovered embezzlement, leading to the replacement of senior management in some of these enterprises, notably the airport and port SOEs. These anti-corruption results are unprecedented in DRC's recent history.

84. **These are signs that the social contract in DRC may be improving.** The momentum may be fragile—but the moment should not be lost. Under this CPF, the WBG seeks to support a strengthening of governance and transparency and ongoing efforts to enhance the social contract. Sustained commitment and support from the international community to these ongoing initiatives—which mark a break with the past—are critical. The WBG plays a critical role in providing development support—a role significantly different from the humanitarian and security programming that has dominated DRC in recent decades. The WBG can play a key role in addressing these challenges and their drivers while acting consistently within its reconstruction and development mandate.

3.2 Proposed WBG Country Partnership Framework

85. **World Bank investment since reengagement after the wars was implemented across the entire territory and focused on infrastructure—with limited impact on institutional capacity and reforms.** Out of the US\$7.55 billion committed between FY02 and FY17 (IDA12-17), around 50 percent was spent on infrastructure, while the remaining was split between budget support/governance projects and

⁹⁴ Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (2016). DRC – NDC:

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%20First/CPDN%20-%20R%C3%A9p%20D%C3%A9m%20du%20Congo.pdf>

⁹⁵ It is not known if this increase was sustained during the 2021-21 school year, where schools have been closed for parts of the year due to COVID-19 restrictions.

operations in the social sectors. Weak sector governance and institutional and SOE capacity were not addressed through these investments in construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and rendered investment largely unsustainable. While road rehabilitation in the East and North was critical in restoring access and mobility after the wars, investments have only covered a fraction of the essential national road network. In the energy sector, IDA financing supported an expansion of transmission capacity, though with little emphasis on distribution to increase access.

86. **Investments in social sectors have been largely input-driven, without much progress addressing sector governance or strengthening systems.** Two-thirds of the US\$1.5 billion committed to social sectors during FY02-17 was invested in the health sector, while less than a third benefited the education sector. Similarly, three DPOs (approved 2002 - 2005, for a total of US\$740 million) were not successful in strengthening institutions or improving governance and did not spur SOE reform. See Section VI, paragraphs 216-229 for analysis of WBG engagement in DRC over the past twenty years.

87. **Lessons from WBG engagement in DRC under the FY13-FY16 CAS are detailed in the 2020 DRC WBG CAS Completion and Learning Review (CLR).** The CLR assesses the design and implementation of the previous WBG strategy for DRC. Strategic lessons from that retrospective assessment, which have informed the FY22-26 CPF, include:

- Go beyond the reconstruction agenda. Engage in social sectors and governance and include reform aspects in a new generation of infrastructure investments that aim to bring in private sector solutions.
- Focus on critical reform agendas, particularly in governance. Ensure reform agendas have strong country/government ownership, a realistic level of ambition given the degree of government capacity and commitment, and adequate funding.
- Governance reforms in settings with a complex political economy should consider phased approaches with incentives for delivery, such as performance-related disbursements.
- Engage through comprehensive multi-sector operations that create and benefit from synergies.
- Focus engagements geographically to achieve economies of scale and maximum impact, without spreading resources too thinly.
- Adopt a fragility lens across engagements. Understand and consider fragility implications across all engagements. Ensure flexibility to respond to a changing fragility context.
- Engage at national and decentralized levels and with state and non-state actors.
- Ensure strong data and market/sector analysis to ensure realistic projections for market potential.
- Engage in donor coordination initiatives. Use the WBG's convening power to strengthen coordination.

88. **The four WBG strategies adopted since 2001⁹⁶ identified persistent conflict and violence, weak human capital, and pervasive corruption as the key constraints to DRC's sustainable development.** To a large extent, the four strategies also identified similar responses to addressing these challenges: stabilization, investment in human development, strengthening governance, and fostering private sector investment. Informed by DRC's development agenda and building on historic lessons learned and findings from key analytical work (including, but not limited to, the 2018 SCD; the 2021 PRA; the 2020 CPSD; various poverty assessments; spatial development analysis and territorial review; gender analysis; governance diagnostics; financial sector analysis; forestry analysis; and a 2021 Digital Economy Assessment), the WBG will, under this CPF, apply principles that depart from past engagements: (i) all engagements will support key governance reforms; (ii) investments will be rebalanced toward the human development sectors, particularly education and social protection; (iii) support to reduce conflict will focus on vulnerable communities, working with decentralized actors; (iv) promote, with IFC and MIGA, off-grid and mini-grid private sector investments in small-scale energy and water infrastructure to quickly improve


⁹⁶ Two transitional strategies (2001, 2004), a 2008 CAS, and a FY13-16 CAS.

access to services; (v) increase connectivity within and between geographic areas most affected by conflict through investments in road infrastructure and digital; (vi) protect the second-largest rainforest globally through the scaling up of initiatives aimed to stop deforestation and improve forest governance; and (vii) focus on the prevention of violence toward women and girls through empowerment and skills initiatives – with continued support to survivors. These principles will, together with the overarching goals of eliminating poverty, boosting shared prosperity, and supporting national development priorities, be used as selectivity filters, guiding WBG engagements that align with the institution’s comparative advantage.

89. **The CPF has three Focus Areas.** Engagements will support the overarching IDA20 theme of “building back better”, adopting approaches that foster green and resilient development. The three CPF Focus Areas, which build on key CLR lessons and aim to address fragility and prevent escalation of conflict, are: (i) strengthen stabilization efforts for reduced risk of conflict and violence; (ii) strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital development; and (iii) strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment (see Figure 3).

90. **Three cross-cutting themes will be applied across the CPF Focus Areas.** Aligned with the proposed IDA20 thematic focus on climate change and in view of DRC’s vast natural resource base, climate and environment represent the first cross-cutting CPF theme (see paragraph 126). The second cross-cutting theme is gender; aligned with IDA20 focus on gender and development, aiming to reduce persistent gaps and inequities linked to gender in DRC while robustly addressing GBV and SGBV (see paragraph 127-128). Governance, the third cross-cutting theme, will be mainstreamed across all WBG engagements in DRC. Support will aim to strengthen systems and institutions; sector governance, including the functioning of key SOEs; and transparency and demand-side governance. This approach is aligned with the IDA20 cross-cutting issue on Governance and Institutions (see paragraph 129). Socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic will be supported through the COVID-19 filter and addressed across WBG engagements (see paragraph 130).

Figure 3: CPF Structure



3.3 Objectives supported by the WBG Program

91. **All WBG engagements in DRC under the CPF will aim to reduce poverty and boost shared prosperity with a specific emphasis on addressing drivers of conflict.** Based on findings in the 2021 RRA, and in support of the government's commitment to conflict prevention, the entirety of the WBG's portfolio will aim to address fragility and prevent the escalation of conflict. The focus is aligned with the IDA20 commitment to deepen support for implementation of the WBG FCV Strategy. Focus Area 1 will address immediate triggers of conflict and violence. Focus Areas 2 and 3 will address medium- to long-term triggers while investing in human capital and strengthening the macroeconomic framework and the enabling environment for private sector development. The approach to conflict prevention and mitigation will be holistic: aiming to build or restore infrastructure; improve access to and the provision of basic social services; and strengthen governance and institutions, including transparency and participation.

92. **To address fragility and conflict effectively and sustainably, the World Bank will focus implementation of geographically targeted investments within provinces that are the most fragile and represent conflict hotspots.** Investments will complement national-level engagements and support economic and human development, with the aim to address fragility factors and reduce conflict risk. Targeted provinces include:

- Kinshasa, Kongo Central and Kwilu in the west: The fast-growing, densely populated capital city of Kinshasa has, in the past, been the scene of political and social unrest and violence. More than half of Kinshasa's population is under the age of 18, many are not in school, and lacking economic opportunities. Unemployment is high and gang criminality is prevalent. In addition, gang violence has been used for political purposes.
- The three Kasais and Lomami in the center: In 2016, central Kasais was transformed from a peaceful region to the epicenter of a conflict that spiraled into horrific brutality (more than 3,000 fatalities in 2017 alone), becoming one of the most serious humanitarian crises globally. The region has seen limited economic development, with the diamond sector in decline following an international push away from "conflict minerals", coupled with limited public spending. As such, the poverty rate increased in these provinces between 2005 and 2012. Home to the family of the current president, tension in the Kasais has abated since the 2018 elections. However, a comprehensive set of engagements aimed to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants, enhance economic opportunities, and strengthen access to basic services will be critical to address the underlying factors of the 2016 crisis.
- North and South Kivu and Ituri in the east: These three provinces, where 94 percent of the close to 5,167 conflict-related deaths in 2021 occurred⁹⁷, are subject to ongoing conflict and violence—caused by the aftermath of the Congo Wars. The area has many militias that are vying for control of fertile land and mining resources, exploiting the widespread availability of arms⁹⁸. Some of these groups include and receive support from foreign fighters. Despite significant mineral deposits, to include 80 percent of the world's cobalt reserves (see Figure 7), North Kivu and South Kivu have the highest number of poor in DRC. Comprehensive support, aimed to address issues linked to the constantly changing security landscape and armed groups, will be critical to stabilize the east, as past Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs have not succeeded. Furthermore, targeted engagements aimed to spur human capital and economic development will be key to curb persistent conflict and violence in the east.

⁹⁷ ACLED, January 2022.

⁹⁸ World Bank, 2021: DRC Risk and Resilience Assessment.

- Targeted refugee-related interventions in the two northwestern provinces of North and South Ubangi. These provinces have seen an inflow of refugees from CAR, putting additional pressure on host communities and deepening fragility factors. Refugees are concentrated in remote and insecure border areas, where they account for a large share of the local population. All refugees are deemed to be in need of humanitarian assistance⁹⁹, with the situation further aggravated by impacts of the pandemic. Support is needed to strengthen government capacity and agility in responding in refugee hosting areas where the population—host communities and refugees alike—is poor and vulnerable

93. **Support to reforms and systems strengthening will be provided on a national scale.** If faced with critical challenges, such as health epidemics, food insecurity, or conflict-related crises (including further support to forced displaced populations), the World Bank will engage in provinces outside the “ten-plus-two-province” focus. Similarly, pilot projects or engagements aimed to mobilize and strengthen private sector investment or support to private operators, including through IFC and MIGA support, may take place outside the operationally targeted provinces.

94. **The three CPF Focus Areas are supported by nine CPF Objectives (see Table 2). Further indicators and targets are laid out in Annex 1: CPF Results Framework.**

Table 2: CPF Focus Areas and Objectives

	CPF Focus Area 1: Strengthen stabilization efforts for reduced risk of conflict and violence	CPF Focus Area 2: Strengthen systems for improved service delivery and human capital development	CPF Focus Area 3: Strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment
Filter: COVID-19	1.1 Strengthen crisis resilience for vulnerable, displaced, and conflict-affected populations 1.2 Improve interconnectedness between and within communities 1.3 Strengthen regional integration and cross-border trade in the GLR	2.1 Strengthen systems to increase access to and quality of services in education, health, and social protection 2.2 Improve access to basic infrastructure services (water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); electricity, classrooms; and health centers) 2.3 Improve gender disparities and inclusion across sectors	3.1 Strengthen systems for improved debt management and increased domestic revenue mobilization 3.2 Strengthen PFM systems and extractive sector governance 3.3 Strengthen economic diversification through increased agricultural productivity and a stronger operating environment for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME)
	<i>Cross-cutting theme 1: Climate and Environment</i>		
	<i>Cross-cutting theme 2: Gender</i>		
	<i>Cross-cutting theme 3: Governance</i>		

Focus Area 1: STRENGTHEN STABILIZATION EFFORTS FOR REDUCED RISK OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

⁹⁹ OCHA, 2020: Democratic Republic of Congo, Strategic Response Plan.

95. **Under Focus Area 1, the WBG will engage to reduce exclusion and increase stability through activities that address triggers leading to the escalation of conflict.** The WBG will concentrate on engagements that link peace and stability with urgent development needs. Support will consist of a comprehensive and targeted set of engagements that aim to strengthen crisis resilience of individual beneficiaries and improve the interconnectedness of communities. Engagements will be climate-informed and address underlying drivers of vulnerability, such as access to land.

Objective 1.1: Strengthen crisis resilience for vulnerable, displaced, and conflict-affected populations

96. **In a marked departure from earlier stabilization initiatives, which relied heavily on DDR-approaches, the World Bank will scale up targeted social protection programs, aiming to strengthen crisis resilience among vulnerable, displaced, and conflict-affected populations.** These efforts will be integrated into the wider stabilization engagements in the east, aiming to create a bridge between the peacebuilding process, associated humanitarian aid, and development support. The WBG program will support the government's efforts to establish a comprehensive, countrywide social safety net system that targets poor, vulnerable, and conflict-affected populations. This will include a specific focus on forcibly displaced and refugee populations. Youth in Kinshasa will also be supported through the national social safety net program (as well as improvements in access to basic services – see Focus area 2) to reduce the impact of exclusionary dynamics that could trigger urban violence.

97. **This new approach, which brings substantial investments in social protection activities, represents a significant increase in support to the government's efforts to develop a comprehensive, countrywide, social safety net system.** The program will include cash transfers and cash-for-work, together with the construction or rehabilitation of social infrastructure using a participatory approach and citizen engagement, which will generate about 30 million person-days of temporary employment. In total, about 1.2 million people will directly benefit from activities and support under social safety net programs—up from about 60,000 people in 2020.

98. **In Eastern DRC, the WBG will provide additional support to the government's stabilization process, targeting the most acutely conflict- and violence-affected populations, including disarmed combatants.** Complementing social protection activities, these efforts will comprise dedicated dialogue, psychosocial, and economic inclusion support. For example, the WBG will explore avenues to support the formalization of artisanal mining, a major economic activity and driver of conflict in the region. Finally, there will be a specific focus on strengthening decentralized governance at the provincial and local levels, aiming to support an enhanced social contract.

Objective 1.2: Improve interconnectedness between and within communities

99. **To reduce exclusionary dynamics—one source of conflict identified in the 2021 RRA—the WBG will support investments in infrastructure (transport and digital) and urban services that will strengthen interconnectedness between and within key urban centers and rural areas and improve access to services.** Physically and digitally connecting the center and periphery will bolster economic development and national cohesion while contributing to stabilization and conflict prevention efforts. Applying the GRID approach, the World Bank will support paved road infrastructure reconnecting Eastern and Western DRC and will continue improving the security and resilience of Goma and Beni airports. Telecom infrastructure will benefit from the “dig once” approach along road rehabilitation and encourage direct private sector investments. The World Bank will also engage to reduce exclusion and the risk of escalation of violence in Kinshasa and its surroundings and provide support to strengthen governance and the foundations for inclusive decentralized urban management capacity and community engagement.

Objective 1.3: Strengthen regional integration and cross-border trade in the GLR

100. **Recognizing that regional peace and stability is built around connecting and integrating border populations, the WBG will support cross-border trade activities. This will also enhance regional integration.** The GLR has been subject to recurring cycles of conflict. Yet, it is also a region with significant trade and cooperation opportunities. These are particularly important for Eastern DRC as this region depends largely on formal and informal trade with neighboring countries, including seaports in Kenya and Tanzania, for access to overseas markets. Due to the role of trade integration for the region's path toward peace and stability, the WBG's Regional Integration and Assistance Strategy Update for FY21-23 identifies the GLR as one of the four priority regions for engagement. This builds on lessons of the Great Lakes Initiative (GLI), initiated in 2013 following a joint mission of the UN Secretary-General and the WBG President to the GLR in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework, where the GLI aimed to address regional conflict dynamics through socioeconomic investments. Yet, challenges in addressing the underlying political dynamics thwarted the peace dividends of this approach.

101. **Going forward, operational engagements aiming to strengthen peace and stability efforts through improved opportunities for trade and regional integration will build on what has worked in Eastern DRC.** The WBG will continue to support small scale producers and traders to access cross-border markets and complement these efforts with supporting value addition of local products and improving connectivity. Building on analytical work proposed on cross-border trade between DRC and Angola, opportunities to also engage in the south will be examined. Such engagements would contribute to opening the Kasai region to markets in northern Angola.

102. **Operational engagements under Focus Area 1** will include implementation of the ongoing Eastern Recovery Project (STEP) (including STEP3, financed primarily from the IDA19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees), the Kinshasa Multisectoral Development and Urban Resilience Project (Kin Elenda), the Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project, the Central African Backbone Project (regional), and the Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (regional); and the proposed Eastern Stabilization Project, a potential DPF series; the Transport and Connectivity Support Project; the Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project; and phase two of the Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (regional). Analytical work includes a proposed Public Expenditure Review (PER) on security and a DRC Jobs and Economic Transformation (JET) analysis.

Focus Area 2: STRENGTHEN SYSTEMS FOR IMPROVED SERVICE DELIVERY AND HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT

103. **Focus Area 2 demonstrates a key shift in WBG sectoral engagements, with a significant increase in investments in education and social protection. The WBG will invest in systems, communities, and people, aiming to build human capital, strengthen access and quality of services, reduce gender disparities, and increase inclusion, and reinforce the state-citizen relationship.** There will be a departure from past input-based financing modalities, and where feasible, investment project financing will include results-based modalities (Investment Project Financing (IPF) with Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) and possibly Program for Results (PforR) in the outer years of the CPF). The approach builds on the WBG 2020-25 Strategy for FCV and the identified areas of special emphasis for WBG engagements in FCV contexts and supports the IDA20 human capital theme. It also builds on analysis in the 2021 RRA, as more equitable access to services and the inclusion of underserved communities and populations in service delivery will address structural causes of conflict and fragility. This departure in programming and focus is steeped in global evidence which shows that investments in physical infrastructure and improved service delivery of education, health, and social protection contribute to economic development and the strengthening of state-citizen relationships, which are key to addressing exclusionary factors of conflict

and fragility¹⁰⁰.

Objective 2.1: Strengthen systems to increase access to and quality of services in education, health, and social protection

104. **Over the CPF period, the World Bank will focus on effectively implementing ongoing human capital engagements¹⁰¹ through comprehensive and integrated support to accelerate progress toward universal health; improving surveillance of epidemics and preparedness and routine immunizations; addressing challenges linked to nutrition and stunting; improving access to and quality of primary and secondary education; and supporting the establishment of an inclusive and targeted national social safety net system, with equal access to refugees (see objective 1.1).** The program includes analytical work, investments, and support to key reforms—a large number mainstreaming governance in sectors through results-based financing modalities. As a part of a systems-building approach, engagements will seek to reinforce sector governance and institutions, including strengthening decentralized administrative structures, citizen-institution links, and channels to express the voice of beneficiaries, with the aim of increasing accountability and transparency.

105. **The IFC will leverage a 2019 World Bank review of the role of the private sector in healthcare in DRC¹⁰².** The review will serve as a framework for IFC's identification and potential support for players in the healthcare space. To identify private sector investment opportunities in the health sector, the IFC will undertake a mapping of pharmaceutical players and private health care facilities, for direct investment or support through local financial institutions, using blended finance, such as IDA PSW, when needed.

Objective 2.2: Improve access to basic infrastructure services

106. **WBG infrastructure engagements will focus on increased and more equal access to and improved quality of basic infrastructure services, which will contribute to strengthening the enabling environment for economic development, prosperity, and stability.** Better access, improved quality, and increased equality in service provision will help address perceptions of exclusion which may exist among specific population groups. Furthermore, it will enable economic opportunities and market development and strengthen the delivery of essential basic services (education, health). Aligned with CLR conclusions, the WBG will seek to expand access to electricity, water, and sanitation services and strengthen associated sectoral institutions and governance using a mix of multisectoral lending and analytical work, coupled with MIGA guarantees and IFC investments and technical assistance. There will be a focus on key provincial cities in DRC, including Kinshasa, as well as rural areas in Ituri, the Kivus and Kasais. Applying the GRID framework, climate considerations will be incorporated into the design of all new and rehabilitated infrastructure and digital aspects will, as much as possible, be incorporated into design and implementation solutions.

107. **Engagements will promote renewable-based mini- and off-grid solutions and aim to advance utility reform (SNEL, REGIDESO).** Support will aim to strengthen the demand-side of governance,

¹⁰⁰ Rastislav Vrbensky, The Center for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, Working Paper WP02/2008: Can development prevent conflict?

¹⁰¹ About US\$2.5 billion was committed under IDA18 in support of human capital development and social sectors. Resources were directed toward comprehensive engagements in the education, health, and social protection sectors, with a view to strengthen systems and support key reforms. These engagements were complemented under the first year of IDA19, when additional investments were made in the human development sectors. All investments made are aligned with the approach laid out in this CPF, including focus on poverty, addressing drivers of fragility and conflicts, and combatting GBV.

¹⁰² World Bank, 2019: Role of the Private Sector in Improving the Performance of the Health System in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

including increased inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and implementation, as well as citizen engagement for improved accountability and transparency. There will be a scaling up of public and private approaches already under implementation, including through a partnering between the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA to attract new international and/or regional private sector players for the electrification of select provincial capitals/major cities. Proposed credit guarantee mechanisms (incorporated into IDA lending) will further promote private sector involvement for improved maintenance and upgrading of distribution networks to private electricity service providers, in particular off-grid in Eastern DRC. Through the promotion of renewable-based mini-grid solutions, costly fossil fuel options will be replaced, which will contribute to a reduction in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Private sector initiatives will also be promoted in the water sector, with a focus on Kinshasa and its hinterland, Ituri, the Kivus, and the Kasais.

108. **IFC and MIGA will engage comprehensively to support an increase in private sector investment in the energy sector**, including through an energy sector deep dive review, targeted investments in the nascent mini-grid space (through the support of existing mini-grids and an IFC upstream scaling mini-grid program), as well as a co-development initiative to co-develop renewable energy Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects. MIGA will aim to scale up its support in the renewable energy sector by providing its de-risking instruments to facilitate foreign private investment.

Objective 2.3: Improve gender disparities and inclusion across sectors

109. **Gender disparities in DRC are significant, despite a strong regulatory framework.** Moreover, pervasive and prolonged conflict and violence at all levels of society have “normalized” violence, compounding preexisting social norms that entrench gender inequality. Aligned with OP/BP 4.20 – Gender and Development - and building on recent analytical work on gender including a 2021 DRC Gender Diagnostic Report¹⁰³, WBG engagements across sectors will aim to address gender inequality as well as the underlying factors for GBV. The two-pronged approach will be implemented through policy dialogue, analytic work and their dissemination, and ongoing projects, with a focus on improving gender disparities and women’s empowerment. At the same time, engagements will aim to address SEA/H risks as a part of project implementation in non-GBV specific engagements, to include, when possible, dedicated components aimed to change behavior (such as approaches adopted in the Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project, EESSE). Proposed operational engagements will aim to reduce gender disparities and incidences of GBV, instigate behavior change, and enhance inclusion.

110. **Operational engagements under Focus Area 2** will include implementation of the ongoing Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSE), the Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project, the COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project (including Additional Financing (AF) for COVID-19 vaccine purchase and distribution), the Regional Disease Surveillance System Enhancement Project, the Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education Project, EESSE, the Electricity Access and Services Expansion Project, STEP, Kin Elenda, the Gender-Based Violence Prevention and Response Project; forthcoming support under the proposed Girls’ Learning and Empowerment Project, the Women’s Empowerment and SME Support Project, the Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project, the Rural Water Development Project; and IFC and MIGA engagements in renewable energy. Analytical work will include an impact evaluation of Performance-Based Financing, an enhanced fiduciary assessment of the health sector, analysis of women’s socioeconomic

¹⁰³ Other analytical and diagnostic work with significant gender focus that has and will continue to inform the approach to gender in the DRC portfolio include: Empowering Girls and Learning in the DRC (2021 ASA); a World Bank Country Gender Profile for the DRC (2017); Demographic Dividend in the DRC (2019); Kinshasa Poverty Study (2020); DRC Jobs Diagnostic (2017); and DRC Poverty Assessment (2016).

empowerment, and an IFC energy sector deep dive review.

Focus Area 3: STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR INCREASED PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT

111. **Under Focus Area 3, the WBG will provide support for improved economic management and governance reforms that will bolster private sector development and investment, mitigating conflict risk through increased inclusion and economic opportunities.** The increased focus on governance reforms is aligned with lessons learned from past engagements, as outlined in the CLR, and supports the IDA20 cross-cutting issue on governance and institutions. There will be continued strong collaboration with the IMF, including on efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization and ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment conducive to private sector-led growth.

112. **To incentivize adoption and implementation of key structural reforms, which will include reforms that will liberalize key productive sectors (energy, water, transport, ICT), the World Bank will consider the use of DPF, after a 15-year hiatus.** Subject to an adequate macroeconomic and policy framework and government track record and commitment to a substantive policy reform program, the World Bank may consider the preparation of a DPF series. Additionally, investments in these sectors will adopt results-based modalities (e.g., IPFs with performance-based conditions, PBC, PforRs may be considered), also aimed to support key sector reforms, including of SOEs. Where possible, the Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD) approach will be embedded.

113. **IFC will prioritize engagement in the energy, ICT, and financial sectors, including digital finance, leveraging World Bank supported sector reforms.** IFC will also support, in a cross-cutting manner, improvements to the business-enabling environment, thereby paving the way for increased private investment in agribusiness, light manufacturing, housing, and services (i.e., health and education). Emphasis will be on improving access to essential products needed to support reconstruction, improve the overall quality of life in households, and address some of the challenges of urbanization. IFC will only support viable players, with sustainable business models, that can be scaled up to reduce their unit production costs and support job creation. IFC will leverage blended finance facilities, such as the IDA Private Sector Window (PSW), when needed, to de-risk investment projects.

114. **MIGA will support foreign private sector-led initiatives, mainly in the energy and ICT sectors, aligned with its strategy to mobilize private finance, especially in IDA and FCS countries and to support climate finance.** MIGA is pursuing several operations to support concessions based on mini-grid projects. In addition, MIGA is partnering with IDA and IFC on the Scaling Mini Grids Program to deliver a large-scale mini-grid project aimed at electrifying areas that have no access to utility-scale power generation. MIGA is also working to support a project that will provide PV power to telecoms towers across locations in DRC. In the ICT sector, MIGA is exploring opportunities to support foreign investment, including data centers and mobile money.

Objective 3.1: Strengthen systems for improved debt management and increased domestic revenue mobilization

115. **Through a comprehensive program combining policy reform, investment lending, and analytical work, the WBG will support the government's efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability, including through increased Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM), and keep debt at sustainable levels, while improving debt management and transparency.** The World Bank will focus on strengthening management of mining revenues and increasing DRM at the provincial level for improved decentralized service delivery. On debt, the World Bank will focus on the implementation of the new Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP) initiated under IDA19. The World Bank will work closely with the IMF

on all matters relating to economic and fiscal management and ensure consistency and complementarity across engagements.

116. **Support for sound macroeconomic management and stability may be provided through DPF, with a potential “foundational economic governance reform” DPF series.** Such an engagement would focus on core PFM reforms, coupled with SOE and selected sectoral reforms, including in the telecommunications and extractives sectors.

Objective 3.2: Strengthen public financial management systems and extractive sector governance

117. **To strengthen the current fragile institutional structure in DRC, which has contributed to growth underperformance, mismanagement of the natural resources sectors, and a weak track record in implementing key economic reforms, the World Bank will support critical reforms in PFM and governance of the extractives sector.** The engagements build on commitment from government to strengthen regulatory institutions, improve governance, and increase oversight and transparency, including in SOEs in energy, water, transport, ICT, and mining. They aim to strengthen public resource management at the central government level, with the objective of increasing efficiency, transparency, and resilience. There will be a focus on strengthening mining revenue management, expenditure management, as well as internal and external control institutions (IGF and the Supreme Audit Institution). Engagements will also support strengthened resource management at the provincial government level for improved service delivery. Engagements will promote the use of digital platforms (e.g., for tax collection, utility billing, and payment purposes) and will promote citizen’s engagement to strengthen accountability and improve the social contract between State and citizens.

118. **To strengthen governance in the extractives sector, the World Bank will support increased oversight of key mining SOEs and, in close coordination with the IMF, implementation of the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)**¹⁰⁴. Through the EITI, there will be support for increased transparency and accountability in the extractives sector (e.g., publication of mining contracts and key financial and operational information for SOEs in the extractives sector, including Gecamines), including strengthening the role of civil society. In addition, the World Bank aim, through strengthened oversight, to improve corporate governance and the State’s role as owner in SOEs. This will be complemented by a focus on strengthening mining revenue management, which will include the digitization of the mining revenue collection administration and the establishment of mechanisms for the implementation of mining revenue redistribution measures. See Box 3 for critical steps in developing the extractives sector in DRC, as stipulated in the 2018 Mining Code.

119. The World Bank will work to strengthen provincial and local governance and accountability, which will be key to restoring trust in the state, rebuilding social cohesion, and mitigating the reemergence or escalation of conflicts. Opportunities will be sought to combine supply- and demand-side governance approaches at the provincial or local levels, through citizen’s engagement initiatives, including participatory budgeting, with a view to making the state administration, across provinces, cities, and chefferies (chiefdoms) more accountable, inclusive, and effective.

¹⁰⁴ DRC joined the EITI in 2007 and the country’s current EITI status is “meaningful progress” (as per the EITI Board 2019 validation). DRC released its 2018, 2019, H1 2020 Report in February 2021. The next DRC validation will start on January 1, 2022. The 2019 validation noted: “while there is anecdotal evidence that EITI implementation has contributed to changing practices and mitigating the risk of corruption, the [EITI] Board expresses concern that corruption and mismanagement of funds in the extractive sector persist.” The World Bank will support the implementation of the EITI 2021-2023 action plan approved by DRC Council of Ministers in June 2021 (this approval was a prior action for the IMF Extended Credit Facility).

Box 3: Critical steps for developing the extractives sector in DRC

Three robust interventions will be needed for DRC and its people to benefit from the increasing global demand for the strategic minerals the country possesses:

- 1. **Strengthen transparency and governance of the extractives sector**, with a focus on improving mining revenue management (including mining revenue distribution as per the 2018 Mining Code); improving transparency, citizens' engagement, and accountability (leveraging the EITI process); and improving oversight of extractive SOEs (e.g., Gecamines).*
- 2. **Support the development of responsible mineral supply chains, with a focus on artisanal mining.** This would involve strengthening OHS, eradicating child labor, combating SGBV, and addressing environmental liabilities, with special attention to conflict-affected mining areas.*
- 3. **Leverage the energy transition to sustain the mining sector and contribute to broad-based economic diversification.** This would include strengthening the institutional capacity to adopt and implement a sustainable development model in the extractive sector, ensuring sound management of environmental and social impacts of mining investments and leveraging energy and transport infrastructure investments from large mines in support of economic diversification and catalyzing economic activity around clusters and corridors.*

The World Bank would consider reengaging directly in the mining sector – in line with the above dimensions – if significant progress is made in improving sector transparency and governance.

Based on the 2021 World Bank Mining Sector Update.

Objective 3.3: Strengthen economic diversification through increased agricultural productivity and a stronger MSME operating environment

120. IFC, MIGA, and the World Bank will work to improve the business enabling environment, including access to financial services, the development of the private sector as an engine for job creation, and accelerating the transition from subsistence to a more productive agriculture sector. This will be done through a mix of WBG instruments, including World Bank investment lending; DPF and Partial Risk Guarantees (PRG) (if conditions allow); IFC investments; MIGA guarantees; and WBG advisory services.

121. **The WBG will support development of the local private sector, including MSMEs and women-owned businesses, with the aim of creating more and better jobs and contributing to a more inclusive and distributive economy.** Aligned with the recommendations of the CPSD, the WBG will also support private sector participation in infrastructure (prioritizing energy, transport, and ICT). The WBG will work to strengthen the financial sector, with a focus on stability and access to services, including digital financial services for women entrepreneurs, MSMEs, youth, and farmers. To support private sector participation in renewable energy and improved performance of the power utility, the World Bank will explore the use of PRG, complementing IFC investments.

122. **The WBG will support the development of the agriculture sector in DRC, adopting and promoting climate-sensitive approaches in line with the GRID framework, to drive inclusion through economic diversification and job creation.** Support will be provided to increase agricultural productivity and market access for smallholder farmers, with climate-smart interventions to ensure long-term sustainability, including water conservation, crop diversification and forest protection. The WBG will specifically scale up engagements to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). Investment and carbon payments under an existing operation will continue to support REDD+

action in western DRC, where Kinshasa's growing demand for agricultural commodities and charcoal exerts increasing pressure on surrounding landscapes. A proposed Forest and Savanna Restoration Project will scale up similar activities in key provinces, promoting restoration (e.g., agroforestry plantations), forest protection, and alternative livelihoods to strengthen the resilience of communities and landscapes along the southern frontier of DRC's rainforest. Institutional support will help improve DRC's capacity in monitoring climate and forest information and integrate it into policy dialogue and planning.

123. **The IFC will seek to support sector players across a broad spectrum (including consumer goods, building materials, human capital services etc.) to scale up production and hence reduce unit production costs and increase cost competitiveness.** MIGA will explore opportunities to mobilize cross-border investments through its political risk insurance instruments. In addition, the IFC will invest in local financial institution players to increase SME access to finance, leveraging, to the extent possible, the World Bank's agriculture and SME program.

124. **Operational engagements under Focus Area 3** will include implementation of the ongoing Improved Forested Landscape Management Project, the Mai Ndombe Emission Reduction Program, the Forest Dependent Communities Support Project, the Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project, the National Agriculture Development Program, the Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project, the SME Development and Growth Project, Kin Elenda; a potential DPF series, the Enhanced Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project (ENCORE), the SME Development and Growth Project II, the Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (regional), the Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project, and a proposed TA project for improved environment and social safeguards management in the mining sector. Analytical work will include a Country Economic Memorandum, a PER, a financial sector development program, as well as technical assistance to the EITI process.

CPF Cross-Cutting Themes and Filter

125. **Climate considerations, gender, and governance will be integrated across the portfolio as cross-cutting themes, complemented by a COVID-19 filter.** The cross-cutting themes and filter support IDA20 themes and WBG corporate priorities. They also build on lessons learned from past WBG engagements in DRC—as reflected in the CLR and analysis of the World Bank engagement in DRC (see Section VI).

126. **WBG engagements will adopt and promote climate-resilient approaches across the portfolio.** The Green, Resilient and Inclusive Development (GRID) framework will be applied across the portfolio to promote climate-focused approaches and emissions reducing system transitions in key sectors (e.g., energy, agriculture, water, and transport). A proposed Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR), which will examine the interplay between development and climate change and climate policies, will provide the underlying analytics for applying the GRID framework. The CPF will also support savanna restoration and forest protection, scaling up a successful pilot engagement in a prime deforestation frontier in Western DRC.

127. **In view of deep-rooted challenges linked to gender equality, persistent and pervasive GBV and SGBV, and in support of the government's commitments and priorities on gender, gender will be integrated into all WBG engagements.** This will be done through targeted activities across sectors aimed to empower women and girls and will be based on lessons learned from the World Bank's global engagement with the empowerment of women and girls and focus on increasing girls' participation in schooling, sexual reproductive health of adolescent girls and women, and behavior change aspects of GBV, financial inclusion, second chance education and skills, and improved life opportunities for women.

128. **Building on experience to date and following a restructuring of 16 active projects to include**

specific SEA risk mitigation measures and comprehensive GRM, future engagements will continue to provide direct support to survivors, aggressively target prevention, and promote women's and girls' empowerment. The CPF spatial approach, which focuses operational engagements on 10 conflict-affected provinces, will also ensure availability and consolidation of direct support. Capacity building for service providers, whose presence on the ground will be necessary to provide direct and follow up support to survivors, will also be examined.

129. **Governance will be mainstreamed across three dimensions within the three CPF Focus Areas.** A mainstreaming of governance reflects the weak governance context in DRC and its impact on development and the Congolese people (see Box 4). It is also aligned with the 2021 RRA, which identifies the governance environment as one of the main drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence in DRC. The governance mainstreaming will be across three dimensions of WBG engagement in DRC:

- (i) Strengthen core PFM functions at central and provincial levels for increased state effectiveness,** establishing the foundations for a modernized PFM system. At the national level, efforts will focus on budget credibility and budget execution, supporting overdue reforms such as establishing a Treasury Single Account and an Integrated Financial Management Information System. At the provincial level, efforts will focus on establishing basic PFM systems in pilot provinces. There will also be efforts to strengthen internal and external oversight institutions (IGF and *Cour des Comptes*, Government Accountability Office), to fight corruption and increase accountability.
- (ii) Support sectoral governance reforms for improved service delivery, including allowing private sector participation.** To ensure sustainability, infrastructure investments in water, energy, transport, and telecom will be coupled with priority sector reforms, such as autonomizing water management in provinces, increasing private sector participation in energy generation and distribution, improving road maintenance mechanisms, and liberalizing long-distance fiber networks. There will also be support for governance reforms in the extractives sector. There will be emphasis on SOEs reforms, which will include critical measures to strengthen operational and financial performance.
- (iii) Focus on transparency and demand-side governance.** Engagements will support efforts to increase transparency (e.g., in budgeting, procurement, SOE management, management of extractive sectors) and to strengthen citizen's engagement (e.g., participatory budgeting at national and provincial levels). The World Bank will engage with beneficiaries and non-government actors, including Faith-Based Organizations, which can contribute to governance reform efforts. In addition, sector-specific grievance redress mechanisms will be established, as has been done in the education sector through the web-based 'Allo Ecole' platform which allows parents and communities to add their voice to complaints and grievances and provide feedback on issues such as teachers absenteeism and the timeliness of textbook distribution.

Box 4: Weak governance has hampered the realization of Inga's enormous hydropower potential

The Inga Falls on the Congo River has enormous hydropower potential (44 GW)—more than the currently installed hydropower capacity in SSA. Further development of Inga could therefore have a transformative impact on electricity access in DRC and beyond. Persistent governance issues have, however, hampered the realization of this potential.

Inga 1 and 2 have an installed capacity of 1,775 MW, providing 72 percent of DRC's total electricity capacity. The most recent feasibility study (2012) proposed a gradual expansion of Inga, starting with Inga 3, with a potential capacity of 4.8 GW. This option could be developed in phases, first addressing domestic electricity needs, including for the mining sector and the fast-growing Kinshasa area.

A US\$73 million Technical Assistance grant (approved March 2014) financed studies for the mobilization of private developers for Inga 3. The grant was canceled in 2016. Two years later, a consortium signed an Exclusive Development Agreement with the Congolese authorities for a 7.8 GW Inga 3 project design. This design, which would fully dam the Congo River (as opposed to diverting it), will have critical implications and impacts on communities, potentially causing the resettlement of thousands of people. It could also have adverse effects on the area's unique biodiversity.

There is renewed interest around Inga, including from the government and the African Union (AU). Potential investors have expressed interest in the Grand Inga project (involving seven proposed power stations on the falls). A Memorandum of Understanding with a new consortium to finance, build, and operate the Inga dams was announced in September 2020, but limited progress has been made.

Weak governance and capacity in DRC represent significant risks to the development of Inga. A highly complex project with environmental and social risks, Grand Inga would require substantial external support as required expertise is not available in DRC. The WBG would only reengage with Inga if the authorities agree to significantly strengthen governance around the project's development, through an open book approach to existing and future agreements, ensuring compliance with World Bank safeguard policies, and the establishment of strong governance and revenue management mechanisms.

130. **All new WBG engagements—lending and non-lending—will have a COVID-19 filter, aligning with the four pillars of the June 2020 WBG COVID-19 Crisis Response Approach Paper.** This reflects adverse socioeconomic impacts that have already been caused by the pandemic, with possible additional security impacts¹⁰⁵. A COVID-19 filter/approach was also applied to all IDA19 operations approved in FY21¹⁰⁶. Engagements addressing COVID-19 impacts will span the human capital, economic, and infrastructure sectors and include specific attention to gender impacts, including those related to SEA/H. Targeted support will be provided throughout the three phases of the Approach Paper - relief, restructuring, and resilient recovery.

¹⁰⁵ Actions taken by the authorities to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus include the declaration of a state of emergency at the start of the pandemic (March to July 2020), a temporary government-imposed confinement in the central business district of the capital (Gombe), curfews, the closing of schools, the closing of airports, and restrictions on travel between Kinshasa and the rest of the country.

¹⁰⁶ The four pillars are: (i) saving lives; (ii) protecting poor and vulnerable people; (iii) saving livelihoods, ensuring more sustainable business growth and job creation; and (iv) strengthening policies, institutions, and investments for resilient recovery.

3.4 CPF Stakeholder Consultations

131. **Despite limitations and challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing lockdowns, multistakeholder CPF consultations have taken place.** The CPF has benefited from continued and coherent dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders, at national and decentralized levels, and with state and non-state actors, including Civil Society Organizations (CSO), Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), and representatives from Faith-Based Organizations (FBO), as well as development partners. Continuous dialogue and consultations have been held with key government stakeholders, including representatives from the Offices of the President and the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance. The CPF has been regularly discussed during high level meetings between the World Bank and the authorities.

132. **Initial meetings were undertaken in Kinshasa, Goma, and Kananga in November 2019 on a preliminary CPF concept with representatives from decentralized authorities and representatives from CSOs and FBOs.** During these meetings, FBOs/CSOs stated their priorities were in line with the Human Capital Project and a further emphasis on World Bank engagements in the human development sectors. Beyond this, they emphasized an urgent need for better governance (anti-corruption) and improved infrastructure (often linked to access to education, water/sanitation, and health). Furthermore, CSO and FBO representatives expressed that the WBG faces high risks, including reputational ones, engaging in DRC. Risks were seen to be driven primarily by inherent country-level risks, not by individual sector engagements. In the consultations held around the SCD and RRA, development challenges directly linked to drivers of fragility were highlighted and discussed, thereby further shaping the CPF approach.

133. **Specific discussions and detailed sharing of strategic approaches took place with key IDA donors (the UK and US), also attended by the EU, most recently in October 2021, during which an outline of the CPF was presented.** Complementarities and further opportunities for collaboration were identified and discussed. Several presentations have been made to other international partners, including bilateral and multilateral partners at the *Groupe de coordination des partenaires* (GCP) (the main development partner coordination group co-chaired by the EU and UN), the United Nations Country Team (humanitarian and development agencies) on the key tenets of the CPF. Also, regular monthly dialogue takes place within various sector specific development partner working groups e.g., the Peace and Security Working Group (PSWG) for partners involved in conflict prevention, stabilization, and security related activities in DRC or the *Groupe Inter-Bailleurs de Santé* (Group of Health Sector Partners) for those working on health issues.

134. **With MONUSCO, a key partner on the stabilization agenda, discussions have been held regularly across a range of CPF related issues.** These include P-DDRCS, the PRA and the MONUSCO transition process, ensuring there is strong dialogue and consistency in strategic approaches and operational activities, particularly for operations in the East and for “Triple Nexus” activities (see Box 5) and coordination in the Kasais. Frequent consultations are held with MONUSCO’s head of political affairs to stay abreast of current events and any potential impact upon the WBG portfolio.

135. **Conversations have taken place with key stakeholders, including government and international partners, in the preparation of the PRA.** These consultations were led by the Coordination of External Resources and Project Monitoring (*Coordination des ressources exterieures et suivi de projet*, CRESP) within the Office of the President, in close coordination with an Inter-ministerial Technical Committee made up of focal points from key Ministries. Presentations to sector Ministries and other Government bodies on the 2021 National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Community Resilience Building (*Stratégie Nationale de Prévention des Conflits, de Stabilisation et de Renforcement de la Résilience des Communautés*) also included discussions on the CPF strategic approach.


IV. IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

4.1 Implementation period and financing envelope

136. The CPF implementation period is FY22-26, covering the last year of the shortened IDA19 cycle (FY22), the entire IDA20 cycle (FY23-25), and one year of IDA21 (FY26). There are plans to prepare a PLR to reflect impacts from COVID-19 and allow for adjustments following the 2023 presidential election.

137. During IDA19, DRC will have access to a PBA of about US\$2 billion¹⁰⁷. Starting in IDA18, when IDA placed more emphasis on FCV, IDA support to DRC increased significantly, with US\$2.65 billion committed (new lending) during FY18-20 (IDA18), compared with about US\$1.7 billion under IDA17 (PBA plus other sources) (see Figure 4). During the first year of IDA19 (FY21), new commitments totaled US\$1.45 billion, while US\$250 million has, to date, been approved in FY22 (the Enhanced Collection of Revenue and ENCORE).

Figure 4: IDA commitments and number of active projects in DRC, per fiscal year, FY02-21 (US\$ million)



138. During the CPF period, DRC will seek additional IDA resources under various IDA windows. Exceptional IDA resources under the IDA19 FCV PRA (for commitment in FY22) of US\$600 million has been granted. Under IDA19, DRC also has access to resources under the Crisis Response Window (resources obtained under IDA18-19 for support to Ebola and food security responses); the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (resources obtained under IDA18-19 for support to refugees in the East and the North as AF to the ongoing STEP operation); the Regional Window (the new Great Lakes Trade Facilitation and Integration Project and a proposed regional Women's Empowerment Project); and the Scale-up Window (the Congolese authorities have not requested support under this window). Additional IDA financing under various windows will be sought for under IDA20/21 as per eligibility, including

¹⁰⁷ To provide additional support to address impacts from COVID-19, IDA19 is exceptionally implemented over two years, FY21-22. IDA allocations are indicative only and based on current IDA19 levels. Actual IDA allocations will be determined annually and depend on: (i) IDA's overall commitment authority (total IDA resources available); (ii) changes in the variables affecting DRC's PBA relative to other countries, such as country performance ratings, per capita GNI and population; and (iii) portfolio performance and progress in implementation of PPAs under IDA's SDFP.

potential PRA resources.

139. **IDA financing will be complemented by resources from various Trust Funds (TFs), World Bank-and Recipient-Executed.** Access to TFs will be sought as opportunities arise and in line with the strategic direction of the CPF, including from the Global Partnership for Education; the Global Risk Financing Facility; and the State and Peacebuilding Fund.

140. **As an IDA country of moderate risk, DRC is subject to the SDFP.** For FY21, DRC had two Performance and Policy Actions (PPAs) related to improvements in debt transparency and fiscal and debt sustainability, with the publication of quarterly bulletins and an annual debt report, as well as a non-concessional borrowing ceiling. For FY22, PPAs focus on debt transparency, with non-concessional borrowing aligned with the IMF ceiling and on fiscal sustainability, with increased timeliness and coverage of annual debt reports and publication of quarterly bulletins. All reports will include information on domestic arrears and contingent liabilities. In addition, the last quarterly debt bulletin (Q4 2021) will include initially gathered debt data for strategic SOEs.

141. **With a FY22 pipeline totaling US\$1.9 billion, all available resources under IDA19, including from the PRA, will be committed¹⁰⁸ and additional IDA resources sought.** Indicative lending for FY22-24 is laid out in Table 3. Lending is indicative in FY23 as the IDA20 PBA and potential PRA allocations are not confirmed, though with an assumption that available IDA (PBA and PRA) will be similar in volume to under IDA19. Lending in the outer years of the CPF will be elaborated in a PLR, in accordance with the overarching principles laid out in this CPF. It is anticipated that a large-scale health operation, supporting the government's intent to introduce free universal health, will be prepared for approval in FY25/26, together with a potential DPF. See Annex 7 for an outline of operations approved in FY21, with a heavy focus on HD sectors, which were all aligned with the directions of the FY22-26 CPF.

Table 3: DRC IDA - indicative lending, FY22-24

CPF Focus Area	Pipeline Projects	Relevant RRA FCV Driver	National IDA (US\$ million)		
			FY22	FY23	FY24
1. Reduce immediate and future risks of escalation of conflict and violence	Eastern Stabilization Project	1, 3, 4, 5, 6	250		
	Transport and Connectivity Support Project, Series of Operations (SOP) 1	1, 2, 3, 5, 6	750		
	Transport and Connectivity Support Project, SOP2	1, 2, 3, 5, 6		750	
	Great Lakes Trade Facilitation and Integration Project (total US\$150M, with US\$100M regional IDA)	2, 3, 6	50		
2. Strengthen systems for improved service quality and	Girls' Empowerment and Learning Project	3, 4		250	
	Women's Empowerment and SME Support Project	3, 4, 6		300	

¹⁰⁸ IDA19 resources available to DRC total US\$2.7 billion, with a PBA of about US\$2.1 billion, plus a PRA allocation of US\$0.6 billion. As of January 10, 2022, cancelled IDA resources in the amount of US\$195 million will be added to the available IDA19 resources and recommitted during FY22. With already approved IDA19 resources totaling US\$1.6 billion, remaining IDA19 resources total about US\$1.3 billion. Regional IDA reallocations will be sought to deliver the proposed US\$1.65 lending program for FY22.

human capital development	Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project	1, 2, 3	600		
	Rural Water Support Project	1, 2, 3			400
3. Strengthen economic management for increased private sector investment ¹⁰⁹	DPF1 ¹¹⁰	1, 2		300	
	DPF2	1, 2			300
	Forest and Savanna Restoration Project	1, 2, 5			300
	TA for Improved Environmental and Social Safeguards Management in the Mining Sector	2, 3, 4			150
	Renewable Energy Guarantee 1	2		50	
	Renewable Energy Guarantee 2	2			150
Total			1,650	1,650	1,300

142. **Through a combination of increased volume of financial resources under IDA and the aim of strengthening impact from each investment, the World Bank will increase the size of the average lending operation—a trend that has already commenced.** The average project size within the portfolio from FY02 to FY17 was US\$154 million, while at end FY21 it was US\$327 million (all active projects). The average size of new lending operations over the FY02 to FY17 period was US\$124 million, compared to US\$363 million in FY21¹¹¹.

143. **The WBG is ready to make use of the full gamut of instruments and its institutional breadth to engage across sectors in DRC.** Acknowledging that past support to reforms through IPFs (e.g., in the energy, water, and transport sectors) were largely ineffective (see paragraphs 216-229), the use of DPF may be considered. DPF would be anchored in continued robust macroeconomic management and reflect a credible and concrete reform effort with tangible results, including the strengthening of the citizen-state relationship, which in the long term can attenuate conflict and violence risks. IPFs will be used for investments and for technical assistance, accompanied by analytical and advisory work. When possible, IPFs with results-based modalities will be adopted. IFC will make use of its full range of investment tools, including loans, equity, and guarantees, while relying on de-risking instruments such as financing under the IDA PSW accompanying upstream and advisory work. MIGA will explore opportunities to support private investments in DRC through its political risk insurance covers – transfer restriction and currency inconvertibility, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract. MIGA will also continue to leverage its business development relationship with IFC to identify opportunities.

144. **DRC has not benefited from World Bank budget support for more than 15 years, as the last series of operations, between 2002 and 2005, were deemed underperforming based on a challenging governance environment.** Under this CPF, use of the DPF instrument may be considered, building on findings from the Independent Evaluation Group that in FCS countries *“regular and predictable DPF support was associated with improvements in policies and institutional development, especially when complemented by related investment lending and technical assistance”*¹¹². Reform areas will be carefully selected, based on client ownership, risk, and WBG comparative advantage. The country context—significant governance, corruption, and PFM challenges along with political instability and limited progress

¹⁰⁹ The ENCORE project (US\$250 million) was approved in December 2021.

¹¹⁰ Use of DPF is subject to an adequate macroeconomic and policy framework and government track record and commitment to a substantive policy reform program.

¹¹¹ The average size of all active projects at end FY21 was US\$327 million. The average size of projects approved in FY21 was US\$362.5 million.

¹¹² As laid out in a retrospective on DPF presented to the Development Committee in 2020.

in the implementation of critical reforms—may, however, not allow for the regular use of DPF. The World Bank will also make use of other lending instruments, including PforRs and IPFs with PBCs that may be more effective in supporting reform initiatives than traditional IPFs. The use of IDA guarantees is also under discussion, particularly in the renewable energy sector in Kinshasa and in the mining Copperbelt.

145. **Lending will be complemented by analytical and advisory work in support of key reforms, progress toward PRA milestones, and development priorities.** Significant World Bank advisory and analytical work is underway to support financial inclusion; financing for universal health coverage; mapping of hydropower and solar sites; country diagnostic through the Digital Economy for Africa (DE4A); infrastructure sector assessment (InfraSAP); and social protection. Proposed ASA over the CPF period will align with the CPF Focus Areas and on preventing risks of escalation of conflict and violence.

146. **The World Bank will undertake core analytics in health and security sectors.** The latter is essential for delivery of the PRA milestone around security and stabilization, which will help to address elite capture issues that can drive conflict escalation. To accompany potential DPF, the World Bank will undertake a PER. In addition, regular economic and poverty monitoring, and updates to the RRA will support agile adaptations to a rapidly changing fragility and conflict context. A review of urban transport in Kinshasa will also be undertaken, together with TA for EITI and for the financial sector. These engagements will include analysis around the poorly redistributive economy, perceptions of exclusion and how related grievances may be used to incite violence. The World Bank will prioritize ASA that will further reform initiatives or inform project preparation and/or implementation related to inclusion, such as economic development and governance (to include decentralization), women’s empowerment, social entrepreneurship and innovation, and fragility and poverty analysis (see Table 4).

Table 4: Indicative ASA Program in DRC, FY22-24

CPF Focus Area	Proposed ASA	Relevant RRA FCV Driver
1. Reduce immediate and future risks of escalation of conflict and violence	RRA Updates	All
	Urban transport in Kinshasa	3
	Public Expenditure Review, Security	2, 5, 6
	Poverty Assessment	1, 2, 3
2. Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital development	Service Delivery in Human Development Sectors Analysis	3, 4
	PER, Health	1, 3
	Social Registry Analysis	1, 3
3. Strengthen economic management for increased private sector investment	Country Economic Memorandum	1, 2, 3
	Economic Update, all fiscal years	2, 3
	EITI technical assistance	2, 5
	Analysis of operational models at decentralized levels – implementing at provincial level	1, 2, 3, 5
	DRC Financial sector development, programmatic ASA ¹¹³	2, 3
	PER	1, 2, 3
	Debt Management Performance Assessment	1, 2, 3
	Sub-national (provincial level) PEFA	1, 2, 3
	Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT)	1, 2

¹¹³ To include a World Bank-led FSAP (Financial Sector Assessment Program) Development Module in FY21/22, undertaken in coordination with the planned IMF-led Financial Sector Stability Review.

	JET Analytics	2, 3
	CCDR	2, 3
	Exploring low deforestation and low carbon development pathways in DRC	2, 3
	Regional trade analysis – opportunities in the south	2, 3

147. **The WBG’s engagements in DRC—as outlined in this CPF—address IDA19 and IDA20¹¹⁴ special themes and contribute to several Sustainable Development Goals.** Addressing fragility and preventing the escalation of violence is the foundation of this CPF, underpinning all WBG engagements in the DRC going forward. Engagements are informed by and aligned with the pillars and guiding principles of the 2020-2025 WBG Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence. The CPF also has a special focus on human capital development (specifically Focus Area 2), climate change (cross-cutting theme), gender (cross-cutting theme), crisis preparedness (COVID-19 filter), and governance and institutions (cross-cutting theme). All operational engagements will be climate-informed, integrating climate resilience and mitigative actions and support priorities and targets outlined in the 2020 Next Generation Africa Climate Business Plan, the WBG Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, and the WBG Climate Change Action Plan 2021-2025¹¹⁵. A forthcoming CCDR will support integrated efforts to mainstream climate change across engagements and sectors. A proposed stand-alone operation will directly support savanna restoration and forest protection to strengthen the resilience of landscapes and communities in provinces surrounding DRC’s rainforest.

4.2 PRA Eligibility

148. **DRC meets PRA eligibility criteria for support to countries at risk of escalation into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence.** DRC meets the qualitative (adoption of the National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Community Resilience Building) and quantitative (the close to 5,800 conflict-related 2020 deaths translate into 6.63 fatalities per 100,000 people¹¹⁶, which is within the 2–10 conflict-related deaths per 100,000 people) requirements for eligibility to the PRA¹¹⁷.

149. **The roadmap for PRA eligibility is founded on strong national commitment.** The process builds on expressed strong commitment from central and decentralized stakeholders and decision-makers, including the president, to address FCV drivers and in particular ongoing violence and insecurity in the eastern part of the country. In May 2020, the government renewed the mandate of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (STAREC), with the intention of potentially expanding its reach to violence-affected areas across DRC¹¹⁸. The president’s speech at the conclusion of national consultations (December 2020) emphasized the need for robust efforts to ensure peace and stability across the territory and to address drivers of FCV. The prime minister has concurred publicly that the new government must bring peace to the east and southeast of DRC. The recent creation

¹¹⁴ As laid out in the Second IDA20 Replenishment Meeting, Co-Chairs’ Summary.

¹¹⁵ World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan 2021–2025: Supporting Green, Resilient, and Inclusive Development.

¹¹⁶ ACLED, 2021.

¹¹⁷ PRA eligibility criteria: (i) a quantified indicator identifying countries that are at risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence; and (ii) the government must have in place a strategy or plan acceptable to IDA that describes the concrete steps that the country will take to reduce the risks of conflict or violence, and the corresponding milestones the government commits to implement with support from the PRA.

¹¹⁸ The program, which was launched in 2009, led by the Ministry of Plan, was primarily designed for armed conflict-affected areas, especially in Eastern DRC. Its main goal is to restore State authority while working towards inter-communal reconciliation and improved governance.

of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reinsertion and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS), which effectively merged the implementation unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and STAREC, shows continuing government momentum to address drivers of fragility and conflict. See Table 5 for an overview of the government's National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building and its' associated PRA milestones.

Table 5: PRA Milestones

Axis 1: Governance - consolidation of state building and restoration of state authority and transparent management of public affairs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase clarity of the processes allocating financial resources to decentralized levels by publishing the interministerial decree, signed by the Ministers of Budget and Finance, establishing the modalities for the distribution of national revenues to provinces, in application of article 220 and 221 of the 2011 Law on Public Finances. 2. Issuance and publication of the Presidential Ordinance appointing the First President of the Court of Auditors. 3. Issuance and publication in the Official Gazette of the Decree on the organic framework and administrative regulations of the Court of Auditors. 4. Enactment of a law on increasing access to public information (adoption and publication).
Axis 2: Access to Justice (and the fight against impunity)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Allocate the necessary budgetary resources to the judiciary. 6. Enactment and publication in the Official Gazette of transitional justice law and determine types of sanctions in support of transitional justice, in particular for SGBV victims. 7. Strengthen the organization and functioning of the Superior Council of the Judiciary. 8. Development and finalization of comprehensive National Security Plan.
Axis 3: Security and Stabilization
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Create and operationalize the National P-DDRCS (Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program). 10. Preparation of a comprehensive security sector reform plan. 11. Zero tolerance for abuse and misuse of authority within the Security and Defense Forces through the creation of local community security committees/operationalization of community police.
Axis 4: Socioeconomic inclusion – management of land issues and development of the mining sector
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Implementation of new land policy. 13. Increasing number and quality of Artisanal Exploitation Zones (AEZ).

150. **DRC's access to the PRA is based on progress in implementing the government's 2021 Action Plan (*Stratégie Nationale de Prévention des Conflits, de Stabilisation et de Renforcement de la Résilience des Communautés*) to reduce and prevent conflict risks.** To monitor progress, the government has designed a framework with a set of milestones to be achieved. The commitments and measures in the framework are not conditionalities for further IDA support under the PRA, nor are they binding legal conditions. Rather, they provide monitoring indicators to credibly assess whether the country environment remains adequate for IDA-financed activities and resources to support DRC in achieving its sustainable development goals and its conflict prevention agenda.

151. **The government's milestones do not require large amounts of specialized capacity or new systems.** Rather they have been conceived to strengthen existing processes, structures, and institutions. Of particular importance is the MONUSCO transition process, which requires a withdrawal of the UN peace-keeping mission that ensures the ongoing protection of civilians, the restoration of state authority,

and the strengthening of key institutions, primarily in the security and justice sectors (see Box 5). Based on violence associated with delays, disruptions, and opacity around previous presidential elections, the government has also identified the need for a transparent and credible election process as a key milestone to prevent the escalation of conflict. This is a significant change in approach and indicates the importance government places on addressing all drivers of conflict and violence within their national strategy. While this election-related milestone does not appear in the World Bank's PRA list of milestones, it remains a key indicator of government progress in preparing a credible elections process for many international, regional, and bilateral partners. These partners, as well as various UN agencies and MONUSCO, were consulted in the preparation process of the national conflict prevention strategy.

Box 5: MONUSCO Transition and the Triple Nexus Approach

The MONUSCO transition process, as outlined by a 2019 independent strategic review, highlighted the conditions for a gradual MONUSCO exit, handing key state responsibilities to the government (security, protection of civilians). These activities are supported by international partners, to deliver coordinated assistance for the transition process, and to reinforce humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding/security gains. This is the "Triple Nexus approach," first applied in the Kasais, where the UN Country Team and development partners will focus on comparative advantages and mandates to addressing development challenges.

The Triple Nexus approach aims to reduce ongoing humanitarian needs in the short to medium term, while long-term assistance works to address chronic causes of poverty and underdevelopment. The World Bank's recent establishment of a liaison office in Kananga (Kasai Central) along with its liaison office in Goma (North Kivu), will ensure close coordination with MONUSCO in areas of ongoing conflict in eastern DRC to maximize complementarity between World Bank development interventions and security, stabilization, and humanitarian support provided by other actors.

Additional IDA resources to DRC (through the PRA) will allow for new development operations within transition-affected provinces and those affected by ongoing conflict, as the wider portfolio is recalibrated to address overarching drivers of fragility in DRC.

152. **The framework is comprehensive and focuses on actions that are critical to the overall success of the program.** It includes actions that fall within IDA's mandate and expertise that can be supported by IDA resources and expertise, including under the PRA (see Annex 7). There are activities that fall outside of the mandate of IDA, which may be supported by other partners. In such cases, the World Bank will maintain a presence as an observer in oversight committees or hold bilateral discussions to remain abreast of developments.

153. **All PRA milestones are linked to conflict prevention and reduction of violence and respond directly to the RRA analysis.** Achievement of these milestones are expected to (i) increase the consolidation of state authority and legitimacy; (ii) strengthen social cohesion and citizen confidence and trust in the State; (iii) reduce elite capture and manipulation of power; (iv) increase transparency in the allocation of resources; (v) reinforce the structures and framework for conflict prevention and reduction of violence, including GBV and SEA/H; (vi) ensure greater coherence in stabilization and peace building processes; and (vii) reaffirm the primacy of the Congolese Government in addressing conflict prevention, stabilization, and resilience activities—with the strong support of international partners.

154. **By accessing the PRA, the active World Bank program in DRC will be recalibrated toward addressing the identified drivers of fragility and conflict.** This recalibration process takes place within a wider readjustment of the WBG portfolio, in which engagements will be concentrated in areas that are affected or have been affected by violence and/or conflict; areas that may see increased levels of conflict

or violence; and areas where refugee inflows lead to significant pressures on host populations. During the PRA recalibration of the World Bank portfolio, active operations will be reoriented or adjusted to better address the structural drivers of FCV and support the government's strategy for conflict prevention and escalation. Pipeline operations—either under preparation or yet to be prepared—will be designed as per the principles outlined in the CPF, responding to the underlying causes of conflict and fragility and risk of conflict escalation (see Annex 7).

4.3 Fiduciary Arrangements

155. **PFM in DRC is characterized by profound and systemwide weaknesses.** The 2020 PEFA assessment highlights weaknesses in budget reliability, predictability, and management of assets and liabilities. Budget execution and controls are affected by the frequent use of exceptional procedures and the lack of human, financial, and material resources that limit the effectiveness of national oversight institutions.

156. **Despite the adoption, in 2011, of a Law on public finances, implementation is still lagging in areas such as multi-year budgeting and the preparation of state general accounts.** Provisions mandating compliance with allocations voted by the National Assembly or control of expenditure commitments are disregarded by the executive powers. The same is true for the provision of the General Regulations on Public Accounts, which requires the establishment of a national network of public accountants to allow the preparation and presentation of reliable budget and financial accounts. A May 2021 IMF report stressed that in December 2019, two thirds of State funds were managed by local commercial banks, under de facto managers who often are not legally authorized to handle public funds. Provincial and local governments have replicated and extended these central level dysfunctionalities in raising revenue and managing scarce public resources.

157. **The Congolese authorities have initiated actions to fight corruption and foster transparency—**by building an effective administration able to deliver basic services. Improvements have been registered in increasingly empowered oversight institutions and investigations carried out by the IGF, which have also been followed by sanctions. Presently, budget preparations and execution, as well as cash management, accounting, and reporting standards are all weak, and the tools used frequently obsolete.

158. **Fiduciary risks attached to World Bank supported operations are high, a consequence of the overall weakness in DRC's PFM arrangements.** As a risk mitigating measure, the World Bank relied on one external Project Implementation Unit (PIU), the Bureau Central de Coordination, with contractual staff, when it reengaged in DRC. Over the years, additional PIUs have been established under the oversight of sectoral ministries, though they have continued to rely on contractual staff and to operate with little oversight¹¹⁹. Contractual staff, including fiduciary staff, are recruited competitively and benefit from competitive salaries. Fiduciary PIU staff receive significant training from the World Bank fiduciary teams.

159. **Despite the strong focus on fiduciary controls within PIUs, World Bank-supported operations are affected by fraud and corruption, as well as occurrences of ineligible expenditures.** There have been many complaints linked to World Bank operations in DRC, across all sectors. World Bank investigations have been conducted on 43 percent of the value of commitments and 20 percent of operations across sectors. Since 2014, there have been around US\$20 million in ineligible expenses in the implementation of World Bank funded projects in DRC. Ineligible expenditures are mostly caused by PIU non-compliance with procurement guidelines, lack of proper justification of expenditures, and undue benefits paid to PIU

¹¹⁹ For example, in DRC, Project Steering Committees (PSC) are often ineffective as members expect an attendance fee ("jeton de presence") which cannot be financed through project funds.

staff.

160. **DRC faces unique fiduciary challenges due to its geography and lack of infrastructure.** Payments to individuals (e.g., teachers and safety net beneficiaries) in remote areas can typically only be conducted by road, increasing the potential for armed robbery. The World Bank is exploring digital payments in the long term. Upfront, an extended network of accredited agents will be trained to safely process payments.

161. **During the CPF period, the World Bank will continue to strengthen fiduciary controls, building on lessons from the past 20 years.** The World Bank will adopt a two-pronged approach: (i) reinforce existing fiduciary arrangements through PIUs; and (ii) strengthen the foundations of public financial management. In addition to fiduciary oversight, where there is a concentration of World Bank-financing in specific sectors, upfront assessments of institutional arrangements will be undertaken.

162. **The World Bank will increase its reliance on HEIS.** This will help strengthen procurement capacity and accelerate the procurement of critical activities for operations with procurement of high-risk, high-value contracts (HEIS was recently used in the DRC COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project and the DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project). While HEIS improves implementation, it does not necessarily comprehensively address the capacity gap on the client side. Therefore, the use of a Procurement Implementation Advisor, for specific ministries and World Bank financed projects, will also be explored, to provide technical support on complex procurement packages.


163. **The World Bank will seek to further rely on its preventive (for the procurement of high-risk, high-value contracts) and forensic services (for in-depth fiduciary reviews), in addition to investigations.** Risk mitigation measures to address fiduciary risks are described in full in Section V on risks.

4.4 Implementation Arrangements

164. **Supervision and implementation in a fragile context with weak capacity—across a vast territory—pose significant challenges.** These challenges are accentuated by persistent and active conflict in parts of the country, and associated security risks; weak infrastructure, which hampers physical access across a large territory; coupled with restrictions posed by COVID-19 (see Section V on risks). Over the past 20 years, most World Bank engagements, particularly in the social sectors, have been implemented across the entire territory, with no portfolio-wide geographic focus or concentration (see Figure 14).

165. **The World Bank will focus implementation of most geographically targeted investment operations in densely populated provinces, with a high number of poor, and that represent fragility/conflict hotspots.** These provinces comprise 67 percent of the total population, 61 percent of the country's poor, and 28 percent of the Congolese territory. Ten of these provinces make up two distinct, currently not connected, corridors of people and activity: one runs east-west along the southern edge of the forest and the other runs north-south bordering the Great Lakes (see Figure 5). These corridors also have the highest economic concentration and potential ("leading regions"). Two additional provinces in the north-west, which are lagging regions with high population density (the only densely populated lagging regions in DRC), will receive targeted refugee-related support. Spatially targeted engagements will complement investments that have a national reach, including support to reform processes (e.g., in PFM, education, energy, mining, transport, and water sectors) and systems strengthening (to include support to strengthen pandemic resilience and address SGBV).

Figure 5: CPF priority provinces for engagement and WBG office locations



166. **Increasing investment amounts and a geographic concentration will increase per capita investment and impact.** Furthermore, it will create economies of scale and leverage engagements across sectors and present opportunities to consolidate and standardize approaches to implementation support, including through shared systems across projects (e.g., GRM, prevention of SEA/H etc.). Focusing operations in high degradation areas surrounding the forest, coupled with specific investments in landscape restoration and improved cropping systems, will also help ease pressure on the forest.

167. **World Bank staff will be further decentralized, increasing presence across the territory through liaison offices in Goma and Kananga.** To strengthen project design and supervision capabilities, the WBG will deploy additional staff in the field, bringing staff closer to stakeholders,

beneficiaries, and implementing units. Decentralized staff will also facilitate dialogue and collaboration with NGOs. Staff in two newly established liaison offices in Goma (in the East) and Kananga (Kasais, in the center of the country) will ensure close dialogue with the client and facilitate project preparation and supervision, including functions such as safeguards and fiduciary support.

168. **To address risks and challenges linked to the implementation of the World Bank portfolio in DRC, the number of staff based in field offices are projected to increase from around 70 to 100.** Most additional staff will be based in the Goma and Kananga offices¹²⁰. Specific focus will be placed on strengthening fiduciary and safeguards functions. The corporate security team has also been reinforced.

169. **The liaison office in Goma in the East is in a geographic area where conflict is still ongoing.** The office will support work on stabilization, the curbing of ongoing conflict, and mitigation of impacts from ongoing conflict and violence. In addition to ensuring direct contact with local stakeholders, the office will provide security support to visiting missions and staff. The Kananga liaison office will play a central role in the implementation of the “Triple Nexus”, with the objective of preventing conflict from recurring, supporting stability and peace, and promoting good governance. The office will facilitate strategic collaboration and dialogue with UN agencies and bilateral partners on the ground.

170. **An in-country FCV team supports the work of the Country Management Unit (CMU) and Country**

¹²⁰ In the Goma office, staff numbers are projected to increase from six to 20 permanent staff. Up to ten staff are projected to be based in the Kananga office by the end of the CPF period.

Team across the three locations. Implementation of interventions in the two refugee-targeted provinces, North and South Ubangi, may benefit from support from the CAR Country Office (Bangui). IFC has three staff members based in Kinshasa (including a Resident Representative).

171. **The Goma and Kananga offices can be reached via air travel from Kinshasa, with commercial and humanitarian flights several times per week.** The main Kinshasa offices (World Bank and IFC) serve as a base for Task-Team Leaders (TTLs) and visiting missions. While the decentralized offices increase proximity to the authorities in the host provinces (Nord Kivu and Kasai Central), security and logistical challenges, coupled with COVID-19 restrictions, continue to make it difficult to reach many remote areas.

172. **A strengthened security team supports WBG implementation on the ground.** Three security specialists constantly assess the situation on the ground—in close collaboration with MONUSCO and other partners. Ongoing analysis and security advice allow for responsible and safe mission implementation. Security specialists may also accompany mission teams to the field. There will be constant exchange between WBG security teams and those on the client side to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of risks.

4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

173. There will be focus under the CPF on improving existing data gathering and digital monitoring systems and provide additional technology-based analytical and decision-making support, including to strengthen citizen engagement, GRM, Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) implementation and monitoring, and portfolio mapping. See Annex 8 for further information.

174. **Given persistent insecurity in DRC and the possibility of conflict escalation, Third-Party Monitoring (TPM)¹²¹ will be used, where practical.** TPM Type I is used by PIUs to monitor compliance with financing terms, verify quality of investments, assess adherence to social and environmental safeguards, or strengthen standard M&E processes. TPM Type II¹²² is used by World Bank to fulfill supervision and implementation support responsibilities and may cover the examining of: (i) progress and quality of infrastructure and construction; (ii) quality of service provision; (iii) effectiveness of GRMs; (iv) adherence to Environmental and Social Standards (ESS); and (v) integrity of financial management systems and procurement practices. In both cases, a portfolio approach can be explored, and GEMS activities may be leveraged. Use of TPM is expensive (especially in insecure operating environments).

175. **To strengthen implementation and improve impact from engagements in DRC, the WBG will employ citizen engagement mechanisms throughout its portfolio.** Citizen engagement can help address inequities, strengthen transparency, improve state-citizen relations, build legitimacy and trust in institutions, and mend the social contract, thereby addressing underlying risks of escalation of conflict and violence. During the CPF period, sustainable mechanisms that involve beneficiaries in service delivery platforms will be established, aiming to strengthen mechanisms for inclusion.

176. **In agreement with the World Bank, the authorities may engage UN agencies for the provision of specialized technical implementation support, as well as for reliable quality control in the procurement of goods and supplies, principally in the health and agricultural sectors¹²³.** Such implementation by UN agencies is governed by World Bank-negotiated Standard Forms of Agreement that lay out fiduciary operational policy flexibilities and requirements, as well as environmental and social risk

¹²¹ The typology was developed in “Demystifying Third-Party Monitoring in Fragile States. A Global Review as part of the FCV Pilots” published as an internal World Bank document by the FCV Group, March 2019.

¹²² TPM refers to the use of World Bank budget or trust fund resources to procure the services of a Contractor or Vendor to verify project performance and adherence by the Recipient to financing terms.

¹²³ In FY21, US\$45.7 million was disbursed to UN agencies in DRC, with estimated FY22, close to US\$200 million.

management operational policy requirements governing, inter alia, codes of conduct, GBV and SEA.

4.6 Partnerships and Donor Coordination

177. **DRC does not have a comprehensive, integrated, strategic international development partner framework**, within which strong development dialogue and shared outcomes between government and development partners can take place. Since 2003, the international community has emphasized humanitarian and peacekeeping support, which bypasses country systems and institutions. Several mechanisms exist at a sectoral/technical level that allow development partners to discuss (mostly bilateral) activities and initiatives, but none of these are steered by government. Interaction between these groups and government is primarily ad hoc. The World Bank is one of the few development partners working directly with and through the government.

178. **Bilateral and multilateral development partners attend the *Groupe de coordination des partenaires (GCP)***, a forum co-chaired by the UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)/Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and the EU Ambassador. GCP meetings and content are built around information sharing and dialogue, rather than coordination and strategic planning. As such, it has not served as an effective tool to develop unified and coherent approaches around major development issues. The World Bank has, since November 2019, held tripartite meetings with the US and the UK. These meetings have furthered strategic harmonization and shaped collective outcomes.

179. **Humanitarian coordination in DRC is strong.** All UN agencies play a significant role, overseen by the DSRSG/Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. Humanitarian Response Plans for DRC are large and regularly underfunded. Furthermore, there is, at times, a lack of clarity between funding appeals for humanitarian activities, and those for other actions – such as for the implementation of the “Triple Nexus” approach in the Kasais. The World Bank has observer status at the UN Humanitarian Coordination Team meetings, which include several international humanitarian NGOs, and focus on life saving and emergency issues. The World Bank also participates in UN Country Team meetings.

180. **The portfolios of the main development partners are dominated by humanitarian aid, where support does not flow through government systems.** The transition from humanitarian interventions to a comprehensive development program is difficult, though UN agencies have identified a stabilization policy under the guidance of the SMSG, jointly with MONUSCO. It has taken nearly two years for agencies and development partners to reach agreement on a common approach for “Triple Nexus” activities and develop an appropriate co-ordination mechanism that includes central and provincial government participation. The World Bank engages at the Kinshasa and Kasai levels of nexus discussions and coordination and is an active member of the donor-led Nexus Coordination Group. The establishment of the World Bank liaison office in Kananga will reinforce this work and facilitate coordination in the Kasais.

181. **The IMF has resumed close cooperation with DRC.** In July 2021, the IMF Executive Board approved a US\$1.52 billion three-year arrangement under the ECF (100 percent of quota). The ECF will support the authorities’ medium-term reform program aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, increasing fiscal space, and promoting sustainable, private sector-led growth. approval and completion of the first ECF review (December 2021) enabled disbursement of US\$429.2 million to reinforce international reserves. This follows IMF emergency support under the Rapid Credit Facility (December 2019, April 2020) totaling US\$731.7 million (50 percent of quota)¹²⁴ and an SDR allocation of US\$1.45 billion (100 percent of quota) issued in August 2021. Key policy actions under the program focus on investment and social spending, the monetary framework, financial supervision, and economic governance and transparency.

¹²⁴ IMF Press Releases No. 19/465 and 20/182.

V. MANAGING RISKS TO THE CPF PROGRAM

182. **Due to a combination of conflict, corruption, and GBV/SGBV, the World Bank is facing a unique and extraordinary level of risk through its engagements in DRC.** In Eastern DRC, there is a concern over the potential radicalization of certain rebel groups, where, in March 2021, the US Department of State designated the Allied Democratic Forces as a terrorist group affiliated with Islamic State (ISIS). International personnel have also been injured and killed on Congolese territory in recent years.

183. **The pervasive and devastating nature of sexual violence in DRC is better documented.** However, it remains among the most epic challenges. Dr. Denis Mukwege has been an advocate and leader for thousands of survivors in DRC, where he lives and works. He was a co-recipient of the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize and is a global leader dedicated to ending the use of sexual violence as a weapon of conflict¹²⁵.

184. **Security and stability are threatened by persistent conflict and violence; the highest number of conflict-related fatalities since the end of the war occurred in 2020.** World Bank and development partner staff working in DRC are subject to significant risk of physical harm or death. In just five years, there have been several fatalities, including, in March 2017, the killing of two members of the UN Group of Experts on Congo¹²⁶ while investigating human rights violations in the Central Kasai region. In April 2019, a World Health Organisation epidemiologist contributing to the Ebola response was killed in Butembo, North Kivu. Most recently, in February 2021, the Italian Ambassador and two members of his mission (a bodyguard and a driver) were killed on the way to visit a UN humanitarian project outside Goma. Kidnappings for ransom are relatively frequent.

185. **Rampant and large-scale corruption, as uncovered in a recent IGF investigation, translates into elevated risks of fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed operations in DRC.** The IGF is investigating embezzlement and fraud cases linked to COVID-19 and Ebola responses, the President's 100-day program, and the free primary education policy. Following these investigations, several high-level political figures, including the President's former Chief of Staff, a former Minister of Education, and a former Minister of Health, have been convicted of fraud and corruption charges.

186. **Violence and sexual violence against women are prevalent across the Congolese society and present significant risk, despite increased focus and concrete measures aimed to address GBV and SEA/H.** A 2018 Inspection Panel investigation uncovered a failure to implement GBV prevention in a World Bank-financed transport project in DRC. Through resulting strengthened GRMs in DRC operations, the World Bank is receiving an increasing number of reported cases of GBV/SGBV. Awareness of SGBV in DRC has been further heightened due to recent allegations of SEA/H committed by aid workers and staff in international and multilateral organizations during the 10th EVD response in Eastern DRC¹²⁷.

187. **The WBG will support the government's efforts in addressing critical risks to development, including on governance, security, and environmental and social safeguards.** The WBG will adopt a systematic approach to addressing identified risks—ensuring mitigation measures are in place—together

¹²⁵ A surgeon and gynecologist, Dr. Mukwege has helped thousands of victims of sexual violence while advocating internationally for survivors of GBV in the context of conflict. The founder of Panzi hospital on the outskirts of Bukavu, Mukwege applies a holistic model that integrates psychological support, legal assistance and socioeconomic support and has treated more than 50,000 victims of sexual violence. He has become a global expert on how to treat physical and psychological wounds of sexual violence.

¹²⁶ The UN Group of Experts on Congo is appointed by the UN secretary-general to monitor the Security Council's sanctions regime for Congo and to propose individuals and entities to be added to the sanctions list.

¹²⁷ A WHO investigation into the reported allegations has identified and received testimony from a total of 75 victims (63 women and 12 men).

with strong processes to address issues should risks materialize. This includes technical assistance for improved capacity, management, and oversight (government at central and decentralized levels, PIUs), with particular focus on procurement, financial management, and environmental and social safeguards; support to reform initiatives, including policy change, through potential DPF and/or governance-focused sector engagements; and dedicated operational engagements aimed to address various risks including conflict (e.g., the proposed Eastern Stabilization Project) and SGBV (e.g., the ongoing GBV Prevention and Response Project, the Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education (EESSE) project and the forthcoming two projects in support of girls' and women's empowerment).

188. **The overall risk rating for the CPF is 'High'.** Individual risk ratings are outlined in the Systematic Operations Risk-rating Tool (SORT), Table 6. Five risk categories are rated 'High', including for risks linked to political and governance; fiduciary; environmental and social; stakeholders; and conflict and violence. These risks and associated residual risk mitigation measures are described in paragraphs 189 to 215.

Table 6: Systematic Operations Risk-rating Tool (SORT)

Risk Category	Rating¹²⁸
Political and governance	H
Macroeconomics	S
Sector strategies and policies	S
Technical design	M
Institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability	S
Fiduciary	H
Environmental and social	H
Stakeholders	H
Conflict and violence	H
Overall	High

189. **Political and governance risks are rated 'High'.** While there are some convincing indications of government commitment to an ambitious reform agenda and to changing the social contract in DRC, the past twenty years have been marked by a lack of government commitment to reform implementation and weak interest in the population's needs. The current government recognizes the critical need for reform, to ensure DRC develops and the population's needs can be addressed. Planned 2023 elections may, however, derail the reform agenda or politicize reforms and programs. It will be critical for the authorities to rapidly deliver on its reform commitments to neutralize some of the opposition to change that exists within the system, build confidence with citizens, and generate momentum and demand for further reform. It will be important for the WBG and the international partner community at large to support reformers and to monitor early successes which can be built on.

190. **To support and encourage implementation of reforms, the World Bank will increase the use of results-based financing within lending.** Through such financing modalities, the World Bank may couple infrastructure investments with needed system reforms—ensuring sustainability (in energy, water, transport, telecommunication, education, and health sectors). Reform-focused engagements will be coupled with substantive, prolonged policy dialogue at central and decentralized levels. In sectors where commitment is considered strong and there is visible reform progress, the World Bank may consider the use of the DPF instrument. Its use will be determined based on a careful assessment of the environment and context, including commitment, governance, and record implementing earlier reforms.

¹²⁸ L = Low; M = Moderate; S = Substantial; H = High.

191. **The WBG will continue to use existing country platforms made up of multilateral and bilateral partners to dialogue and communicate, creating consensus around reform agendas.** The WBG will continue to leverage and expand upon work with CSOs and key stakeholders (FBOs also), aiming to enhance participation, voice, and access. The Catholic Church, for example, is a powerful stakeholder in DRC. The church can influence public opinion (as well as other prominent stakeholders such as teachers' unions) toward reform, as seen in 2019 during the launch of free primary schooling.
192. **Macroeconomic risks are rated 'Substantial'.** Given significant fiscal pressure, low revenue mobilization, and high dependence on volatile extractives sectors, macroeconomic risks are substantial. Without improved domestic revenue mobilization, which will allow for increased spending in human and physical capital, diversification of the economy, and an acceleration of economic growth, poverty numbers may continue to rise. In the medium- to long-term, continued weak public investment will also curtail development and there is a risk of increased debt, which might limit the space to absorb shocks.
193. **The latest debt sustainability analysis (July 2021) assesses DRC's risk of debt distress to be moderate.** DRC is vulnerable to export volatility and to its narrow revenue base. This emphasizes the need for economic diversification and revenue mobilization highlighted earlier, but also keeping non-concessional borrowings to high-impact projects and within the ceiling agreed under the IMF program and the policy and performance action under the World Bank SDFP.
194. **To mitigate macroeconomic risks, the WBG will engage comprehensively, through dialogue and investments, and work in close collaboration with the IMF to strengthen macroeconomic and fiscal management.** The World Bank will consider the use of DPFs or performance-based disbursement methods to support reforms for improved macroeconomic and fiscal management.
195. **Risks linked to sector strategies and policies are rated 'Substantial'.** Sector strategies are generally weak, and/or poorly implemented, and while policies may be adopted, they are frequently not implemented. The strengthening of policies and strategies in sectors critical to the development of the Congolese economy will require the adoption and implementation of difficult reforms, including updating and strengthening regulatory and institutional frameworks, improving institutional effectiveness and governance, and undertake concrete decentralization measures for improved accountability.
196. **Based on experience from the past CAS period, and as laid out in the CLR, investment lending operations in DRC will include support to the implementation of critical reforms and institutional building activities at the national and provincial levels, through support to government programs.** An example of this is the EESSE project, a results-based loan with PBCs (a first for DRC), which partially finances the government's free primary schooling program through support to reforms addressing PFM, rationalization of the education administration offices, and teacher recruitment reforms. Moreover, support under World Bank financing to complex reform processes will be reinforced through enhanced implementation and technical support from senior World Bank sector teams based in DRC.
197. **Risks related to institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability are rated 'Substantial'.** Weak technical and institutional capacity to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate programs pose a major constraint to successfully implementing WBG programs. While certain ministries (health, education, water/energy, and transport) have significant experience working with IDA, other parts of the administration, particularly at decentralized levels, do not. Successful implementation of critical ESF and fiduciary requirements will therefore require significant capacity support.
198. **Active and planned engagements will include targeted capacity building support at ministerial and implementing agency level.** There will be increased efforts to directly involve civil servants in project implementation and to build sustainable capacity in ministries at all levels, including through

performance-based payments. This would ensure critical continuity and ownership, at the technical level, in a context of frequent leadership changes. Decentralization of PIUs and World Bank staff (supported through the two decentralized offices – see section IV) will help build further capacity at provincial level.

199. **The World Bank will gradually increase reliance on government institutions and civil servants for project implementation through targeted and sustained capacity building efforts.** The World Bank has piloted performance-based payments for civil servants in the health sector. Such approaches will be further tested and applied to encourage project implementation by civil servants, where performance-based payments will partially compensate for low salary scales. Where PIUs are still in operation, the World Bank will work to further professionalize the PIUs with, for example, the implementation of rigorous performance assessments of staff and a focus on strengthened oversight and accountability.

200. **Fiduciary risks are rated ‘High’.** Fiduciary risks in DRC are ubiquitous, notwithstanding government commitment to combat corruption. High fiduciary risk is primarily a result of weak governance, weak capacity (including for financial management), and lack of enforcement of laws and regulations. As a result, and despite the implementation of tailored fiduciary arrangements (see section 4.3), the World Bank faces significant financial management and procurement risks in its portfolio.

201. **The CPF period might experience increased fiduciary risks due to larger, multisectoral operations coupled with decentralized implementation/operational structures.** While larger, multisectoral operations are more complex, this approach focuses fiduciary oversight on a smaller number of operations. Implementation at provincial level can initially appear more complex, due to weak capacity and limited familiarity with World Bank operations, yet past experiences have shown increased ownership at the provincial level, with increased accountability and a focus on results. The Kananga and Goma World Bank offices will also allow closer fiduciary oversight across the provinces targeted under the CPF.

202. **In-country staff presence for key fiduciary functions will be further strengthened.** Over the CPF period, the World Bank intends to double the number of country-based governance and fiduciary staff in each of the three offices, who will: (i) provide hands-on support to the authorities at the national and provincial levels; (ii) systematically identify the specific internal control failures that facilitate fraud and corruption, and support government to address those weaknesses by implementing institutional reforms such as those described in Box 4; (iii) provide rigorous oversight through prior and post reviews and monitoring of audit findings; and (iv) strengthen client capacity in fiduciary management and processes.

203. **Environmental and social risks are rated ‘High’, to include risks of GBV and SGBV.** Management of environmental and social (E&S) risks is hampered by a lack of client technical capacity in government ministries, project implementation units, and among consultants preparing or implementing safeguard instruments. Preparation and implementation of such instruments are also hampered by limited human and financial resources, as well as weak processes and systems. Capacity and resources for enforcement are also weak. These challenges have been highlighted by more robust environment and social safeguards instruments prepared for projects under the ESF. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has limited the ability of World Bank staff and project teams to interact with beneficiaries and stakeholders or provide timely support to the implementation of safeguards under IDA’s financed operations.

204. **The WBG has increased its efforts to provide capacity building in safeguards and the new ESF standards for project teams.** These efforts, which have included workshops, one-on-one working sessions with project teams, and regular group meetings with project E&S specialists, will continue over the CPF period. Such interactions have raised awareness of key risks and options to address them. Stronger focus has been placed on proactive stakeholder engagements and on enhancing project-level GRMs. CMU E&S development staff has increased in the past two years to manage the workload more effectively and provide enhanced support to teams and clients. This support will be further enhanced as E&S safeguards

staff will also be permanently based in the two field offices in DRC, not just in Kinshasa. There will also be support to the program from staff based in Nairobi and DC.

205. **The World Bank has taken measures to address identified environmental risks and build capacity.** These include, at project level, extensive client training and direct support from World Bank E&S staff. At portfolio level, measures include a 2018 E&S Risk Management Assessment and close integration and support to the preparation of ESF instruments into the project cycle. The inclusion of OHS requirements in contracts and other bidding documents is systematic. Compliance monitoring of OHS remains a challenge. Training sessions have been organized on ESF content and processes, road safety, Unexploded Ordnances and Landmines (UXO) risk management, and defensive driving. In addition, standard operating procedures for managing UXO risks in infrastructure projects and a road safety manual for contractors and PIUs have been adopted. Additional support is needed to undertake agile reviews, strengthen ownership on the client side, and enhance the legal framework and tools for environmental and social risk. The World Bank will continue to support relevant public institutions through policy-level support and environmental risk management capacity building, including facilitating a partnership framework for remote environmental compliance monitoring and supervision.

206. **Social safeguards risks in the portfolio are high but should be seen against the backdrop of the country's high overall social risk context of persistent conflict and violence, including GBV; forced displacement; and widespread marginalization of vulnerable groups and individuals.** Key social risks that can be created or exacerbated by World Bank-financed projects include: loss of access to land or involuntary resettlement (including physical and/or economic displacement); non-inclusion of vulnerable populations in project benefits, including women and girls, single parent household heads, older citizens, and indigenous peoples; loss of access to natural resources or land for indigenous peoples; security and safety risks linked to military and other armed groups active in project areas; and GBV, including SEA/SH.

207. **World Bank-financed projects in DRC will include enhanced GRMs, which encompass multiple entry points that offer safe, accessible, and confidential reporting channels, including avenues for filing anonymous reports on cases of abuse.** Strong mechanisms for reporting and addressing SEA/SH have been established in ongoing operations, including the GBV prevention and response project. Since 2018, almost 30,000 GBV survivors have accessed services through World Bank-funded GBV service providers. In the cases of EESSE and Kin Elenda, strong GRMs are integrated into the project design—for EESSE, the GRM is a mobile based platform called Allo Ecole. The design and implementation of functional GRMs will be systematized across all operational engagements throughout the CPF period.

208. **A 2017-18 IP investigation into DRC ProRoutes transport project highlighted breaches of contract, including labor conditions, and failure to implement SEA/SH prevention measures.** As a result, 16 IDA operations were restructured (portfolio retrofitting since January 2019) to include specific SEA/SH risk mitigation measures. In addition, new projects have been supported to identify and address SEA/SH risks from project preparation stage, integrating robust detection and response mechanisms into the design and behavior change elements into project components.

209. **Focus on GBV, including SEA/SH, will continue throughout the CPF period.** In addition to continued focus on detection of cases and support to survivors, the WBG will aim to address behaviors that lead to GBV, with the long-term goal of reducing the number of cases. In this regard, the World Bank is working to inform and change social norms through behavior change initiatives that remain survivor as well as women and girl-centered and that seek to transform unequal power dynamics and harmful attitudes towards women and girls. Such initiatives include gender-sensitive teacher training, the recruitment of community-based female focal points to increase access to services, and enhanced economic and educational opportunities for girls and women. The EESSE is the first World Bank financed

education project providing support to a GBV mitigation package, targeting long-term behavior change through training and mobilization of communities (teachers and parent committees) and female focal points in every school (providing psycho-social training to survivors). The proposed Girls' Empowerment and Learning and Women's Empowerment projects, along with EESSE and the GBV projects, will be cornerstones of the World Bank's support to making a change in the behavioral aspects of GBV.

210. **Stakeholder risk is rated 'High'. WBG operations in DRC are highly scrutinized by national and international actors, including media and CSOs, representing reputational risk.** There is, among certain stakeholders, strong skepticism as to the effectiveness of WBG engagements in DRC—an environment often depicted as highly corrupt, where it is difficult to progress on the development agenda, and where activities may even have a perceived negative impact (e.g., cases of GBV and SGBV in WBG operations).

211. **To mitigate stakeholder and reputational risks, the WBG will develop and deploy a comprehensive external engagement approach.** Comprehensive engagement and communications strategies will be designed and implemented, targeting central and decentralized stakeholders from government, non-government, academia, and private spheres. This will include a strengthening of WBG relations with CSOs, FBOs, UN agencies, and community structures that play a role in decision-making and implementation of population-centric programs and engagements. Furthermore, citizen engagement will be used as a tool to incorporate stakeholder and citizens' voices into the design and implementation of WBG engagements in DRC—as has been done in the design of the Kin Elenda and EESSE projects.

212. **Conflict and violence risks are rated 'High'.** There are high risks represented by ongoing conflict, violence, and insecurity in DRC, as well as from the possibility of renewed conflict, potentially affecting project implementation as well as WBG and PIU staff safety. Planned 2023 elections could also lead to an increase in civil unrest and conflict, impacting security risks for anyone working on projects in DRC. The poor condition of ground and air travel represents additional risks.

213. **Improved security measures are in place for all WBG and PIU staff.** Three Corporate Security Officers and a mission coordinator based in DRC continuously monitor and assess the security situation, in liaison with MONUSCO and the UN at large. A Staff Field Mission Guide has been prepared, providing a comprehensive set of safety protocols. Risk measures are recommended by the security team and missions subject to Country Director approval. PIU staff and contractor safety will be closely monitored, and capacity support provided to ensure adherence to the ESF.

214. **The two liaison offices (Goma and Kananga) will facilitate staff missions, including implementation of identified security measures.** With the establishment of these offices, new security risk mitigation measures have been added, including protocols for carrying personal protective equipment or use of MONUSCO escorts, and the accompanying of corporate security in "red areas". As per the ESF, a country-wide Security Management Plan (SMP) will be prepared on the client side, to inform project-level SMPs, hence ensuring coherence in mitigating and addressing security risks in the implementation of World Bank financed projects. There will be a constant exchange between WBG security teams and those on the client side to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of risks.

215. **Risk mitigation is aligned with the recently approved Updated Policy on Development Cooperation and Fragility, Conflict and Violence.** The CPF is based on findings and recommendations from the 2021 RRA and designed to adjust assistance in a dynamic manner to best respond to the needs and circumstances of the evolving FCV situation. The approach is aligned with the Updated FCV Policy on engaging in humanitarian crises, forced displacement, and the security sector. WBG engagement in such situations will continue to be based on the institution's comparative advantage, the development rationale, and focused on long-term engagement in support of national systems, strengthening core state functions, and building institutional resilience and capacity.

VI. MAPS AND FURTHER ANALYSIS

Figure 6: DRC land cover and land use (2020) (left) and primary forest loss (2002-2020) (right)




Figure 7: DRC spatial distribution of mining permits (by resource type)




Figure 8: DRC artisanal mining sites and conflict




Figure 9: DRC intermodal transport corridors and “core” road network (main axes)




Figure 10: DRC energy infrastructure and generation capacity




Figure 11: DRC ICT infrastructure (2020)




Figure 12: Geographic evolution of violent events across DRC, 2018 - 2021






Figure 13: DRC population, infrastructure, conflict, and forest resource mapping



Note: This map is developed based on preceding maps on forests (Figure 6); transport, energy, and ICT infrastructure (Figures 7, 8, 9); and conflict (Figure 12).

Figure 14: Geographic distribution of the World Bank portfolio in DRC



Note: Mapping is not exhaustive and does not include all active operations.


Analysis of World Bank engagements in DRC over the past 20 years

216. **The WBG reengaged in DRC in 2001, together with other partners and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), after 10 years of non-engagement during the wars.** Since reengagement in 2001, four country strategies have been adopted—two transitional strategies (2001 and 2004) and two CAS (2008 in 2012). The last strategy was updated and extended through a 2016 CAS PLR). An SCD was finalized in 2018. The preparation of a new CPF was postponed for various reasons: the two-year delay of presidential elections originally scheduled for November 2016 and subsequent delays in forming a coalition government (September 2019). This coalition government did not engage in the design of a new partnership framework. In April 2021, when a new government with Parliamentary majority was in place, discussions around strategic priorities for WBG engagement were undertaken.

217. **The four WBG strategies adopted since 2001 have identified persistent constraints to DRC’s sustainable development, e.g., conflict and violence, weak human capital, and pervasive corruption.** Furthermore, the four strategies have, to a large extent, also identified similar responses: stabilization, investment in human development, strengthening governance, and fostering private sector investment. This section examines how resources under IDA12-17 were invested and briefly discuss their impact.

218. **From FY02 to FY17 (IDA12-17), the World Bank financed 47 projects in DRC (not counting AF as separate projects), with total commitments of about US\$7.55 billion.** During the same period, there were disbursements of nearly US\$6.16 billion, i.e., an average of US\$410 million per year (there was no disbursement in FY02). World Bank investments over this period focused on infrastructure, with limited impact on institutional capacity or reforms. Out of the US\$7.55 billion committed over 15 years, around 50 percent was dedicated to infrastructure (see Figure 15 below), while the remaining was split between budget support/governance projects and operations in the social sectors. Limited investments were made in the agriculture and forestry sectors. Though the amounts invested in infrastructure sectors in DRC from FY02 to FY17 are substantial, at US\$3.8 billion, the impact has been diminished by demographic factors (e.g., population growth¹²⁹), the sheer magnitude of the territory, and other factors¹³⁰. The same applies in the social sectors.

Figure 15: Breakdown of IDA commitments in DRC, IDA12-17 and IDA18 (US\$ billion) ¹³¹



¹²⁹ At the official end of the last war, in 2003, the Congolese population was about 50 million, with 40 million living in absolute poverty. Since then, the population is estimated to have more than doubled, with around 60 million people living in extreme poverty.

¹³⁰ Vivien Foster and Daniel Alberto Benitez: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic: The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Infrastructure: A continental perspective. March 2010.

¹³¹ DDR and GBV prevention projects are considered social protection engagements and are mapped with HD projects.

219. **In the transport sector, the World Bank provided US\$250 million for the rehabilitation of 2,500 km of dirt roads in Eastern and Northern DRC; US\$365 million for the rehabilitation of 1,300 km of the railway, acquisition, and rehabilitation of 30 locomotives and 900 wagons; and US\$50 million for the rehabilitation of Goma airport since 2002.** Road rehabilitation in the East and North was critical in restoring access and mobility after the wars, where World Bank investments have benefited about 2.5 million people. However, the investment only covers a fraction of DRC's 58,000 km of essential national and provincial roads. Furthermore, road maintenance by the national road maintenance fund is not adequate, which has led to many rehabilitated roads quickly deteriorating. In the railway sector, the dire financial situation of the National Railway Company (*Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo*, SNCC) indicates that infrastructure financed under DRC Multi-modal Transport Project may not have been properly maintained after project closure in FY18¹³². Moreover, all mining products are now exported by road through Zambia, not by rail. While the Goma airport reconstruction has been largely satisfactory, it is not yet finished (started in FY15), and the airport needs further works following the 2021 Nyiragongo volcanic eruption.

220. **In the energy sector, World Bank focus has been expanding transmission capacity to increase domestic and regional power demand (with close to US\$1 billion invested through the Southern Africa Power Market project and the Regional and Domestic Markets Development project) and on rehabilitating old generation infrastructure, with little emphasis on distribution to increase access.** As a result, the generation capacity of Inga 1 and 2 has increased by 632 MW and the rehabilitation of 2,400 km of transmission lines (Inga – Kinshasa – Kolwezi) has augmented power supply to mines in the Katanga “Copperbelt”. Despite the expansion of transmission and distribution over the past twenty years, general access to electricity has only increased from 7 percent in 2001 to 19 percent in 2020—as the population has almost doubled over the same period.

221. **In the water sector, treatment plants have been rehabilitated in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi (in the Copperbelt) and Matadi (the port gateway of DRC) under World Bank financed operations, adding an additional 65,000 cubic meters of clean water per day.** Through DRC Urban Water Supply Project (US\$365 million) and other emergency projects (around US\$500 million), 1,000 km of water pipes have been laid, with 2.5 million people gaining access to basic water supply services. Meanwhile, the population of Kinshasa has more than doubled—from six million to likely around 15 million—and the volume of investments has therefore not been sufficient to keep up with demographic trends and demand/need.

222. **Infrastructure developments managed by SOEs that are marked by inefficiency and deficiencies in corporate governance and management have further limited development impact, rendering investments largely unsustainable and unsuccessful as to strengthening institutional capacity or processes.** SOE reform efforts in the transport, energy, water, mining, and telecom sectors have largely failed (see Box 6 below), and the political economy of SOEs essentially remains unchanged.

¹³² Project outcome was rated Highly Unsatisfactory by IEG.

Box 6: Weak reform implementation hampers railway sector performance

From 2011 to 2018, the World Bank set out to invest holistically in the transport sectors in the DRC through a US\$386 million Multi-Modal Transport Investment Project. The project aimed to improve transport connectivity in the DRC, strengthen the operational performance of SOEs in the sector, and restore the financial and operational viability of the SNCC. About US\$365 million benefited the railway sector, where 1,200 km of tracks, 900 wagons, and thirty locomotives were rehabilitated or acquired and about 4,350 staff benefitted from a retirement plan that allowed them to leave the SNCC.

Nevertheless, during the project implementation period, total transport volume decreased from 185 million Units of Traffic (UT) (2009) to 152 million UT (2018)—against an original target value of 700 million UT (one Unit of Traffic = ton kilometer of freight and passenger kilometer). Additionally, the SNCC's cash flow further deteriorated, from a deficit of US\$35 million in 2009 to a deficit of US\$100 million at project close—against a targeted surplus of US\$15 million—and key structural reforms (e.g., improved corporate governance and management practices, cost saving measures, separation of non-core activities) were not implemented.

The unsuccessful reform effort is seen to be a result of lack of commitment from the authorities to undertake necessary but difficult reforms and to tackle vested interests. The project illustrates sustainability issues linked with investments in sector infrastructure without needed sector reforms and difficulties incentivizing structural reforms through the IPF instrument.

223. **Investments in social sectors during FY02-17 were also largely input-driven, focusing on infrastructure construction and rehabilitation (around 5,000 classrooms and about 1,000 health centers rehabilitated or constructed), without much progress addressing sector governance or strengthening systems.** Two-thirds of the US\$1.5 billion committed to social sectors over this period was invested in the health sector, while less than a third benefited the education sector. During the same period, social protection investments took the form of traditional DDR approaches, which had limited impact.

224. **From the start of the World Bank reengagement in 2001 until the contested 2011 Presidential elections, DRC received budget support and debt relief under IDA.** During this period, which corresponds with discussions on the HIPC Initiative (Decision Point reached in 2003), the World Bank prepared three stand-alone Development Policy Operations (DPOs) (2002, 2004, 2005), totaling US\$740 million. In addition, when DRC achieved the completion point under the HIPC Initiative (2010), IDA provided debt relief amounting to US\$887 million over 20 years.

225. **The three DPOs were evaluated as having unsatisfactory outcomes, with modest impact on institutional strengthening and negligible progress recorded on governance and SOE reforms.** Reform momentum and progress in implementing the new legal and institutional framework adopted, after the wars, for PFM, SOEs and commercial affairs slowed down after 2012 and halted ahead of the 2016 elections. With an increasingly complex political environment, some of the early PFM progress reversed in the years ahead of the 2019 transition (e.g., increasing reliance on emergency spending circumventing the expenditure chain). This also affected the implementation of the SOE legal framework approved in 2008, with the result that project efforts aimed at restructuring key SOEs largely failed.

226. **The mining sector was central to the World Bank's work in DRC during the first 15 years after reengagement (with a focus on the copper and cobalt industries in the Katanga region).** Following the wars, the World Bank supported the development of a new mining code in 2002, which enabled further private sector investment. The World Bank also supported a 2018 code that aimed to establish a more progressive fiscal regime in line with good international practice. Between 2002 and 2005, two of three DPOs targeted the restructuring of the copper mining SOE, Gecamines, while a private-sector

development IPF financed a staff retrenchment program and a management contract. The governance and political economy of the sector, however, did not improve much over these years. In 2010, the government seized mining assets where IFC had a stake. The World Bank considered suspending its program as a result, but did not, and rather negotiated an economic governance matrix to stay engaged. In 2012, the IMF suspended its program with DRC due to concerns relating to mining sector transparency. The IMF SMP approved in December 2019, which paved the way for a new IMF program, required the publication of all new mining contracts and an acceleration in the publication of old contracts. The IMF three-year ECF approved in July 2021 requires the publication of all new mining contracts as a continuous benchmark¹³³.

227. **In the forestry sector, the World Bank focused primarily - at the end of the wars - on supporting the development of a legal and institutional framework that reflected DRC's ambition to manage its national forests in a more sustainable and participatory way.** While the World Bank did not finance any investments in the forestry sector, it was a priority theme for country dialogue. Reforms were supported as part of the development policy operations in the early 2000s, technical assistance, and consultations. Institutional capacity building was an important complement to policy advice, and the World Bank invested US\$96 million in nature conservation and national park conservation in 2009 after an Inspection Panel (IP) Investigation was completed. The IP investigation was requested in 2005 by Pygmy communities who felt harmed by forest-related reforms supported by the World Bank between 2003 and 2005. In 2008, the Board of Executive Directors concluded that the World Bank had failed to comply with its Environmental Assessment and Indigenous Peoples policies.

228. **Since 2010, the World Bank's approach in forestry has progressively taken on a climate and conservation angle, in line with the international agenda for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD).** About US\$130 million have been mobilized by the World Bank to date through various Trust Funds to support the enabling environment for REDD+ and test new approaches on livelihoods, climate and sustainable landscape management. These have included investments in Mai-Ndombe and capacity building activities for Indigenous Peoples and local communities to participate in REDD+. The ongoing carbon finance pilot project in Mai Ndombe, which works with rural communities to restore degraded landscapes, has generated positive preliminary results, based on which a scale-up operation is planned. In September 2018, the World Bank also approved a US\$55 million Emission Reductions Payment Agreement (ERPA)—an innovative way to foster private sector investment in DRC's forested landscapes through carbon transactions.

229. **Following the 2016 political crisis in DRC, and because World Bank investments in the social sectors had significantly lagged investments in infrastructure and sustainable development sectors, it was decided to commit the entirety of IDA18—about US\$2.5 billion—in support of human capital development and social sectors.** Resources were directed toward comprehensive engagements in the education, health, and social protection sectors, with a view to strengthen systems and support key reforms. These engagements were complemented under the first year of IDA19, when additional investments were made in the human development sectors, including to a FY19 Gender-Based Violence Prevention and Response Project. All investments made are aligned with the approach laid out in this CPF, including focus on poverty, addressing drivers of fragility and conflicts, and combatting GBV.

¹³³ As of July 2021, 146 contracts have been published out of a list of 162 prepared by EITI-DRC and CSOs.

VII. CPF ANNEXES

Annex 1: DRC WBG FY22–26 Country Partnership Framework - Results Matrix

Focus Area 1: Strengthen stabilization efforts for reduced risks of conflict and violence		
<p>Under Focus Area 1, the WBG will engage to reduce exclusion and increase stability through a comprehensive and targeted set of activities that address triggers for escalation of conflict. The WBG will concentrate on engagements that link peace and stability with urgent development needs. Support will consist of a comprehensive and targeted set of engagements that aim to strengthen crisis resilience of individual beneficiaries and improve the interconnectedness of communities. Engagements will be climate-informed and address underlying drivers of vulnerability, such as access to land.</p>		
CPF Objective 1.1. Strengthen crisis resilience for vulnerable, displaced, and conflict-affected populations		
<p>Intervention logic: The World Bank will scale up targeted social protection programs, aiming to strengthen crisis resilience among vulnerable, displaced, and conflict-affected populations. These efforts will be integrated into the wider stabilization engagements in the east, aiming to create a bridge between the peacebuilding process, associated humanitarian aid, and development support. The program will support the government's efforts to establish a comprehensive, countrywide social safety net system that targets poor, vulnerable, and conflict-affected populations. This will include a specific focus on forcibly displaced and refugee populations. Youth in Kinshasa will also be supported through the national social safety net program to reduce the impact of exclusionary dynamics that could become a trigger for urban violence. Given the increasing shocks resulting from climate change, engagements to enhance social protection will be climate-adaptive, identifying climate-vulnerable populations in need of support</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 3 – exclusion; Driver 4 – trauma and social cohesion; Driver 5 - local conflict systems; Driver 6 - outside interference</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>1. Number of direct beneficiaries of social safety net programs (Country Results Indicator, disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 63, 640 (of whom > 30% are women (2020) Target: 1.2 million - of whom > 40% are women (2026)</p> <p>2. Total of social transfers (cash transfers + public works) distributed by safety net programs</p>	<p>- Percentage of refugees in social safety nets programs Baseline: 0.1% (2021) Target: 10% (2026)</p> <p>- System monitoring the impact of WBG and its contribution to implementing the national development plan Baseline: 0 Target: annual report on impact (2026)</p>	<p>Financing – Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC Eastern Recovery Project 2, 3 (P145196) - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foundational Governance DPO Series (FY23, FY24) - Eastern Stabilization Project (FY22)

<p>Baseline: US\$12.5 million (2020) Target: US\$319 million, of which > 60% distributed to women (2026)</p> <p>3. Number of social infrastructures rehabilitated or constructed with a participatory approach and citizen engagement process Baseline: 500 (2021) Target: 2,153 (2026)</p> <p>4. Person-days of employment created (on construction sites, Kinshasa): Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 29.6 million (2026)</p>	<p>- Number of Provinces with zoning plans that include an analysis of land related conflicts Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 1 (2022) and 3 (2026)</p>	<p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PER, Security - RRA update
<p>CPF Objective 1.2. Improve interconnectedness between and within communities</p> <p>Intervention logic: To reduce exclusionary dynamics, the WBG will support investments in infrastructure (transport and digital) and urban services that will strengthen interconnectedness between and within key urban centers and rural areas and improve access to services. Physically and digitally connecting the center and periphery will bolster economic development and national cohesion while contributing to stabilization and conflict prevention efforts. Applying the GRID approach, the World Bank will invest in paved road infrastructure reconnecting Eastern and Western DRC and will continue improving security and resilience at Goma and Beni airports. Telecom infrastructure will benefit from the “dig once” approach along road rehabilitation and encourage direct private sector investments. The World Bank will also engage to reduce exclusion and the risk of escalation of violence in Kinshasa and its surroundings and provide support to strengthen governance and the foundations for inclusive decentralized urban management capacity and community engagement.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 2 – non-diversification of the economy; Driver 3 – exclusion; Driver 5 – local conflict systems</p>		
<p>CPF Objective Indicators</p> <p>5. People provided with access to resilient infrastructure and services (Kinshasa) Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 2 million (2026)</p>	<p>Supplementary Progress Indicators</p> <p>- Number of kilometers of safer and climate-resilient roads constructed and/or rehabilitated (rural and urban) Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 1,400 km (rural) + 25km (urban) (2026)</p>	<p>WBG program</p> <p>Financing – Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC Eastern Recovery Project 2, 3 (P145196) - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141)

<p>6. Number of people with improved access to climate-resilient, all-weather roads and transport services Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 762,500 (2026)</p> <p>7. Number of people provided with access to the Internet Baseline: 20,712,000 (2020) Target: 40,000,000 (2026)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of kilometers of digital infrastructure built Baseline: 620 km (2021) Target: 1,800 km (2026) - Develop telecom infrastructure for increased mobile penetration and digital economy Baseline: 4,700 telecom towers (2021) Target: 5,450 telecom towers (2026) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFR RI-Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project (P143307) - DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project (P168756) - National Agriculture Development Program (P169021) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foundational Governance DPF Series (FY23, FY24) - Eastern Stabilization Project - Transport and Connectivity Support Project (SOP1 and 2) (FY22, 23) - Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project (FY22) - RI-Great Lakes Trade Facilitation and Integration Project phase 2 (FY22) <p>IFC Investment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFC investment in telecom sector
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CPF Objective 1.3. Strengthen regional integration and cross-border trade in the Great Lakes Region		
<p>Intervention logic: Recognizing that regional peace and stability is built around connecting and integrating border populations, the WBG will support cross-border trade activities. This will also enhance regional integration. The WBG will continue to support small scale producers and traders to access cross-border markets and complement these efforts with supporting value addition of local products and improving connectivity. Building on analytical work proposed on cross-border trade between DRC and Angola, opportunities to also engage in the south will be examined. Such engagements would contribute to opening the Kasai region to markets in northern Angola.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 2 – non-diversification of the economy; Driver 3 – exclusion; Driver 6 – outside interference</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>8. Strengthen regional trade (value of goods handled through targeted trade infrastructure)</p> <p>Baseline: US\$333 million (2018) [DRC-Rwanda/Uganda]</p> <p>Target: US\$700 million (2026) [DRC-Rwanda/Uganda/ Burundi]</p>	<p>- Increase market opportunities for small traders (daily average number of traders processed through targeted borders) [DRC-Rwanda/Uganda/ Burundi]</p> <p>Baseline: US\$65,000 (2021)</p> <p>Target: US\$120,000 (2026)</p>	<p>Financing - Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFR RI-Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (P151083) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transport and Connectivity Support Project (SOP1 and 2) (FY22, 23) - RI-Great Lakes Trade Facilitation and Integration Project phase 2 (FY22) <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC JET Analytics
Focus Area 2: Strengthen Systems for Improved Service Delivery and Human Capital Development		
<p>Focus Area 2 demonstrates the shift in WBG sectoral engagements, with a significant increase in financing for education and social protection. There will be increased investments in systems, communities, and people, aiming to build human capital, strengthen access and quality of services, reduce gender disparities, and increase inclusion, and reinforce the state-citizen relationship. There will be a departure from past input-based financing modalities, and where feasible, investment project financing will include results-based modalities. The approach builds on the WBG 2020-25 Strategy for FCV and the identified areas of special emphasis for WBG engagements in FCV contexts and supports the IDA20 human capital theme. It also builds on analysis in the 2021 RRA, as more equitable access to services and the inclusion of under-served communities and populations in service delivery will address structural causes of conflict and fragility.</p>		
CPF Objective 2.1. Strengthen systems to increase access to and quality of services in education, health, and social protection		
<p>Intervention logic: There will be comprehensive and integrated support to accelerate progress toward universal health; improving surveillance of epidemics and preparedness and routine immunizations; addressing challenges linked to nutrition and stunting; improving access to and</p>		

quality of primary and secondary education; and supporting the establishment of an inclusive and targeted national social safety net system, with equal access to refugees. The program includes analytical work, investments, and support to key reforms—a large number mainstreaming governance in sectors through results-based financing modalities. As a part of a systems-building approach, engagements will seek to reinforce sector governance and institutions, including strengthening decentralized administrative structures, citizen-institution links, and channels to express the voice of beneficiaries, with the aim of increasing accountability and transparency. IFC will identify players for potential support in the healthcare space.

Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 3 – exclusion

CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>9. Primary completion rate (gender parity index) nationwide (%) Baseline: 67% (0.99) (2017-2018 MICS) Girls: 66.3% Boys: 67.1% Target: 74% (1.00) (2026) Girls: 69% Boys: 70%</p> <p>10. Primary gross attendance rate (gender parity index) in 10 priority provinces Baseline: 106 (1.0) (2017-2018 MICS) Girls: 106.8 Boys: 105.9 Target: 118 (1.0) (2026). Same for girls and boys</p> <p>11. Percentage of basic childhood immunization coverage (pentavalent 3) (%) Baseline: 53% (2021) Target: 5% increase from baseline (2026)</p> <p>12. Budget execution rate in health and education (%) Baseline: 57% health sector, 91.6% education sector</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of a national multisectoral nutrition strategy and coordination mechanisms in four priority provinces Baseline: Does not exist (2021) Target: Exists (2026) - Proportion of births deliveries assisted by skilled personnel (%) Baseline: 85% Target: 5% increase from baseline (2026) - Laboratory testing capacity for detection of priority diseases (national capacity scores – JEE score) Baseline: 3 (2020) Target: 4 (2026) - Number of women and children (age 0 - 23 months) who receive essential nutrition services in 4 priority provinces Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 4,000,000 (2026) disaggregated by gender 	<p>Financing - Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education Project (P149233) - Education Quality Improvement Project (P157922) - Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project (P172341) - DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project (P168756) - Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (P147555) - COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project (P173825) - COVID-19 Vaccine Purchase and Distribution Project (P173825) - Regional Diseases Surveillance System Enhancement Project (phase 4) (P167817) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Girls Learning and Empowerment Project (FY23)

<p>Target: 95% (2026)</p> <p>13. Timely and reliable education system data publicly disclosed nationwide (Text) Baseline: School census data disclosed with substantial delay or not at all (2021) Target: School census data collected at least every 18 months and publicly disclosed prior to subsequent collection (2022 onwards)</p> <p>14. Establishment of a social registry: Baseline: Not established (2021) Target: Established (2026)</p> <p>15. Individuals enrolled in a social registry, including refugees Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 1.8 million, with 100,000 refugees (2026)</p>	<p>- Reduction in per-student primary school fee expenditure, among poor households in the 10 priority provinces (%) Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 75% (2026)</p>	<p>- Women Empowerment and SME Support Project (FY23)</p> <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact Evaluation of Performance Based Financing (P150979) - Enhanced Fiduciary Assessment of the Health Sector (P172671) - IFC mapping of pharmaceutical players and private health care facilities
<p>CPF Objective 2.2. Improve access to basic infrastructure services (WASH, electricity, classrooms, health centers)</p> <p>Intervention logic: Engagements will focus on increased and more equal access to and improved quality of basic infrastructure services, which will contribute to strengthening the enabling environment for economic development, prosperity, and stability. Better access, improved quality, and increased equality in service provision will help address perceptions of exclusion which may exist among specific population groups. Furthermore, it will enable economic opportunities and market development and strengthen the delivery of essential basic services (education, health). The WBG will seek to expand access to electricity, water, and sanitation services and strengthen associated sectoral institutions and governance using a mix of multisectoral lending and analytical work, coupled with MIGA guarantees and IFC investments and technical assistance. There will be a focus on key provincial cities in DRC, including Kinshasa, as well as rural areas in Ituri, the Kivus and Kasais. Applying the GRID framework, climate considerations will be incorporated into the design of all new and rehabilitated infrastructure and digital aspects will, as much as possible, be incorporated into design and implementation solutions.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 3 – exclusion</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program

<p>16. Number of people provided with access to basic water services Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 1.2 million (2026)</p> <p>17. Number of people provided with new or improved electricity services, including renewable energy Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 4.5 million (2026)</p> <p>18. Volume of solid waste safely disposed (T/day) Baseline: 0 (2021) Target: 1,000 (2026)</p>	<p>- Volume of waste treated at fecal sludge treatment plant (number, cubic meters/day) Baseline: 0 Target: 1,500 (2026)</p>	<p>Financing - Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC Electricity Access & Services Expansion Project (P156208) - Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Services project (P159217) - COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project (P173825) - DRC Eastern Recovery Project 2, 3 (P145192) - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project (FY22) - Rural Water Support Project (FY24) - WBG upstream scaling mini-grid program - IFC Co-development initiative for renewable energy IPP projects - IFC investment in renewable energy projects <p>MIGA guarantees</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BBOX – off-grid solar services <p>ASA – Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFC Energy Sector Deep Dive review
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CPF Objective 2.3. Improve gender disparities and inclusion across sectors		
<p>Intervention logic: WBG engagements across sectors will aim to address gender inequality as well as the underlying factors for GBV. The two-pronged approach will be implemented through policy dialogue, analytic work and their dissemination, and ongoing projects, with a focus on improving gender disparities and women's empowerment. At the same time, engagements will aim to address SEA/H risks as a part of project implementation in non-GBV specific engagements, to include, when possible, dedicated components aimed to change behavior (such as approaches adopted in the EESSE project. Proposed operational engagements will aim to reduce gender disparities and incidences of GBV, instigate behavior change, and enhance inclusion.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 3 – exclusion; Driver 4 – trauma and social cohesion</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>19. Number of women (aged 15-49) using modern methods of contraceptives (cumulative), or reduce adolescent fertility Baseline: 11.5% (2021) Target: 15% (2026)</p> <p>20. Increase in girls' gross secondary enrollment rates Baseline: Lower secondary: 75%; Upper secondary: 53% (2017-2018 MICS) Target: Lower secondary: 80%; Upper secondary: 58% (2026)</p> <p>21. Increase in the utilization of multisectoral response services for GBV survivors in targeted health zones Baseline: 28,177 (2018-2021) Target: 23,100 annually¹³⁴ (2021-2026)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Surveillance systems in place for priority zoonotic diseases/pathogens (measured as JEE score) Baseline: JEE score of 3 (2021) Target: JEE score of 4 (2026) (JEE score is WHO joint external evaluation) - Increased women participation in public works programs (%) Baseline: 30% (2020) Target: more than 50% (2026) 	<p>Financing: Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project (P166763) - DRC Eastern Recovery Project 2, 3 (P145196) - Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project (P172341) - Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (P147555) - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141) - DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project (P168756) - Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education Project (P149233) <p>Financing - Indicative</p>

¹³⁴ The number of users of such services depends on survivors' needs and demand for services. The annual target is an estimate based on current demand for services and trends in GBV incidence. The figures may change due to shifting external conditions.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Women Empowerment and SME Support Project (FY23) - Girls' Learning and Empowerment Project (FY23) <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Empowering Girls and Learning in the DRC - Women's Socioeconomic Empowerment
Focus Area 3: Strengthen Economic Governance for Increased Private Sector Investment		
<p>Under Focus Area 3, the WBG will provide support for improved economic management and governance reforms that will bolster private sector development and investment, mitigating conflict risk through increased inclusion and economic opportunities. The increased focus on governance reforms is aligned with lessons learned from past engagements, as outlined in the CLR, and supports the IDA20 cross-cutting issue on governance and institutions. There will be continued strong collaboration with the IMF, including on efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization and ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment conducive to private sector-led growth.</p>		
CPF Objective 3.1. Strengthen systems for improved debt management and increased domestic revenue mobilization		
<p>Intervention logic: Through a comprehensive program combining policy reform, investment lending, and analytical work, the WBG will support the government's efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability, including through increased DRM, and keep debt at sustainable levels, while improving debt management and transparency. The World Bank will focus on strengthening management of mining revenues and increasing DRM at the provincial level for improved decentralized service delivery. On debt management, the World Bank will focus on the implementation of the new SDFP initiated under IDA19. The World Bank will work closely with the IMF on all matters relating to economic and fiscal management and ensure consistency and complementarity across engagements.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 2 – non-diversification of the economy</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>22. Maintain macroeconomic stability (no monetary financing of the fiscal deficit)</p> <p>Baseline: Monetary financing of fiscal deficit (2020)</p> <p>Target: No monetary financing of the fiscal deficit from 2021 onwards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve credibility of budget (as measured by budget execution) <p>Baseline: 70.2% (2018), 75.3 (2019), 75.0 (2020)</p> <p>Target: >90% (2026)</p>	<p>Financing - Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening PFM and Accountability Project (P145747) - DRC Enhanced Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project (P171762)

<p>23. Increase domestic revenue mobilization (% of GDP) Baseline: 9% of GDP (2020) Target: 14% of GDP (2026)</p> <p>24. Strengthen debt management Baseline: Exemption to IDA SDFP PPA (2020) Target: DRC NCB in line with IDA SDFP and IMF Debt Limit Policy (from 2022)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase provincial capital expenditure budget executed per year (Kinshasa) Baseline: 20% Target: 80% - Improve DeMPA (Debt Management Performance Assessment) indicators: Baseline: 30% of indicators rated C or above (2015) Target: 75% of indicators rated C or above (2026) 	<p>Financing: Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foundational Governance DPO Series (FY23, FY24) <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC Economic Update - DRC Country Economic Memorandum - Poverty monitoring
<p>CPF Objective 3.2. Strengthen public financial management systems and extractive sector governance</p> <p>Intervention logic: To strengthen the current fragile institutional structure in DRC, the World Bank will support critical reforms in PFM and governance of the extractives sector. Engagements build on commitment from government to strengthen regulatory institutions, improve governance, and increase oversight and transparency, including in SOEs in energy, water, transport, ICT, and mining and will aim to strengthen public resource management at the central government level, with the objective of increasing efficiency, transparency, and resilience. There will be a focus on strengthening mining revenue management, expenditure management, as well as internal and external control institutions (IGF and the Supreme Audit Institution). Engagements will also support strengthened resource management at the provincial government level for improved service delivery. Engagements will promote the use of digital platforms (e.g., for tax collection, utility billing, and payment purposes) and will promote citizen's engagement to strengthen accountability and improve the social contract between State and citizens. To strengthen governance in the extractives sector, the World Bank will support increased oversight of key mining SOEs and, in close coordination with the IMF, implementation of the EITI.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 1 – governance/social contract; Driver 2 – non-diversification of the economy</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>25. Improve public financial management Baseline: 16% of indicators rated C or above (PEFA 2019) Target: 29% of indicators rated C or above (2025)</p> <p>26. Increase transparency and accountability in budget process (measured by Open Budget Survey)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase transparency in budget process at the provincial level Baseline: provincial budgets published in Official Gazette, but not easily accessible for the general public (2019) Target: approved budget, annual budget execution report and audited report publicly 	<p>Financing - Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening PFM and Accountability Project (P145747) - DRC Enhanced Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project (P171762) - DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project (P128887)

<p>Baseline: 33/100 for Transparency, 31/100 Public Participation, 44/100 Budget Oversight (2019) Target: >50 for Transparency, Public Participation and Budget Oversight (2025)</p> <p>27. Increase financial transparency of key SOEs (SNEL, REGIDESO, RVA, SNCC, SCTP, GECAMINES)</p> <p>Baseline: Audited financial statements not publicly disclosed for key SOEs (2019) Target: Audited financial statements publicly disclosed on an annual basis for key SOEs (2026)</p>	<p>disclosed (and accessible for the general public) for 5 provinces (2026)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase transparency in management of extractive resources: DRC has met 3 specific EITI requirements from the 2019 EITI Scorecard: (i) State Participation (requirement #2.6); (ii) Direct Subnational payments (#4.6); and (iii) Subnational transfers (#5.2) <p>Baseline: DRC is making “meaningful progress” to meet these 3 requirements under 2016 EITI Standard (DRC EITI Report Oct 2019) Target: DRC fully meets the 3 requirements under 2019 EITI Standard (i.e. DRC scores 90 points for the 3 requirements meaning, the broader objective of the requirement has been fulfilled, and all required aspects of the requirement have been addressed)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141) <p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foundational Governance DPF Series (FY23, FY24) - Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project (FY22) - TA for Improved Environmental and Social Safeguards Management in the Mining Sector (FY24) <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CEM - PER - TA to the EITI
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CPF Objective 3.3. Strengthen economic diversification through increased agricultural productivity and a stronger MSME operating environment		
<p>Intervention logic: IFC, MIGA, and the World Bank will work to improve the business enabling environment, including access to financial services, the development of the private sector as an engine for job creation, and accelerating the transition from subsistence to a more productive agriculture sector. The WBG will support development of the local private sector, including MSMEs and women-owned businesses, with the aim of creating more and better jobs and contributing to a more inclusive and distributive economy. The WBG will also support private sector participation in infrastructure (prioritizing energy, transport, and ICT) and work to strengthen the financial sector, with a focus on stability and access to services, including digital financial services for women entrepreneurs, MSMEs, youth, and farmers. In support of the development of the agriculture sector, the WBG will adopt and promote climate-sensitive approaches in line with the GRID framework, driving inclusion through economic diversification and job creation.</p> <p>Relevant FCV Drivers: Driver 2 – non-diversification of the economy; Driver 3 – exclusion</p>		
CPF Objective Indicators	Supplementary Progress Indicators	WBG program
<p>28. Number of farmers adopting improved and climate smart agricultural technology (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 25,980 (2020) Target: 1,700,000 + 33,500, out of which 850,000 women (2026)</p> <p>29. Land area under sustainable landscape management practices Baseline: 2,754,862 (2020) Target: TBD at PLR (2026)</p> <p>30. Revenue from forest carbon (sales of Emission Reductions) (US\$ million) Baseline: US\$0 (2021) Target: US\$55 (2026)</p> <p>31. Number of jobs created by beneficiary MSMEs Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 30,000 (2026), of whom 40% women</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sale of agriculture and food products by smallholders (%) Baseline: 0% (2021) Target: 30% (2026) - Rural and non-rural roads rehabilitated (km): Baseline: 0 km (2021) Target: 4,000 km (2026) - Increase in use of climate-resilient inputs/practices by women farmers (%) Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 25% (2026) - Number of signed PPP contracts in the transport and energy sectors Baseline: 0 Target: 3 	<p>Financing: Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project (P128887) - Purchase/Sale of Emission Reductions (ER) to be generated under the Mai Ndombe ER Program (P160320) - Forest Dependent Communities Support Project (P149049) - National Agriculture Development Program (P169021) - AFR RI-Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project (P143307) - DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project (P168756) - SME Development and Growth Project (P160806) - Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project (P171141)

<p>32. Simplify fiscal regime and improve dispute resolution Baseline: 246 different taxes and other forms of payments made to the government at the central level by firms Target: Consolidated tax regime</p> <p>33. Increase in the use of digital financial services Baseline: 21.7% of 15+ made or received digital payments (Findex 2018) Target: 40% of 15+ made or received digital payments (2026)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of regulatory reforms implemented Baseline: 0 Target: 10 - Number of public-private consultations of fiscal and regulatory environment Baseline: 0 Target: 5 	<p>Financing - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to the effectiveness and operationalization of the emission reductions payment agreement - Women Empowerment and SME Support Project (FY23) - AFR RI-Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project phase 2 (P151083) (FY22) - Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project (FY22) <p>ASA - Indicative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact Evaluation on PSD Interventions in DRC - DIME Jobs DRC Productive Opportunities - DRC Financial Sector Development Programmatic ASA - FSAP Development Module - IFC investment in climate program <p>IFC investment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFC investment in financial sector - IFC investments in agriculture, light manufacturing, and services <p>MIGA guarantees</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bartrac Equipment
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Annex 2: Completion and Learning Report

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CAS COMPLETION AND LEARNING REVIEW

Date of CAS (FY2013-FY2016): April 12, 2013 (Report No. 66158-ZR)
Date of CAS Performance and Learning Review: April 14, 2016 (Report No. 103566-ZR)
Period Covered by the Completion and Learning Review: May 9, 2013 to June 30, 2017

Introduction and CAS Objective

1. **This Completion and Learning Review (CLR) is a self-evaluation by the World Bank Group (WBG)¹³⁵ country team for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) regarding the results of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for DRC during the period FY13–FY16 (Report no. 66158-ZR), as updated and extended to FY17 by the April 2016 CAS Performance and Learning Review (PLR) (CASPLR, Report No. 103566-ZR).** The CAS was aligned with DRC’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP-II), adopted in 2011 and articulating the Government’s vision for: (i) strengthening governance and consolidating peace; (ii) diversifying the economy to accelerate growth and create employment; (iii) improving access to basic social services and enhancing human capital; and (iv) protecting the environment and fighting climate change. The CAS strategic objectives were aimed at: (i) increasing state effectiveness and improving good governance; (ii) boosting competitiveness to accelerate private-sector-led growth and job creation; (iii) improving social service delivery and increasing human development indicators; and (iv) addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces. Gender and climate change were cross-cutting themes of the CAS.
2. **The CLR rates the Development Outcomes of the CAS (the extent to which the CAS achieved its stated objectives) and WBG performance (design and implementation of the CAS program).** The CLR uses the Results Framework, as updated at the time of the PLR, to evaluate CAS achievements. This Results Framework included a total of 14 outcomes, which were measured by 38 outcome indicators. This is *not* an assessment of DRC’s progress toward its development goals, but rather of program achievements directly linked to WBG-supported activities and to WBG engagement in DRC during the CAS period.
3. **Preparation of a Country Partnership Framework (CPF) – which this CLR is intended to inform - was long-delayed for a number of reasons. Presidential elections, initially planned for November 2016, did not take place until end-December 2018 (with the exception of some provinces in the East due to the Ebola outbreak), with a precautionary evacuation of the World Bank country office staff from Kinshasa to neighboring Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, for one month.** Preparation of the SCD was delayed as well, and that document was delivered to the Board in March 2018. Further complicating matters, in 2018, two Ebola outbreaks - one in Equateur Province (May to July 2018), followed by an outbreak in Eastern DRC in August 2018 (which ultimately claimed more than 1,400 lives) - heightened the security and fragility risks in the country and further delayed and complicated the conduct of national elections. Even after the contested elections, in which President Tshisekedi was declared the winner with 38.5 percent of the vote in early-January 2019, there were additional delays in forming a government with which the Bank could begin to engage. The new cabinet was not announced until late August 2019.
4. **In light of the significant lapse in time since the close of the CAS period (June 30, 2017), as well as the unusually fragile country conditions, this is more of a *qualitative* CLR (focusing on the *learning***

¹³⁵ In this report, the World Bank Group constitutes the World Bank (Bank), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

aspects of the retrospective assessment) than a typical CLR which aggregates the *quantitative ratings of each results indicator*. To the extent that data are available to measure progress towards quantitative CAS targets, they are presented in the analysis that follows. More broadly, the team has extracted the most relevant lessons from the WBG experience in DRC over this extended period of engagement. This body of experience has guided the preparation of the forthcoming Country Partnership Framework (CPF).

I – SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Overall CAS Program Performance

5. While acknowledging improvements that occurred during the CAS period such as better visibility into extractive industries' operations (including through the WBG-supported EITI process) and greater clarity in SOE financial operations, there continued to be significant governance and capacity challenges, which were reflected in part, in the precarious financial situation of several of the SOEs. Achievement of results under "*Strategic Objective Two — Boosting competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation*" reflects improvements in some Doing Business indicators, improved road connectivity in the CAS program areas, greater broadband internet capacity, and an increase in agricultural productivity in program areas, although increased power generation and electricity access fell short of program targets. Achievement of results under "*Strategic Objective Three — Improving social services delivery and increasing human development indicators*" reflects improvements in access to clean water in program areas, an increase in immunization rates, but only modest improvement in primary-level enrollment rates, completion rates fell short of program targets, and there was only limited progress on social protection. Results under "*Strategic Objective Four — Addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces*", reflects the adverse impact of sporadic flare-ups of conflict and violence on program activities, the complexity of the underlying issues and – perhaps most importantly - the limitations of WBG instruments and interventions under this CAS to address such fragility.

WBG's Performance

6. Program design benefited from extensive consultations, was fully aligned with DRC's development goals, and reflected a balanced combination of advisory, analytical, and investment activities. Program implementation was flexible, which enabled the WBG to respond to changes in country circumstances. Mid-course adjustments (at the time of the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) in April 2016), were aimed at responding to the challenges and opportunities observed, which included scaling up investments in public sector management, human development, infrastructure, and promoting regional initiatives to foster regional integration. They also included new non-lending activities to address pressing challenges such as domestic revenue mobilization, public investment efficiency, demography and social protection. As part of these mid-course changes, the CAS period was extended by one year from end-FY16 to end-FY17 to implement the new WBG activities and the remaining CAS deliverables. The one-year extension was also intended to allow for the then-anticipated post-election transition period, as well as the completion of the national development plan and the SCD. As noted above, elections were significantly delayed, and a new government was not in place until the summer of 2019. Notwithstanding these adjustments to the CAS program and duration, there were a number of "missed opportunities" at the time of the PLR, as described in the sections that follow. Outcome indicators could have been revised at the time of the PLR, to reflect a more realistic likelihood of completion, thereby contributing to an overall performance rating of Fair. Program implementation was also highly collaborative, both within the WBG as well as with other development partners (notably with the African Development Bank, *Agence Française de Développement*, USAID, DFID, and the European Commission, among others). A total of US\$2.19 billion was disbursed during the CAS period.

7. **A number of lessons have been gleaned from implementation of this CAS which will be reflected in the forthcoming Country Partnership Framework (CPF).** They include: going beyond the long-time emphasis on reconstruction projects and engage more extensively in social sectors to build the country's human capital; placing greater emphasis on governance and reforms across the portfolio, including a new generation of infrastructure projects to crowd in private sector solutions; pursue multi-sectoral projects that can create and benefit from synergies; take a spatial approach to focusing engagements geographically for maximum impact, rather than spreading the WBG's finite resources too thinly across the country's vast territory; and perhaps most importantly, apply a fragility lens to consider the impact of DRC's ongoing fragility across all engagements under the forthcoming CPF. In addition, this CAS experience calls for a more realistic level of ambition, given the degree of government capacity and demonstrated commitment to the necessary reforms; and holding open the option to scale up those engagements where results have been achieved.

II. HIGHLIGHTS OF ASSESSMENT

8. **The following is a summary of the assessment, with details of individual results indicators presented in the CLR Annex.**

Objective 1: Increase state effectiveness and improve governance

9. **Under this objective, the CAS program sought to increase effectiveness and transparency within the central government, in eight selected provincial governments, among three extractive industries (petroleum, mining and forestry), and in six major state-owned enterprises.** This objective was to be measured against three principal outcomes: (1) Increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the former provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, and Equateur; (2) Increased transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil, and mining industries; and (3) Enhanced governance and operational performance among State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

10. ***Outcome 1.1 – Increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the former provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, and Equateur***¹³⁶. IDA commitments under this objective totaled US\$264.0 million, complemented by trust funds totaling US\$33.9 million. WBG support was delivered through five interventions: the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project (P104041), the Capacity for Core Public Management Project (P117382), the Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation Project (P122229), the Strengthening PFM and Accountability Project (P145747), and the Statistics Development Project (P150148). The complementary trust funds were: MDTF-PFMAP (PROFIT Congo) Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (P145747), and SRTF Catalytic Project to Strengthen the INS (P125509). There were also a number of Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA): PEFA Assessment (P131609), Country Economic Update (P133727), Donor Forum (P145874), Coordinated PFM Reform Assistance (P113619), Debt Management Reform Plan (P130862), Use of Country Systems (P144456), National Risk Assessment (P146211), and PEMFAR (P147410). In support of this outcome, the CAS program sought to instill a results-oriented culture which had previously not existed by promoting rapid

¹³⁶ These eight provinces have since been subdivided into a total of 20 provinces. Nationally, there are now 26 provinces compared to the original 11 provinces. This CAS self-assessment is based on the previous provincial boundaries.

results initiatives¹³⁷, performance contracts (“*lettres de mission*”) between the Prime Minister and government ministries and supporting training. The program built eight country-owned training centers for civil servants to provide an infrastructure for sustained capacity development of the public sector. The program promoted transparency mechanisms, including participatory budgeting and regular publication of budget execution reports and procurement information. It supported the standardization of organization charts, starting with five participating ministries¹³⁸, and promoted greater transparency in the appointment of officials in these ministries. It also supported the computerization of the HR system, as well as the roll-out of payroll reforms. By 2015, 97.74 percent of the salaried employees at the central level were paid through the reformed computerized system. The percentage of expenditures handled outside normal approval procedures steadily declined from 26.34 percent in 2009 to 7 percent by 2015.

11. **Indicators for measuring progress towards attaining this outcome included:** (i) the percentage

DRC: Rating of the CAS Strategic Objectives during CLR	
Strategic Objectives/Outcomes	Status
Strategic Objective One: Increase state effectiveness and improve governance	
1.1. Increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the (former) provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, and South Kivu	Partially Achieved
1.2. Increased transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil, and mining industries	Mostly Achieved
1.3. Enhanced governance of mining sector state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and increasing the operational performance of other SOEs	Partially Achieved
Strategic Objective Two: Boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	
2.1. Enhanced business environment for private sector development	Mostly Achieved
2.2. Improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure	Mostly Achieved
2.3. Improved access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost	Mostly Achieved
2.4. Increased generation of electricity and improved access to energy	Partly Achieved
2.5. Boost agriculture production and increase access to markets	Mostly Achieved
Strategic Objective Three: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	
3.1. Increased access to clean water and sanitation	Achieved
3.2. Improved access to health services in targeted areas	Partially Achieved
3.3. Improved access to basic education in targeted areas	Partially Achieved
3.4. Strengthened social protection system	Partially Achieved
Strategic Objective Four: Address fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces	
4.1. Improved management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas	Partially Achieved
4.2. Increased socioeconomic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas	Partially Achieved

of national revenue transferred to targeted provinces (Bandundu, Kasai Occidental, Katanga, South Kivu); (ii) reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in the four targeted provinces (Bandundu, Katanga Kasai Occidental and South-Kivu); and (iii) the percentage of public contracts awarded through open competitive bidding in selected ministries and provinces.

12. **The first indicator was not particularly pertinent to, nor necessarily reflective of, the above CAS program activities as the drivers of this indicator, such as the increase in domestic revenue mobilization and the pace and scope of devolution, were not the main thrusts of the CAS program.** During the preparation of this CLR, it was

not possible to verify this indicator for the four provinces, although more generally, the amount of money

¹³⁷ The Rapid Results Methodology uses coaches to determine tangible results with measurable indicators, including strengthening the target institution’s capacity to implement priority reforms over a specified period punctuated by visible, interim results.

¹³⁸ Participating ministries were: Finance, Budget, Planning, Civil Service, and Public Enterprises (also called State Portfolio).

transferred to all provinces was only 22 percent of Central Government revenue in 2015 (a year for which the most recent budget execution data was available) against the CAS target of 35 percent. Even then, attribution to CAS program activities would have been tenuous, reflecting flaws in the design and definition of results indicators – indicators which could have been revised at the time of the PLR.

13. **Regarding the second indicator, the goal was to reduce the discrepancy from 51 percent to 31 percent.** Data at the provincial level were not available. However, at the central level, budget execution was erratic, falling from 56 percent in 2013 to 51 percent in 2014, although it improved to 59 percent in 2015, still far above the program target. Budget execution was generally more challenging at the provincial level, partly because of low and unreliable central government transfers, as well as the provinces' limited ability to forecast their own revenue.

14. **With respect to the percentage of competitively awarded public contracts, performance (58 percent) fell short of the CAS target (75 percent).** The percentage of central government contracts awarded through open competitive bidding - which accounted for 86.5 percent in 2012 - regressed to 58.4 percent by 2015, suggesting a backsliding to non-competitive contract management. There have been some improvements in the openness to publish large contracts on the Procurement Authority Website, and the number of published procurement plans increased from 12 in 2012 to 83 in 2016. In addition, at the central level, the Procurement Dispute Committee became operational, and an independent audit was conducted for 2011, 2012, and 2013.

15. **CAS Outcome 1.2: Increased transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil, and mining industries.** IDA commitments under this Outcome totaled US\$117 million, complemented by Trust Funds of US\$128 million. WBG support was delivered through three operations: the Forestry and Nature Conservation Project (P100620), the National Parks Rehabilitation Project (P083813), and the Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector Project (P106982). The Trust Fund projects were the Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas (GEF) Project (P111621), Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector TF (P106982), EITI Implementation - Phase II (P113977), the Mai-Ndombe REDD+ Integrated Project under CAFI (P162837), the Forest-Dependent Communities Support Project (P149049), and the FCPF REDD Readiness Project (P124072). The Outcome Indicators were: (i) Area of forest concessions with signed social responsibility contracts; (ii) Percentage increase in revenue from the mining sector in total fiscal revenue; and (iii) Percentage of oil petroleum permits competitively auctioned.

16. **The CAS program supported the negotiation of Social Responsibility Contracts¹³⁹ between industrial concession holders and local communities, which increased the area within signed social responsibility contracts from 2 million hectares to 10.7 million hectares, thereby fully achieving the CAS target.** The CAS program also supported capacity building aimed at improving the forestry sector's management, including supporting the establishment of Provincial Consultative Forest Councils to bring together various stakeholders (government, civil society), and launching a Spatial Information Management System (SyGIS) to enhance forestry governance.

17. **The percentage increase in revenue from the mining sector increased from 2 percent of GDP in 2011, to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2014, surpassing the CAS target of 2.7 percent.** The EITI process (supported under the CAS) helped to shed additional light on revenues from the mining sector, which showed an uptick during the CAS period (US\$1.0 billion in 2013, and US\$1.35 billion in 2014) in tandem with increased production in industrial mining. Growth in mining revenues in 2015 suffered from the global decline in international commodity prices. In addition, the 2002 mining code, which was mainly designed to attract

¹³⁹ These social responsibility contracts ("*cahiers des charges*") are negotiated between rural communities and logging companies operating in those communities.

investors, was overly generous to those foreign investors, undercutting revenues to Government. A new mining code to increase Government mining revenues (revised with support from the WBG through background analytical work and dialogue, together with other development partners) was signed into law in March 2018 – after the end of the CAS period.

18. **In order to codify the principle of competition in awarding oil concessions, the Government promulgated Law Number 15/012 of 1 August 2015 on the General Regime for Hydrocarbons, which provides for competition in issuing exploration permits.** Revenue from existing oil extraction activities is currently reported under EITI. The program indicator of “Percentage of petroleum permits competitively auctioned” was not tested during the CAS period, as there were no reported petroleum concession transactions since the law’s promulgation.

19. **CAS Outcome 1.3: Enhancing governance and increasing the operational performance of SOEs.** IDA commitments under this Outcome totaled US\$2,137.32 million. WBG support was delivered through six operations: the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (P071144), the Urban Water Supply Project (P091092), the Multimodal Transport Project (P092537), Southern Africa Power Market (P069258), Regional and Domestic Power Markets Project (P097201), and the Electricity Access and Services Expansion Project (P156208). In terms of analytical work, the Urbanization Review (P156796) also supported the program.

20. **The program’s goal (and principal outcome indicator) was increased efficiency of the six SOEs that deliver key public services, most notably the national railway company (SNCC), the national electricity utility (SNEL), the port management company (SCTP), the airports authority (RVA), the river transport authority (RVF), and the water utility (REGIDESO).** This was to be achieved through, among other things, public-private partnerships or management contracts. However, SOE reforms preceded this CAS period, and SNCC, SCTP, and RVA had management contracts in place prior to 2013¹⁴⁰. Under the CAS, these reforms continued, and similar management contracts were instituted at SNEL and REGIDESO.¹⁴¹ Thus, technically, all these SOEs, at one point or another, had a management contract in place.

21. **Indeed, these measures resulted in greater clarity in the financial and operational status of these SOEs - some of which (SNCC, SNEL, REGIDESO) were able to produce reliable financial statements, which constituted a major accomplishment.** In addition, the Government signed performance contracts with SNEL (in place since February 2012) and REGIDESO (in place since March 2015) spelling out each party’s obligations.

22. **However, the parties to these Government-SOE performance contracts have not honored their respective obligations.** Unpaid Government bills continued to mount (US\$125 million owed to REGIDESO by Government entities as of August 2016, and US\$35 million owed to SNEL as of December 2016). Arrears among the SOEs, as well as between the SOEs and the Government, for which a resolution framework was instituted prior to this CAS, further increased during the CAS period. SOEs remained unable to cover their operating costs, including carrying out required maintenance on fixed assets. In the case of SNEL, very low tariffs for commercial customers, and generally poor collection rates, remained a major constraint. As for SNCC, poor management and the loss of mining customers to road transportation resulted in an untenable financial situation, pushing the company to the brink of bankruptcy. SNCC, which continued to accumulate

¹⁴⁰ Prior to this CAS period, SNCC had a management contract with *Vecturis* during 2008-2013; SCTP had one with *Progosa* during 2008-2010; RVA had such an agreement with *Aéroports de Paris* and *KPMG* during 2008-2011.

¹⁴¹ Manitoba Hydro International at SNEL (2015-Present), and *Sénégalaise des Eaux/Erano* at REGIDESO (2013-2016).

debt at the rate of US\$30 million per year, amassed an outstanding debt of about US\$350 million, of which US\$270 million was salary arrears, as of late-2017.

23. **Efforts to improve operational and financial performance of SOEs through investments in assets and private participation need to be accompanied by adequate government commitment to reforms, and strong motivation to improve poor SOE management practices in order to show results.** As noted in the IEG review of the ICR for the Multi-Modal Transport Project, in a post-conflict country characterized by weak implementation capacity and political inertia, managing expectations is critical and the scope of interventions should be limited, leaving space to scale-up only once positive initial results are achieved. The scope of this Multi-Modal Transport Project was ambitious and (with the exception of roads) covered all transport subsectors - railways, inland waterways, ports, port access channel/maritime transport, airports and aviation. Project experience shows that the operational and financial performance of the railways could not be improved solely through investments in rail assets and by hiring a private operator. Problems ran deeper and encompassed a pervasive lack of staff motivation and poor management practices throughout the railway company. And critically, Government's commitment to the needed reforms was low. The absence of support from both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Portfolio prevented the project from achieving its development objective. The role of the private operator was reduced from a performance contract management to technical assistance.

24. **A recovery plan for SNCC was reviewed and adopted by government at the end of the CAS period.** However, based on the ICR of the Multi-Modal Transport Project, this would seem to call into question the realism of this results objective. *The mere signing of a management contract did not translate into improved operational performance of these SOEs, nor did it result in improved service delivery to citizens.*

Objective 2: Boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation

25. **To accomplish this objective, the CAS program focused primarily on a range of interventions to enhance the investment climate, improve road and rail transportation, expand broad-band networks, improve energy production and distribution, and accelerate agriculture productivity in selected commodities while improving market access for farmers in select communities (mostly in Equateur and Bandundu provinces).**

26. **CAS Outcome 2.1: Enhanced business environment for private sector development.** IDA commitments under this outcome amounted to US\$398 million. WBG support was delivered through: the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (P071144), the Western Growth Poles Project (P124720), the Financial Infrastructure and Markets Project (P145554), and the Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 1 (P151083). The targets set for measuring progress towards achieving this outcome related to improvements in a number of Doing Business indicators, namely the time to register a business, the number of days to obtain a construction permit, and the number of days to import and export. There was also a target linked to setting up an electronic funds transfer system, as well as one related to the number of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) supported by the IFC.

27. **With the creation of the One-Stop Shop for business services in May 2014, the time required to register a business decreased from 58 days to 11 days, nearly achieving the CAS target of 10 days.** The time required to obtain a construction permit also declined, from 150 days to 122 days, against the program target of 94 days. It was not possible to assess progress made with respect to reducing the number of days to import and export, due to methodological changes in the Doing Business analysis. DRC's performance against this new parameter changed modestly, from 35.05 in 2013, to 37.57 in 2017, although the CAS did not include a target for this new benchmark.

28. A fully functioning, modern payment system providing electronic (cash-less) funds transfer with real-time clearing and settlement of accounts, and interconnectivity with other payment systems in the region is now in place as envisaged under the CAS. IFC met its target for providing capital and advisory services to at least 10 SMEs in a wide range of sectors, including healthcare, education, and transport.]

29. **CAS Outcome 2.2: Improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure.** IDA commitments under this outcome totaled US\$768 million,¹⁴² through the following operations: the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (P104497), the High Priority Reopening and Maintenance Project – Pro-Routes (P101745), the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Project (P092724), the Multimodal Transport Project (P092537), the Western Growth Poles Project (P124720), the Urban Development Project (P129713), and the Goma Airport Project (P153085). There were also trust funds executed by the WBG, mainly from DFID for road transportation, totaling US\$119 million. The outcome indicators were: (i) the average transit time between the copper belt and the Zambian border; and (ii) the number of days/year when roads are not passable by 4x2 vehicles in program areas (Province Orientale, Katanga, Equateur and South Kivu).

30. **The CAS target to reduce the average transit time between the copper belt and the Zambian border from 17 days to 5 days, through WBG support for the rehabilitation of the national railway company, was no longer a valid indicator by the end of the CAS period.** The original target (as formulated) was in relation to transit time by train for mining companies, but mining companies subsequently switched to transporting their wares by road, maintaining the relevant sections of the roads themselves (through public-private partnership arrangements). ***This indicator could have been revised at the time of the PLR to reflect this change in transport mode, thus representing a missed opportunity to make a mid-course correction in the CAS Results Framework.*** The CAS program invested in the rehabilitation of railway wagons and railway tracks outside the copper belt and financed the purchase of 18 locomotives. For several communities, rail travel is their only form of connectivity and is, therefore, highly relevant. Although it was not a CAS program indicator, a target of rehabilitating 700 km of railway tracks during the CAS period was set and was achieved by the end of the CAS period, with 719 km of track rehabilitated¹⁴³. As discussed earlier, the railway company (SNCC) was under severe financial distress due to poor management, although it had been endowed with infrastructure under the CAS program. Government considered various options to improve the company's profitability, including providing a concession to a private operator.

31. **The CAS program target of not more than 100 days/year when roads are not passable by 4x2 vehicles in program areas (Province Orientale, Katanga, Equateur and South Kivu) was achieved (the actual as of the end of the CAS period was 50 days).** Across the entire CAS program, 4,979.9 km of roads were reopened or rehabilitated. In other areas (and not part of the performance indicators for this CAS), one of the five Air Traffic Control Infrastructure was installed, and river navigation aids were installed to improve safety over 2,000 km of inland waterways.

32. **CAS Outcome 2.3: Improved access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost.** IDA commitments under this outcome amounted to US\$132.98 million. WBG support was provided through the Regional CAB APL5 for DRC Project (P132821) and the telecommunications component of the Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P105644). The program also provided ICT Regulatory

¹⁴² This reflects amounts in transport projects as well transport components in other projects such as agriculture.

¹⁴³ A new indicator of 1,300 km was set for 2018, although it fell well beyond the end of the CAS period. While this is a commendable accomplishment, the target of rehabilitating 700 km of track was not a CAS outcome indicator. As such, it does not factor into the overall performance rating of the CAS.

Advisory Services TA (P132812). The program outcome indicators were: (i) increased total broadband penetration (household population); and (ii) increased international Internet Bandwidth (Bits per capita).

33. **Broadband penetration (household population) increased from 0.1 percent in 2011 to 2.8 percent in FY17, exceeding the CAS target of 2.5 percent.** The CAS program added 2,300 km to the country's fiber optic network of 650 km, almost quadrupling the national capacity. Two international operators, AIRTEL and Liquid Telecom, were recruited to maintain and operate the fiber-optic infrastructure. The two operators are finalizing the small works necessary to interconnect the SNEL network with their distribution networks. A new legal and regulatory framework to liberalize the telecommunications sector was adopted by the Government - it was cleared by the responsible parliamentary committees on October 27, 2016 but was not approved by Parliament until November 23, 2018 – well after the end of the extended CAS period – and therefore cannot be counted among CAS results. In addition, a new state-owned enterprise, *Société Congolaise de Fibre Optique* (SOCOF), was created on September 30, 2016 and was granted a license on November 12, 2016 by the Ministry of Telecommunications to build, operate and commercialize publicly funded fiber-optic broadband infrastructure.

34. **International Internet Bandwidth (Bits per capita) increased from less than 14 in 2011, to 411 (against a CAS target of 50).** This was enabled by DRC's integration into the existing international broadband network funded under the CAS program.

35. **CAS Outcome 2.4: Increased generation of electricity and improved access to energy.** IDA commitments in support of this outcome totaled US\$1,382 million. WBG investment was principally through three operations: the Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P097201), the Regional and Domestic Power Market Development (P069258), and the Electricity Access and Services Expansion Project (P156208). The program consisted mainly of rehabilitating the power production, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, as well as capacity building of the power utility (SNEL).

36. **One of the main goals of these efforts was to generate and deliver 5,515 GWh of energy to the copper belt in Katanga from the end-2011 baseline of 2,540 GWh.** The program was only able to deliver 4,265 GWh or 77 percent of the CAS target. The investment program suffered implementation delays due to the complexity of the rehabilitation exercise, and the limited capacity of the responsible utility. As a result, the quantity of energy generated at Inga rose modestly from 4,809 GWh at end-2010 to 5,907 GWh by the end of the CAS period, far short of the CAS target of 9,039 GWh. Similarly, the number of households connected to the grid rose by only 11,752 households, against a CAS target of 35,000.

37. **CAS Outcome 2.5: Boost agriculture production and increase access to markets.** IDA commitments totaled US\$393 million. The WBG portfolio consisted of the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Project (P092724), the agriculture component of the Western Growth Poles Project (P124720), and the Great Lakes Agricultural Program (P143307).

38. **Maize productivity in the program area increased from 0.5 metric tons/ha to 1.6 metric tons/ha, attaining 80 percent of the CAS target of 2 metric tons/ha.** Cassava productivity increased from 7 metric tons/ha to 20 metric tons/ha, well above the target of 15 metric tons/ha. Although not part of the program targets, some of the notable achievements included production and distribution of 2,800 metric tons of commercial seed for maize, cassava, and rice, against the target of 1,500 tons. Under the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Project (P092724), improved agricultural and animal technologies were provided to 435,000 farmers in targeted areas in Equateur province, against the CAS target of 441,000 farmers, 49 percent of whom were women, against a project target of 60 percent female beneficiaries.

Objective 3: Improve service delivery and increase human development indicators

39. **This objective was to be measured under four outcomes:** (i) increased access to clean water and sanitation in the cities of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi and Kindu; (ii) improved access to health services in 83 health zones; (iii) improved access to basic education; and (iv) a strengthened social protection system.

40. **CAS Outcome 3.1: Increased access to clean water and sanitation.** IDA commitments in support of this outcome totaled US\$494 million. WBG supported this objective through four interventions: the Emergency Social Action Project (P086874), the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (P104497), the Urban Water Supply Project (P091092), and the Eastern Recovery Project (P145196). Achievement of this outcome was to be measured through: (i) the percentage of the population in the targeted areas with access to potable water; and (ii) the number of people provided with access to improved water sources.

41. **The percentage of the population in the targeted areas with access to potable water increased from 43 percent at end-2011, to 58 percent at the end of the CAS period, surpassing the CAS target of 55 percent.** Similarly, the number of people provided with access to improved water sources increased from 5,292,000 in March 2010 to 7,172,000 - well in excess of the CAS target of 6,494,000. This successful outcome was enabled by the 786-km extension of the water distribution network, serving an additional 1.88 million residents of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, and Kindu with safe drinking water.

42. **CAS Outcome 3.2: Improved access to health services in targeted areas.** IDA commitments in support of this outcome totaled US\$494 million. The CAS supported this objective through five interventions: the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (P104497), the Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support Project (P088751), the Human Development Systems Strengthening Project (P145965), the Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and Women's Health Project (P147489), and the Health System Strengthening Project (P147555). Progress towards this outcome was to be measured through: (i) the rate of DPT3 immunization; (ii) the percentage of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel; (iii) the number of women aged 15-49 who were new users of family planning services; (iv) the percentage of children under 5 years of age sleeping under mosquito nets in targeted areas; and (v) the percentage of reported cases of SGBV who received PEP (post-exposure prophylaxis) kits within 72 hours.

43. **The proportion of children in 83 health zones aged 0-11 months who received the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT3) vaccination increased from 85 percent at end-2011 to 90 percent (the CAS target) by the end of the CAS period.** To facilitate this exercise, 98 percent of the 83 health zones covered under the program were provided with adequate vaccine storage and cold-chain equipment. However, the target for the percentage of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel declined slightly, from 80 percent at end-2001 to 79 percent by 2014 (latest data available), falling short of the CAS target of 85 percent. Similarly, there was a regression in the number of women aged 15-49 taking up family planning services, declining from 6 percent at end-2011 to 2 percent in 2014, which is below the program target of maintaining the number of new users at 6 percent. The percentage of children under 5 years of age sleeping under mosquito nets in targeted areas increased, from 35 percent at end-2011 to 66 percent in 2013, falling short of the CAS target of 70 percent. In contrast, the percentage of reported cases of SGBV who received PEP kits within 72 hours rose from 25 percent in 2014 to 92 percent in 2016, against the CAS target 50 percent.

44. **CAS Outcome 3.3: Improved access to basic education.** IDA commitments for education under this CAS totaled US\$170 million. The WBG supported education through: the Education Sector Project (P086294), the Human Development Systems Strengthening Project (P145965), and the Eastern Recovery Project (P145196). Progress towards this outcome was measured by: (i) increased primary gross enrollment; and (ii) increased completion rate at the primary level.

45. **Gross primary enrollment slightly fell short of expectations, rising from 92.7 percent at end-2011 to 107 percent in 2014, which was below the program target of 132.3 percent.** Disaggregated by gender, gross primary enrollment was 102 percent for girls and 112 percent for boys. The gross first grade intake rate increased from 107.7 percent in 2012 to 133.1 percent in 2014, surpassing the target of 129.8 percent. In some target provinces such as Kasai, the first-year primary school enrollment was more than double the projected number: 497,471 students versus 235,800. In addition, some 38 million textbooks were distributed, against the projected 25.7 million textbooks; and a student-to-textbook ratio of 1:2 was achieved. The primary school completion rate increased from 59 percent to 70 percent, although it fell short of the CAS target of 97.8 percent. Completion rates among girls (65 percent) continued to lag behind those of boys (75 percent).

46. **CAS Outcome 3.4: Strengthened social protection system.** IDA commitments for social protection totaled US\$206 million. The CAS supported social protection through the Emergency Social Action Project (P086874), the Street Children Project (P115318), the Eastern Recovery Project (P145196), and the Human Development Systems Strengthening Project (P145965). The target indicators under this outcome were: (i) establishing and regularly maintaining a comprehensive database of safety net beneficiaries; and (ii) the number of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works (by gender).

47. **Regarding the first indicator, the CAS target was to begin with the dataset containing information on street children in Kinshasa (established in 2012) and develop it further by including beneficiaries of other safety net programs, such as labor-intensive public works, and update it at least every six months with input from provinces.** However, expansion of this dataset did not take place, nor has the existing dataset on street children been updated regularly or reliably. Several factors contributed to this outcome: (i) the Minister of Social Affairs changed frequently, with new Ministers often ill-suited for their role (e.g., one of the Secretary-Generals of the Minister of Social Affairs worked previously in the mining sector and had no background in social protection); (ii) there was a year-long period during which there was no Minister of Social Affairs; (iii) coordination with provinces is challenging, as many provincial “Chefs de Divisions” do not collect systematically data and many of them lack internet connections to facilitate communication; and (iv) social protection services are provided primarily by or through a range of NGOs and FBOs (faith-based organizations), many of which do not collect or communicate data systematically.

48. **Regarding the number of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works, the goal was to grow the number of such beneficiaries from the 2012 baseline of 3,192 (30 percent of whom were female) to 18,000 by the end of the CAS period.** The Emergency Social Action Project generated 260,000 person-days (below its target of 290,000 person-days), and the ongoing Eastern Recovery Project generated 135,000 person-days, 50 percent of whom were female. This corresponds to about 4,488 jobs between the two projects¹⁴⁴. Hence, this activity has did not meet the CAS target.

49. **However, there were some successes.** Together with other development partners, the WBG supported TA for updating the Social Protection Strategy and elaborating an Action Plan for improving the efficiency of safety net programs. Both documents were formally adopted by 11 Sector Ministers in the Government in 2017. This represents a significant achievement, as they are the first-ever comprehensive Social Protection Strategy and Action Plan in the country’s history. Their preparation represented an unprecedented level of broad-based national dialogue that featured participation by provinces as well as the donor community. Also significant is the fact that, following the formal adoption of these documents,

¹⁴⁴ Converting person-days to the number of people employed requires knowledge about average length of employment for which there is no norm. The Eastern Recovery Project assumed 4 months at 22 days/month for each household. On this basis $(260,000 + 135,000) / (4 * 22) = 4,488$.

for the first time in the country's history, the national budget included an *investment* allocation for social protection services.

50. **The CAS also supported a particularly successful intervention among street children in Kinshasa.** A total of 15,586 street children benefited from at least one service (against an appraisal-stage projection of 8,000), with an estimated 10,000 children (41 percent of whom were girls) receiving a holistic package of services, against a target of 5,500. Some 5,335 children (48 percent of whom were girls) reestablished contact with their families (against an initial target of 800), with 4,099 people returning to live with their families, a 77 percent success rate.

Objective 4: Address fragility and conflict in the Eastern Province

51. **Under this objective, CAS program activities were aimed at addressing the key governance and socio-economic impediments to peace consolidation and sustainable development in the volatile Eastern provinces.** IDA commitments for addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern Provinces totaled US\$251 million. The WBG supported the East through the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project (P104041), the Eastern Recovery Project (P145196), and PFMAP (PROFIT Congo) Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (P145747). These projects were aimed at two principal outcomes: (i) improved management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas; and (ii) increased socio-economic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas.

52. **CAS Outcome 4.1: Improved management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas.** Progress towards this outcome was to be measured by: (i) increased budget retrocession to Eastern conflict-affected province of South-Kivu; (ii) number of communities benefitting from participatory budget planning processes; and (iii) reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in conflicted-affected areas.

53. **South Kivu had been receiving 10-20 percent of its revenues as retrocessions from the central Government, and this figure was expected to be increased to 35 percent.** There was an absence of data to confirm that this figure increased.

54. **Through TA from the Governance and Financial Management projects cited above, participatory budgeting was introduced in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces.** In total, 16 districts, against the program target of 8 districts, benefitted from this support. In addition, the eastern cities of Kalemie, Bukavu, and Kindu benefitted from support in investment planning, budgeting, and financial management.

55. **It had been envisaged that discrepancies between projected and actual expenditures in the conflicted-affected province of South-Kivu would decline from 51 percent to 30 percent.** Per the indicator above for retrocessions to South Kivu, this has been difficult to measure due to erratic and limited central government transfers, as well as provincial governments' limited capacity to forecast their local revenue streams. As such, this sub-component cannot be measured.

56. **CAS Outcome 4.2: Increased socio-economic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas.** The outcome indicators were: (i) increased number of person-days of employment created in conflict-affected areas; (ii) number of persons in conflict-affected areas with access to agricultural extension services and improved agricultural inputs; (iii) percentage of reported cases of SGBV who receive at least two services as needed (economic support, psycho-social, legal, medical); and (iv) percentage of people in conflict-affected communities who report an increase in inter-community cohesion and decrease in livelihoods-related tensions.

57. **As discussed above, some 135,000 person-days of employment in labor-intensive sub-projects were created against a CAS target of 400,000: 73,000 person-days in Goma and Bunia in Beni and**

Butembo, and 62,000 person-days in Bukavu (62,000 person-days). Additional employment creation was anticipated but would have been registered beyond the end of the CAS period and cannot be counted toward measuring achievement of this outcome indicator.

58. **Regarding the number of persons in conflict-affected areas with access to agricultural extension services and improved agricultural inputs, agreements with the various actors to support implementation of the envisaged activities were signed.** Basic seeds were ordered for delivery in time for the next agricultural season. As this occurred past the end of the CAS period.

59. **The percentage of reported cases of SGBV who receive at least two services as needed (economic support, psycho-social, legal, medical) has increased from 50 percent at baseline to 87 percent (as of June 30, 2017), surpassing the target of 60 percent.** Since October 2014, support has been provided to the two existing Centers of Excellence, the Panzi Foundation in South Kivu and Heal Africa in North Kivu. Activities focus on providing holistic support to survivors of sexual violence as well as health support to vulnerable women, including fistula repairs. As of June 2017, a total of 22,605 beneficiaries had received support 9,007 of whom were survivors of sexual violence. As of end June 2017, 100 percent of eligible reported cases of SGBV had received emergency kits (PEP) within 72 hours. Similarly, 87 percent of reported cases of sexual violence received at least two multidisciplinary services as needed (medical, legal and psychosocial).

60. **Regarding the percentage of people in conflict-affected communities who report an increase in inter-community cohesion and decrease in livelihoods-related tensions, the Provincial Consultative Committees in North and South Kivu validated the conflict maps produced by the Social Fund with the help of specialized NGOs.** All community sub-projects are accompanied by conflict scans and by relevant peacebuilding measures such as capacity building, establishment or strengthening of Local Peace Committees and active support to mediation. All Social Fund and partner NGOs staff have been trained in conflict transformation. Particular efforts concentrated on the simmering Bantu-Pygmy conflict in Tanganyika, including supporting the mediation efforts of local authorities, helping communities to produce conflict management plans, and producing a radio program (“My neighbor is my brother”) to be aired by local radio stations (which have been strengthened). While all of these are commendable actions, there is no data on the outcome indicator – which was to measure the percentage of people who report improved community cohesion. As this could not be measured.

III. WORLD BANK GROUP PERFORMANCE

61. **The design of the CAS program contributed to implementation and pursuit of its key objectives. The program undertook some timely adaptation measures in response to changing circumstances, especially due to security developments in the Eastern provinces, and a fragile central government.** There was also a sound program of ongoing activities, several of which will likely carry forward to the CPF.

Design of the Program

62. **CAS objectives and supporting instruments were fully aligned with the country’s development priorities.** With a few notable exceptions, the results framework was a reasonably good gauge of the program’s performance. Key risks to achieving CAS outcomes were adequately identified and influenced its design.

- *Relevance to and alignment with country development priorities.* The CAS focus on governance, growth, and social development was highly relevant to, and fully aligned with, DRC’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II). In addition, program design was informed by extensive consultations held with stakeholders in DRC in May-June 2012, including civil society, think tanks,

youth groups, religious groups, Parliament, members of the Government, and the country's major development partners.

- *Pertinence of World Bank Group interventions.* The strategy contained a balanced blend of ASA and investment activities, including programs aimed at promoting regional cooperation on trade and development (including energy), and consolidating peace.
- *Quality of the Results Framework.* The CAS used a simple results framework with quantifiable outcomes. While the Results Framework was reflective of the CAS objectives, a few of the indicators were not directly influenced by or attributable to CAS activities (e.g., Government transfers to local governments, proportion of mining revenue in GDP) and could not be verified. Some objectives did not have corresponding measurement tools (e.g., transparency and financial management in the forestry sector); and others could not be verified. The weaknesses in the Results Framework are reflected in the overall rating of Fair – and there will be greater attention to the objectives and indicators in the forthcoming CPF Results Framework.
- *Risks and Mitigation Measures.* The CAS rightly identified the key risks, most of which materialized as anticipated in the CAS. Insecurity in the East did stall program implementation in the area. Similarly, episodes of political paralysis, exacerbated by strong vested interests, continued to slow down important policy reforms. Some of the mitigation measures implemented during the CAS period included maintaining dialogue around a Governance Matrix, which helped improve transparency in the extractive industries; although traction in other areas, especially with respect to SOE reforms, was more limited. The Government's narrow fiscal space, which was exacerbated by the collapse of international commodity prices, undermined some aspects of the CAS program, such as Government's inability to pay its utility bills which impacted these companies' revenue streams. Although implementation capacity remained a challenge, virtually all activities in the CAS program anticipated this challenge and contained capacity building support to mitigate this risk.
- *Integration of Lessons Learned from the previous CAS.* Several lessons identified in the previous CAS guided the CAS program's design and implementation. These included: extensive collaboration with other development partners, flexibility in the program's implementation, extensive investment in advisory services and analytics, and civil society involvement (especially in budgetary processes and EITI implementation). Most CAS program activities did not encounter severe budget overruns as in the previous CAS, thanks to more thorough preparation.
- Key pieces of analytical work were prepared during this period (various sectoral analyses, PERs, Poverty Analysis, mining code), which helped inform the Bank's policy dialogue with the authorities, as well as pipeline projects.

Implementation of the CAS Program

63. **At the beginning of the CAS period, the undisbursed balance on the existing portfolio totaled US\$1.7 billion.** During the CAS period, an additional US\$2.1 billion was committed, bringing the total available resource envelope to US\$3.8 billion (US\$2.45 billion of national IDA, US\$1.11 billion of regional IDA, and US\$0.26 billion of trust funds). Of this, US\$2.19 billion was disbursed during the CAS period. The program was fully delivered as enumerated at the time of the PLR. Program delivery was aided by multiple factors. First, a robust set of advisory and analytical activities provided a foundation for the investment program. Second, a judicious but robust use of the Additional Financial instrument (38 percent of new commitments by volume), allowed the program to start small where capacity was deficient and the policy framework was still under development, and then scale up once there was sufficient traction. Implementation was also marked by significant flexibility, especially to accommodate new important

developments, such as the need to support demobilization and integration for ex-combatants in the restive Eastern Provinces. Program implementation was aided by a strong in-country presence of World Bank Group staff who provided continuous implementation support. It was further enabled by rigorous and regular annual Country Portfolio Performance Reviews during which major implementation impediments were identified and closely followed up. However, disbursement performance slackened toward the end of the CAS period, in part due to the political fragility and weak capacity that continued to prevail in the country.

64. **Program implementation was characterized by extensive WBG-wide collaboration. IDA and IFC collaborated in the financial sector to promote access to financing for Small and Medium Enterprises, including through the IDA-supported Financial Infrastructure and Markets Project, and IFC’s “SME Ventures” program, respectively. There was also extensive collaboration in the agribusiness sector, including preparation of a draft IDA-IFC Joint Implementation Plan for Agribusiness, and in improving the investment climate in DRC.** There was also strong IDA-MIGA collaboration in the telecommunications sector, where IDA is promoting policy reforms and investments, and MIGA is providing guarantees to investors¹⁴⁵. Similarly, there was extensive collaboration with other development partners. Virtually all sectors collaborated extensively with other development partners in order to ensure coherence in approaches, synergize interventions, and maximize geographical coverage.

65. **Despite these efforts, implementation was often slowed down by a number of challenges, including:** (i) strong vested interests and frequent changes in government ministers, which slowed down reforms; (ii) low capacity in the public as well as private sector; (iii) the inability of Government to meet its obligations, especially as it pertains to reforming State-Owned Enterprises; and (iv) intermittent flare-ups of insecurity in the East. At the end of the CAS period, implementation was further impaired by the ongoing political crisis triggered by issues pertaining to holding presidential elections.

IV. ALIGNMENT WITH THE WBG CORPORATE GOALS

66. **The CAS objectives and program were fully aligned with the WBG Twin Goals of eradicating extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.** Although, in general, extreme poverty in DRC is broadly dispersed, it is particularly acute in: remote communities that are physically isolated due to poor infrastructure, often with limited income-generating opportunities and access to markets; areas that have been ravaged by war, especially in the east; and poor urban communities, particularly in Kinshasa and other major cities that are experiencing unprecedented rapid and unplanned growth. Consequently, the CAS program was designed to respond to these various dimensions. In particular, the CAS program’s road rehabilitation and agricultural promotion activities were targeted at the former Oriental and Equateur provinces to address the extreme poverty that characterizes these provinces. The program’s activities in the country’s eastern region sought to promote conflict resolution and economic recovery – notably the Great Lakes Initiative that was launched in 2013. Similarly, the program’s social interventions extensively expanded access to potable water in major urban centers and invested in education and health in selected poor communities across the country in order to ensure access, efficiency, and equity in social service delivery. The program’s activities in support of shared prosperity included, among other things, the promotion of labor-intensive works to provide opportunities to unemployed youth. More generally, the CAS program sought to stimulate broad-based, inclusive growth by addressing some of the most binding constraints to SME growth, such as business registration, and access to energy and financial services. The program sought to improve public sector governance, including more effective management of natural resource revenues to facilitate investments in public infrastructure. Finally, the WBG is supporting the

¹⁴⁵ For instance, in November 2013, MIGA issued an initial loss coverage for a project covering an investment of up to \$100 million to support the construction, expansion and operation of a telecom tower network in DRC.

availability, reliability, and timeliness of statistics to improve the analysis and understanding of the dynamics of poverty, social cohesion, and conflict in DRC, so as to inform pro-poor policies.

V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

67. **A number of lessons have been gleaned from this CAS' implementation experience relating to, among others, expanding capacity building beyond the public sector; flexibility in a fragile environment; donor coordination not only to avoid duplication, but to ensure even coverage in a geographically vast country; and striking a balance between central and provincial government support.** More broadly, the forthcoming CPF should reflect a realistic level of ambition, given the degree of government capacity and demonstrated commitment to the necessary reforms.

68. **Each project should have some capacity building activities including, where appropriate, support for the relevant nonpublic actors, such as private contractors, NGOs and other entities participating in the projects.** Capacity building should be front-loaded and well adapted to local needs.

69. **Start small, in a manner commensurate with existing capacity, and progressively scale up as capacity strengthens.** Similarly, start with those provinces where there is strong commitment to the desired reforms. “

70. **Where possible and as appropriate, work with decentralized entities.** Because of their proximity to the local population that they serve, local governments tend to have a greater sense of accountability. Local governments are also generally characterized by less turnover at the political level than the central government, thus enabling sustained engagement.

71. **Where possible and as appropriate, decentralize project implementation support.** For a large country with limited communication infrastructure like DRC, small satellite PIUs to support implementation in individual, or a cluster of, provinces are more effective than one centralized PIU with no regional representation. At the same time accountability should be clearly defined to avoid finger-pointing between PIUs.

72. **A judicious combination of instruments is more effective in supporting policy changes.** A WBG-supported program that is almost exclusively composed of Investment Project Financing is not very effective in dealing with policy reforms. IPFs need to be complemented with other instruments that are more effective in facilitating a policy reform agenda. That said, there have been no Development Policy Financing operations in nearly two decades, given the fragile macroeconomic framework that has prevailed over this period. That appears to be changing and budget support operations could be part of the forthcoming CPF. Also, output-based approaches, where applicable, have proven to be effective tools in galvanizing reform processes and should be encouraged and promoted as appropriate.

73. **More multi-sectoral collaboration is needed to maximize program impact.** For instance, investments in the national road program should be closely coordinated with agriculture investments for amplified, multi-sectoral impact.

74. **Donor coordination needs to be more structured.** Some 20 development partners account for up to 90 percent of development assistance. Whereas individual WBG-supported interventions have aimed to coordinate with other development partners, there is need for a more country-managed coordination process to ensure more even geographical coverage across the country and harmony in approaches.

75. **Flexibility in implementing the CPF program is vital in a fragile environment.** In a country as vast and complex as DRC, it is difficult to determine how the situation will evolve over four or five years of a CAS period, and the challenges and/or the opportunities that will manifest themselves. The CPF program should be flexible to effectively respond to changes in political, economic, and social circumstances. *Hence*

the importance of taking full advantage of the PLR exercise as an opportunity to take stock of changes in the country context and adjust the CPF program – and the Results Framework - accordingly.

76. ***CPF targets should relate to outcomes that can be attributed to WBG activities.*** Some of the CAS outcomes targets could not be attributed to CAS-supported activities. Principles of causality and attribution should guide the definition of target outcomes in the CPF.

77. ***Spatial development dynamics should be explored in designing the new CPF.*** Because of its immense size, DRC is progressively evolving a spatial configuration in its domestic market dynamics as well as trade with its neighbors and the rest of the world. Recognition of these emerging spatial dynamics helps design a forward looking and coherent CPF investment program that takes full advantage of both the pertinent domestic and external opportunities in the various localities of this enormous country.

CLR Annex: CAS Results Matrix ^{146 147}

CAS OUTCOMES AND INDICATORS	STATUS AND EVALUATION SUMMARY	WBG ACTIVITIES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE OUTCOME	LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEW CPF
CAS Strategic Objective One: Increase state effectiveness and improve good governance			
PRSP goal 1: Strengthening governance and consolidating peace			
Country Development Goals: Improve public financial management at national and provincial level; Pursue the decentralization process			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak public financial management system at national and provincial levels Inadequate capacity at national and provincial levels resulting in budget overruns Poor human resource management in the public service Lack of transparency in public procurement 			
CAS Outcome 1.1. Increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, Equateur.	<p>There was greater citizen engagement in the budget process, with opportunities for civil society inputs. In addition, comprehensive budget execution reports are published regularly on the Ministry of Budget website, and procurement information is published periodically on the Procurement Authority website. Public participation was also introduced in the targeted provinces. Six cities (Bukavu, Kalemie, Kikwit, Kindu, Matadi, and Mbandaka) were helped to develop procurement plans and to consult their citizens in the budget process. Their budgets have been audited by the <i>Cour de Comptes</i> (supreme audit institution) for three years in a row, contributing to greater budget discipline and transparency. That said, the proportion of central government resources transferred to provinces remained low, and discrepancy between budgeted and executed amounts remained high, as did the proportion of procurement for large</p>	PROJECTS Closed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhancing Governance Capacity (P104041, FY08) IDF New Procurement Law Capacity Building TA (P130499). TA and capacity building for budget preparation in DRC provinces. Capacity for Core Public Management (P117382, FY11) Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation (P122229, FY14) 	<p>- Provinces where there was greater citizen participation experienced higher investments at sub-provincial levels than had previously been the case, demonstrating greater accountability and responsiveness associated with higher transparency. It is recommended that the next CPF expands this experience to other provinces.</p>

¹⁴⁶ Fiscal Years (FY) for projects and Trust Funds refer to FY of actual approval. FYs for ASA refer to FY of actual completion of the analytical work.

¹⁴⁷ With the total number of provinces increasing from 11 to 26, the self-assessment is based on the previous provincial boundaries.

	contracts that did not use competitive tender methods.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PFMAP (PROFIT Congo) - Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747, FY14) Statistics Development (P150148, FY16) 	
1.1.1 Percentage of national revenue transferred to targeted provinces (Bandundu, Kasai Occidental, Katanga, South Kivu) <u>Baseline</u> : 31.5% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target</u> : 35% <u>CY/FY16 Actual</u> : Not Verified.	Not Verified Data on the specific amounts transferred to the four provinces, calculated <u>as a percentage of central Government revenue</u> , is not available. However, the actual amount of central Government <u>transfers</u> to <i>all</i> provinces for CY15 as reported by the Ministry of Budget, when compared to the actual amount of central Government <u>revenues</u> as reported in the Budget Settlement Law (" <i>Reddition des Comptes</i> ") of 2015 – latest data available – was 22 percent, implying that only 22 percent of the actual revenues received by the central Government were actually transferred to provinces. However, this figure is difficult to interpret. Several civil servants who work in provinces continue to be paid centrally. In one calculation (as reported in the ICR for the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project – P104041), when civil servants and other activities that are paid for centrally but work or take place at the provincial level were taken into account, the amount of central revenues <u>spent</u> at provincial levels was calculated at 46 percent). This applies to all provinces, not just the four target provinces in this objective, though it could be reasonable to assume that this would apply to these four provinces as well.	TRUST FUNDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MDTF - PFM (PROFIT Congo) Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (P145747) SRTF Catalytic Project to Strengthen the INS (P125509) ASA Delivered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PEFA Assessment EW (P131609, FY14) Economic Update EW (P133727, FY14) Kinshasa Annual Forum TA (P145874, FY14) Coordinated PFM Reform Assistance TA (P113619, FY14) Debt Management Reform Plan TA (P130862, FY14) Use of Country System TA (P144456, FY15) National Risk Assessment ML&TF TA (P146211, FY14) PEMFAR (P147410, FY15) Ongoing:	<p>- Provincial transfers should be dealt with in the broader context of decentralization and deconcentration.</p> <p>- The next CPF should consider a broader study of decentralization, including what competences could progressively be transferred to provinces, and their ability to raise own revenues, among other things.</p> <p>- The next CPF should also include indicators where clear attribution can be ascertained.</p>
1.1.2 Reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in the four targeted provinces (Bandundu, Katanga Kasai)	The latest available information is for Calendar Year 2015 (which is also DRC's Fiscal Year). Progress towards more realistic and credible budget execution in line with forecasts remains limited because of the continued unreliability of "retrocession" (transfers from central government), as well as weak forecasting of		<p>- There is need for capacity building at the provincial levels and in the major cities on budget and program planning, as well as local revenue collection.</p>

Occidental and South-Kivu) <u>Baseline:</u> 51% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 30% <u>CY15 Actual:</u> 63%	<p>provinces’ own revenue, in addition to weak budgeting and execution processes.</p> <p>However, it is important to note that the execution of the sub-category “operating expenditures” has undergone an overall improvement from 76% in 2011 to 90% in 2015.</p> <p>There has also been progress in increasing transparency and data reliability regarding provincial budgets. For instance, the budget settlement law (<i>loi de reglement</i>) for 2014 was prepared, and as was one for 2015 is under preparation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Programmatic Subnational Economic Analysis (P151614, FY16)• Provincial Budget Planning (P123040, FY15)• Public Expenditure Management (P127546, FY14)• Procurement Use of Country System (P148347, FY15)• Economic Update PA (P151615, FY16)• Economic Update EW (P156429, FY16)• PEMFAR - Dissemination & Macro Model EW (P156672, FY16) <p><u>OTHER PARTNERS</u> IMF, DfID, AfDB, UNDP, European Commission (EC), Belgium/CTB, and USAID</p>																
1.1.3 Percentage of public contracts awarded through open competitive bidding in selected ministries and provinces. <u>Baseline:</u> 0 (2012) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 75% of large contracts <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 58%	<p>The regulatory environment for procurement improved considerably since 2010. However, performance has been uneven and, in some cases, regressed. On the positive side, there has been an openness to publish the large contracts on the Procurement Authority Website, and the number of published procurement plans increased from 15 in 2012 to 83 in 2013, 136 in 2014, 139 in 2015 and 83 in 2016. In addition, Procurement Units have been set up as follows:</p> <table><tr><td>Levels</td><td>Number of procurement Units</td><td>Number of Contracting authorities (Ministries, SOEs, Agencies)</td></tr><tr><td>Central Level</td><td>97</td><td>114</td></tr><tr><td>25 Provinces</td><td>16</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Kinshasa province and municipalities</td><td>39</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>152</td><td>182</td></tr></table> <p>Also, at central level, the Procurement Dispute Committee is operational, handling a number of disputes: 9 in 2012, 21 in 2013, 30 in 2014, 24 in</p>	Levels	Number of procurement Units	Number of Contracting authorities (Ministries, SOEs, Agencies)	Central Level	97	114	25 Provinces	16	29	Kinshasa province and municipalities	39	39	Total	152	182		<p>- There is need for a concerted effort to ensure that procurement gains are not lost. The next CPF should continue to support Government in this important area.</p>
Levels	Number of procurement Units	Number of Contracting authorities (Ministries, SOEs, Agencies)																
Central Level	97	114																
25 Provinces	16	29																
Kinshasa province and municipalities	39	39																
Total	152	182																


	<p>2015 and 13 in 2016. An independent procurement audit has been conducted and disseminated for the 2011 budget, and the audit reports for the 2012 and 2013 budget have been finalized and are pending board approval for dissemination. There has, indeed, been significant progress.</p> <p>But there have been some shortcomings as well. At provincial level, Dispute Resolution Committees are yet to be established due to delays in the deployment of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority at the decentralized levels.</p> <p>Most notably, the percentage of public contracts awarded through open competitive bidding has declined lately, after initial improvement: 79.54% in 2011), 86.51% in 2012, 94.35% in 2013; 83.08% in 2014; and 58.36% in 2015.</p>		
Country Development Goals: Improve transparency and governance in the management of natural resources; Improve traceability of Government revenues issued from natural resources; Increase its contribution to domestic economy and local communities' welfare			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor management of forest, oil and mining resources due to weak legal framework, lack of enforcement mechanisms, and weak institutional capacity. 			
CAS Outcome 1.2. Increased transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil and mining industries	<p>Overall, the targets set under the CAS were largely achieved, as significant progress was made towards enhancing transparency under the extractive sectors, especially under EITI, and country dialogue through the Governance Matrix.</p>	PROJECTS Closed during CAS Period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forestry and Nature Conservation (P100620, FY09) Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas (GEF) (P111621, FY09) 	
1.2.1 Area of forest concessions with signed social responsibility contracts	<p>The CAS program assisted communities in negotiating social responsibility contracts with the industrial logging concessionaires, covering 10.7 million hectares. In total, 75 such contracts were negotiated, generating US\$15.1 million over four</p>	Ongoing:	<p>- Relying on policy or regulatory pre-conditions can severely impair project implementation as happened under the Forestry Project. Whenever possible, such conditions should be met prior to</p>

<p><u>Baseline:</u> 2M ha (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 10.7M ha <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 10.7M ha</p>	<p>years for the benefit of 588,530 individuals. The program also supported institutional strengthening for the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development, including facilitating the voluntary retirement of 1,702 staff and 972 managers who had passed their retirement age and instituting a transparent hiring process, thus allowing the ministry to rejuvenate its workforce. In addition, the program supported the installation of a specialized forest management system, the Spatial Information Management System (SyGIS), to increase the ministry's capacity for managing DRC's forests.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Parks Rehabilitation Project (PREPAN P083813 & P127437, FY09) Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector (P106982, FY11) Pipeline: <p>TRUST FUNDS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EITI TF Phase II: EITI Implementation (P113977) FIP Improved Forested Landscape Management (P128887) Mai-Ndombe REDD+ Integrated Project under CAFI (P162837, FY17) Forest Dependent Communities Support (P149049 – FIP, FY16) FCPF REDD Readiness (P124072, FY11) FCPF Carbon Fund: DRC ER-Program (P160320, pipeline) <p>ASA/OTHER Delivered</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oil and Gas Advisory TA (P127283, FY15) DRC Forest Governance Assessment TA (P154671, FY15) Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC TA (P152956, FY16) 	<p>project startup, or incorporated as project outputs.</p> <p>- The Forestry and Nature Conservation's successful handling of the voluntary retirement process can serve as a good example of similar exercises under the next CPF.</p> <p>- There were press reports of some NGOs alleging violations of the 2002 moratorium against issuing new forest concessions. Dialogue with Government on forest governance needs to be maintained under the new CPF.</p>
<p>1.2.2 Percentage increase in revenue from mining sector in total fiscal revenue <u>Baseline:</u> 2% of GDP (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 2.7%* <u>FY14 Actual:</u> 3.8% (source EITI)</p> <p>*There was a typo in the PLR, and this target was stated as 27% instead of 2.7%.</p>	<p>In 2014, Government revenues from mining amounted to \$1.348 billion, or 3.8 percent of GDP. However, these revenues are still considered low by industry standards. The 2002 Mining Code is considered generous compared to peer countries. The WBG, together with other development partners such as the IMF, have assisted Government to prepare a new code in order to, among other things: (i) increase in the royalty rate; (ii) align the corporate income tax for the mining sector (30 percent) to the general regime (35 percent); (iii) introduce provisions for a super-profit tax; and (iv) introduce provisions to secure the corporate tax basis. This new code was signed into law in March 2018, well past the end of the extended CPF period.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mai-Ndombe REDD+ Integrated Project under CAFI (P162837, FY17) Forest Dependent Communities Support (P149049 – FIP, FY16) FCPF REDD Readiness (P124072, FY11) FCPF Carbon Fund: DRC ER-Program (P160320, pipeline) <p>ASA/OTHER Delivered</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oil and Gas Advisory TA (P127283, FY15) DRC Forest Governance Assessment TA (P154671, FY15) Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC TA (P152956, FY16) 	<p>- The EITI process has been instrumental in enhancing transparency in industrial mining. The next CPF should consider extending this process to artisanal mining and the forestry sector as well. Here, too, dialogue with government is essential to ensure country ownership of this reform agenda.</p>
<p>1.2.3 Percentage of oil petroleum permits competitively auctioned <u>Baseline:</u> 0% <u>FY17 Target:</u> 100% <u>FY17 Actual:</u> N/A</p>	<p>78. To codify the principle of competition in awarding oil concessions, the Government promulgated Law Number 15/012 of 1 August 2015 on the General Regime for Hydrocarbons which provides for competition in issuing exploration permits. The program indicator was not tested as</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DRC Forest Governance Assessment TA (P154671, FY15) Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC TA (P152956, FY16) 	<p>- Implementation of this code should continue to be monitored in the context of the Governance Matrix.</p>

	there were no reported petroleum concession transactions since the law's promulgation. As there is no data for this indicator.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Balancing Mining Development and Forest Conservation in the Congo Basin (P146347) Congo Basin Timber (P153586, FY16) Transport, Economic Growth, and Deforestation in the DRC <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of Environment standards related to REDD+ in the Mining sector Eastern DRC Mineral Recovery TA (P148763, FY17) <p>OTHER PARTNERS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IMF, EC, DfID, GIZ, KFW, CTB, USAID 	
Country Development Goals: Improve transparency and performance management of key State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak enforcement capacity Lack of transparency in the management of SOEs Influence from vested interest Ineffective government oversight of strategic SOEs 			
CAS Outcome 1.3. Enhanced governance and increasing the operational performance of SOEs	There is clarity on their financials, the utility companies have private service contractors to assist in their management, and major infrastructure has been put in place or installation is ongoing, resulting in improvements in service delivery. SOEs have some recovery plans in place. However, governance remains poor, and Government commitment remains low. Some of	<p>PROJECTS</p> <p>Closed during CAS Period:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Private Sector Development and Competitiveness (P071144, FY04) <p>Ongoing:</p>	<p>- Performance Contracts between SOEs and Government are useful tools only if each party honors their obligations.</p> <p>- Service Contracts (such as in the case of REGIDESO and SNEL) can be useful in improving governance at state-owned enterprises that the Government is not</p>

	the SOEs (e.g., SNCC) are on the brink of collapsing.																														
<p>1.3.1 Increased efficiency of SOEs that deliver key public services (SNCC, SNEL, SCTP, RVA, RVF, REGIDESO) through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or management performance contracts</p> <p><u>Baseline</u>: 3 (2013)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target</u>: 6 (Service contract concluded for REGIDESO)</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual</u>: 6 (including those in place prior to the CAS, otherwise 2 currently)</p>	<p>Prior to the CAS period, the Government issued Decree Number 12/031 of October 2012 providing a framework for resolving SOE financial obligations (as audited for the year ending December 31, 2011) that were deemed to be beyond the SOEs' capacity to meet. These obligations, which amounted to US\$3.5 billion as of December 31, 2011, included commercial debts, salary arrears (US\$800 million), tax obligations, enterprise-to-enterprise debts, and others. Some of these obligations were to be cancelled outright while others converted into equity. Although there were residual obligations, especially salary arrears, the exercise was meant to stabilize these SOEs. Some of the major SOEs had (or were later to have) stabilization contracts:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>SNCC</td><td>Railways</td><td>Vecturis</td><td>2008-2010; 2011-2013</td></tr> <tr> <td>SNEL</td><td>Energy Utility</td><td>Manitoba Hydro International</td><td>2015-2017</td></tr> <tr> <td>SCTP</td><td>Port, Vessels, Railway</td><td>Progosa</td><td>2008-2010</td></tr> <tr> <td>RVA</td><td>Airport</td><td>ADPI/KPMG</td><td>2008-2010; 2010-2011</td></tr> <tr> <td>RVF</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>REGIDESO</td><td>Water Utility</td><td>SDE/Eranove</td><td>2013-2016</td></tr> </table> <p>Support for SOE stabilization and transformation continued under the CAS. Although these efforts momentarily stabilized these SOEs, and some are doing better than others (e.g., RVA), most SOEs have fallen back on hard times. The major positive outcome of this process has been clarity over their financial situation, with some undergoing regular audits. However, because of their</p>					SNCC	Railways	Vecturis	2008-2010; 2011-2013	SNEL	Energy Utility	Manitoba Hydro International	2015-2017	SCTP	Port, Vessels, Railway	Progosa	2008-2010	RVA	Airport	ADPI/KPMG	2008-2010; 2010-2011	RVF				REGIDESO	Water Utility	SDE/Eranove	2013-2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Urban Water Supply (P091092, FY09) Multimodal Transport (P092537, FY10) AF Southern Africa Power Market (P069258, FY12) AF Multimodal Transport (P129594, FY13) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF Urban Water Supply (FY16) <p>ASA</p> <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Urbanization Review EW (P156796, FY17) <p>OTHER PARTNERS</p> <p>DfID, AfDB, AFD, CTG, EC</p>	<p>yet ready to fully concession or privatize.</p> <p>- Projects for SOE reforms should be kept simple, and expectations must be properly calibrated.</p> <p>- Because of the heavy policy content that has great bearing on SOE governance and operational performance (e.g., tariff reform), the dialogue on such reforms needs to be elevated higher than project itself. It is essential to ensure that SOE reforms have strong country ownership, and adequate funding, to support them.</p>
SNCC	Railways	Vecturis	2008-2010; 2011-2013																												
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	continued poor governance and failure by the parties to the SOE-Government performance contracts to honor their respective obligations, the SOEs have fallen back in deep debt (cross-debts, commercial debts, and social debts – mainly salary arrears and retirement contributions). The situation of some of them is particularly precarious (such as SNCC).		
CAS Strategic Objective Two: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation			
PRSP goal 2: Diversifying the economy to accelerate growth and create employment			
PRSP goal 4: Protecting the environment and sustaining the fight against climate change			
Country Development Goals: Pursue structural economic reforms to promote private sector development			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Years of conflict have undermined the capacity of private enterprises to thrive and therefore are not contributing to the growth of the economy • Lack of access to finance • Public enterprises are a major bottleneck to private sector development in DRC 			
CAS Outcome 2.1 Enhanced business environment for private sector development	Overall, the CAS targets for enhancing the environment for private sector development have been mostly achieved as discussed below. In addition, following an internal reorganization (Circular letter of February 5th, 2016 from the managing director of the one-stop shop of Kinshasa/Gombe) the number of procedures to register a business were merged from 6 to 3, resulting in a further reduction in the number of days to register a business. This reform was recognized in the Doing Business indicators of 2018.	PROJECTS Closed during CAS Period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private Sector Development and Competitiveness (P071144, FY04) Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Western Growth Poles (P124720, FY13) 	- Given DRC's large size, a key lesson is to start supporting "Doing Business" reforms not only at the central level, but at the provincial level as well. - Another key lesson is to focus on a wider array of pertinent reforms, and not necessarily those reflected in the "Doing Business" indicators.

<p>2.1.1 Time to register a business is decreased by half</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u> 58 days (2012)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u> 10</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual:</u> 11</p>	<p>One-Stop shop (<i>Guichet unique</i>) was implemented and is operational As a result, the time to register businesses has significantly reduced. This, in turn, led to major growth in both individual as well as corporate businesses.</p> <div><p>Businesses created at the One-Stop-Shop (May 2013 to December 2016)</p><table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Corporations</th><th>Individuals</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2013</td><td>713</td><td>1089</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>1772</td><td>6578</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>1671</td><td>6862</td></tr><tr><td>2016</td><td>1473</td><td>6033</td></tr></tbody></table></div>	Year	Corporations	Individuals	2013	713	1089	2014	1772	6578	2015	1671	6862	2016	1473	6033	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Financial Infrastructure and Markets (P145554, FY14) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 1 (P151083, FY16)Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 2 (FY17) <p>TRUST FUNDS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Regional Integration/ Legal Harmonization (FIRST TF) (TF012786, FY13-15)Entrepreneurship as Pathway Out of Poverty – TF (P153240) <p>ASA</p> <p>Delivered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">FSAP EW (P144434, FY14)AML/CFT Assessment of the DRC (P147917, FY15)Strengthening Payment System (P132451, FY15) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Investment Climate Strategy EW (P143263, FY16)Spatial Development TA (P145907, FY16)Payments System: Financial Infrastructure and Markets Project (P145554, FY14)	<p>- It appears that previously, small businesses, especially individual entrepreneurs, were forced to operate informally. With these reforms, they can now formalize their businesses which will, among other things, allow them to access a number of services, such as financial services, that often require that a business be registered.</p>
Year	Corporations	Individuals																
2013	713	1089																
2014	1772	6578																
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2016	1473	6033																
<p>2.1.2 Number of days to obtain a construction permit:</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u> 150 days (2015)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u> 94 days</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual:</u> 122 days</p>	<p>DRC’s performance is significantly ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa’s average of 155.6 days (source: Doing Business). The cost of obtaining a permit (6.2 percent of the value of the construction) is now comparable to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (7.6 percent).</p>																	
<p>2.1.3 Number of days to import and export:</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u></p> <p>Import: 63 days (2015)</p> <p>Export: 44 days (2015)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u></p> <p>Import: 57 days</p> <p>Export: 40 days</p> <p>(Source: Doing Business Report)</p>	<p>It is not possible to assess the progress toward this outcome because the Doing Business methodology changed to the “distance to frontier” parameter, whereby an economy’s distance to frontier is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the lowest performance and 100 representing the frontier. DRC’s performance improved modestly, from 35.05 in 2013, to 37.57 in 2017.</p>																	

FY17 Actual: Not Rated		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Doing Business Reforms Coordination (FY16-17) (P156593) 	
<p>2.1.4 A fully functioning, modern payment system providing electronic (cash-less) funds transfer with real-time clearing and settlement of accounts, and interconnectivity with other payments systems in the region in place by 2015</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u> System not in place</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u> Payment system in place</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual:</u> In place</p>	<p>The Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system and the Automated Clearing House (ACH) were implemented and are operational.</p>	<p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jobs (FY16-17) <p>IFC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Entrepreneurship/SME capacity building “Business Edge” (ongoing) SME credit lines (ongoing) DRC Investment Climate (Project ID 600085) <p>OTHER PARTNERS</p> <p>DfID, KfW, UNDP/UNCDF, EC, AfDB, CTB, GTZ</p>	
<p>2.1.5 IFC fund providing risk capital and advisory to SMEs; and providing microfinance to local banks and MFIs, with the objective of increased access to credit for SMEs.</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u> 0 (2012)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u> 10 SMEs</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual:</u> 10</p>	<p>The IFC program is supporting a range of SMEs including: Hospital, Call Center, Mobile Internet, Private School in Lubumbashi, Dry Port, Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Fluvial Transport, Coffee Roaster, Road Transporter, Private school in Kinshasa.</p>		
<p>Country Development Goals: Improve infrastructure capacity covering the roads sector, railways, telecoms, and electricity</p>			
<p>Issues and Obstacles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor quality of infrastructure High cost of movement of goods, people, and services Lack of technical capacity Weak M&E system 			
<p>CAS Outcome 2.2.</p> <p>Improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure</p>	<p>There was significant progress in meeting the targets for restoring <i>rail</i> and <i>road</i> infrastructure. With respect to rail travel, the CAS program restored the infrastructure by rehabilitating the</p>	<p>PROJECTS</p> <p>Closed during CAS Period:</p>	

	tracks and endowing the company with rolling stock and locomotives. Targets set for road rehabilitation were fully met.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation (P104497, FY07) 	
<p>2.2.1 Average transit time between copper belt and Zambian border</p> <p><u>Baseline</u>: 17 days (2011)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target</u>: 5 days</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual</u>: Not Verified</p> <p>While the CAS program met what could be considered as an alternative target, that is consistent with the original objective, it cannot be measured (as the opportunity to revise the indicator at the time of the PLR was missed).</p>	<p>The original target (as formulated) was in relation to transit time by train for mining companies. Since mining companies have since switched to road transportation and maintain the relevant sections of the roads themselves, this indicator – in its original formulation – was no longer relevant and could not be measured. The indicator should have been revised at the time of the PLR, <i>which represents a missed opportunity</i>. That said, the CAS program invested in the rehabilitation of railway tracks outside the copper belt and railway wagons, along with financing the purchase of 18 locomotives, since, for some communities, rail travel is their only form of connectivity. The program is on the way to exceeding the original target of rehabilitating 700 km of track (new goal, 1,300 km, fell past the end of the CAS period). As discussed under section 1.3.1 above, the railway company (SNCC) is under financial distress due to poor management, and Government was considering options for the company's profitability, including the possibility of concessioning it to a private operator.</p>	<p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Priority Reopening & Maintenance – Pro-Routes (P101745, FY08) Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery SIL (P092724, FY10) Multimodal Transport (P092537, FY10) Western Growth Poles (P124720, FY13) Urban Development (P129713, FY13) Goma Airport (P153085, FY15) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF High Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance (national with GLI regional component) (FY16) AF Urban Development Project (FY17) AF Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery (FY17) Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 1 (P151083, FY16) Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 2 (FY17) <p>ASA</p> <p>Delivered:</p>	<p>- Although the physical dimensions of the railways system have been addressed under the program, the railway company's management remains very weak despite the CAS program's efforts. A recovery plan was devised and had been under consideration by the Government. The next CPF will continue to advise Government on various options for the future of this company (restructuring, concessioning).</p>
<p>2.2.2 Number of days/year with roads not passable by 4x2 in project areas (Province Orientale, Katanga, Equateur and South Kivu)</p> <p><u>Baseline</u>: total of 90 days (2011)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target</u>: 100 days (including the AF2 new road sections)</p>	<p>The program has opened 3,600 km of both trunk roads (1,600 km) and feeder roads (2,000 km) in Province Orientale, Katanga, and Equateur, of which 2,400 km are under maintenance contracts to forestall their deterioration.</p>		<p>The main lessons for the next CPF include: (1) continuing with the "stage construction approach" of reduced technical standards at the beginning, followed by sustained maintenance thereafter in order to open as many kilometers of road as possible; (2) considering asphaltting road sections only when traffic volumes warrant it given the high cost of this option; (3) continuing to strengthen the capacity of</p>

<p><u>FY17 Actual</u>: 50 days</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> River and Urban Transport Review EW (P144128, FY15) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spatial Development TA (P145907, FY16) Urbanization Review EW (P156796, FY17) <p><u>OTHER PARTNERS</u> DfID, AfDB, AFD, CTB, EC, KfW, EIB, JICA</p>	<p>local contractors to improve the quality of their work, and enhance their ability to take on increasingly more technically complex assignments, and using them more often compared to using “force account” through the Road Agency; (4) the importance of the Road Maintenance Fund (FONER – <i>Fonds National d’Entretien Routier</i>) which has been successful in mobilizing significant amounts of funds for road maintenance through SMEs; and (5) the importance of Output-Based Contracts in road rehabilitation and maintenance and the need to expand its use.</p>
<p>Country Development Goals: Build a modern national infrastructure for telecoms; Improve the access rate to telecoms and new technologies; Strengthen the liberalization and competitiveness of the sector to attract private investments</p>			
<p>Issues and Obstacles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of national fiber-optic network - broadband infrastructure Costly broadband internet and phone access Legal and regulatory framework to be revised, renovated, and updated Over dependence on satellite technology 			
<p>CAS Outcome 2.3. Improved access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost.</p>	<p>Although the targets set below were achieved, the portion of the objective linked to reducing cost has not been attained.</p>	<p><u>PROJECTS</u> Closed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Telecom Component of the Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P105644, FY04), closed on Sep. 30, 2016. <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional CAB APL5 DRC (P132821, FY15) 	<p>- One major lesson relates to the difficulty of roaming on the sub-regional level. A key recommendation to the next CPF is to support a regional ASA to provide recommendations on policies to reduce roaming rates, between the Republic of Congo and DRC, to encourage competition and facilitate cross-border trade and investments.</p>
<p>2.3.1 Increased total broadband penetration (household population) <u>Baseline</u>: 0.1% (12/2011) <u>FY17 Target</u>: 2.5% <u>FY17 Actual</u>: 2.8% (source: <i>Autorité de régulation de la poste et</i></p>	<p>The CAS program added 2,300 km to the country optic fiber network of 650 km, almost quadrupling national capacity. Recruitment of international operators to commercialize the excess capacity of the SNEL network reached the final stage of negotiations. Two operators were identified: AIRTEL and Liquid Telecom, and the transaction was expected to be completed by early 2017. Meanwhile, a new legal and regulatory framework</p>		

<i>des télécommunications du Congo (ARPTC))</i>	to liberalize the telecommunications sector was adopted by the Government. It was cleared by the responsible parliamentary committees on October 27, 2016 and was sent for consideration by Parliament. In addition, a new state-owned enterprise, Société Congolaise de Fibre optique (SOCOF), was created on September 30, 2016 and given a license on November 12, 2016 by the ministry in charge of telecommunications to build, operate and commercialize the fiber optic broadband infrastructure.	ASA Delivered: ICT Regulatory Advisory Services TA (P132812, FY14)	
2.3.2 Increased international Internet Bandwidth (Bits per capita) <u>Baseline:</u> <14 (12/2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 50 <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 411 (source: <i>Autorité de régulation de la poste et des télécommunications du Congo (ARPTC))</i>	The program-funded broad band network has been integrated into the existing, internationally connected network.		
Country Development Goals: Increase the production and transmission capacity of electrical energy; Develop infrastructure for the supply of energy to improve households' access to electricity; Develop renewable energy sources			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Widespread supply shortfalls • Inadequate transmission of networks • High cost of power • Weak institutional capacity 			
CAS Outcome 2.4. Increased generation of electricity and improved access to energy	Overall, the envisaged work on power generation, transmission, and distribution was advanced, and was expected to be completed early in the next CPF period.	PROJECTS Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inga3 and Mid-size Hydropower Development (P131027, FY14) 	- There are several lessons of relevance to the new CPF including, among others: (i) the need for charging tariffs that reflect the cost of the service; (ii) ensuring adequate technical skills at SNEL; (iii) honoring, by both parties, of

2.4.1 Quantity of energy delivered to Katanga Region <u>Baseline:</u> 2,540 GWh (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 5,515 GWh <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 4,265 GWh	The 4,000-km transmission line from Inga to Katanga was fully restored to its original capacity of 560 MW. Some 77 percent of the energy planned to be delivered to Katanga already is being dispatched. Once the ongoing rehabilitation of the energy production units at Inga were to be completed by end-2017, the full planned amount of energy would be transmitted to Katanga. Hence this target is on track to be fully achieved, albeit with some delay.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P097201, FY04) Regional & Domestic Power Market Development (P069258, FY07) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rural Electrification (FY17) GLI Ruzizi Power Project (FY17) Inga 3 BC Development (FY17) Scaling Up Electricity Access (FY17) <p>ASA Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scaling Up Electricity Access TA (P157240, FY17) <p>OTHER PARTNERS AfDB, EIB, KfW, USAID, NORAD, AFD, CTB</p>	the terms of the SNEL-Government performance contract; (iv) implementing SNEL's recovery plan; and (v) creating the necessary conditions for private sector investments in the sector.
2.4.2 Quantity of renewable energy generated at Inga (GWh) <u>Baseline:</u> 4,809 GWh (end-2010) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 9,039 GWh <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 5,907 GWh	As described above, the rehabilitation plan at Inga suffered delays but the units under rehabilitation were expected to be completed by the end of 2017, at which point the target would have been fully achieved.		
2.4.3 Increased access to electricity services in targeted areas including Kinshasa (number of additional households connected since 2007) <u>Baseline:</u> 0 (2007) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 35,000 households <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 11,752	Apart from the energy production delays described above, there were also delays in rehabilitating and extending the distribution network. Once completed, the target was expected to be fully achieved.		
Country Development Goals: Increase agriculture productivity and marketing of crops			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low agricultural productivity Farmers lack access to agriculture inputs Poor access to processing facilities for better value addition of agriculture produce Weak institutions to manage agricultural and rural development Ongoing conflicts over land titles, and between agricultural and pastoral communities in the Eastern provinces 			
CAS Outcome 2.5 Boost agriculture production		PROJECTS Ongoing:	

and increase access to markets		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture Rehabilitation & Recovery SIL (P092724, FY10) • Western Growth Poles (P124720, FY13) 	The following are some of the principal lessons drawn from the program's implementation.
<p>2.5.1 Increased yields of primary crops in targeted areas in the Equateur province</p> <p><u>Baseline and Target:</u> Increase crop yields from 2012 to 2017:</p> <p><u>Baseline:</u> Maize -- less than 1t/ha); Cassava -- 7t/ha); Rice -- 1t/ha)</p> <p><u>FY17 Target:</u> Maize: 2t/ha Cassava: 15t/ha Rice: 2t/ha</p> <p><u>FY17 Actual:</u> Maize: 1.6t/ha Cassava: 20t/ha Rice: N/A</p>	<p>The targeted yields were mostly achieved. Some 2,800 tons of commercial seed for maize, cassava, and rice were produced and distributed, against a target of 1,500 tons. Around 105,000 individuals benefited from the project, versus the targeted 103,000. The feeder road rehabilitation program fell short of the program target, with 2,122 km of roads rehabilitated versus the CAS target of 2,500 km.</p> <p>Improved agricultural and animal technologies were provided to 435,000 farmers in targeted areas in Equateur province, against the target of 441,000 farmers. About 49 percent of participating farmers were women, less than the 60 percent target of female beneficiaries predicted at appraisal.</p>	<p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great Lakes Agricultural Program (GLI regional with national component) (P143307, FY16) <p>ASA</p> <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting Investments in Agriculture EW (P156592, FY16) <p>OTHER PARTNERS DfID, FAO, AfDB, CTB, KOICA, IFAD, UNOPS, ISSSS stabilization strategy (local conflict-prevention platforms)</p>	<p>- Use of implementing partners in a weak institutional context reduces portfolio risks and improves project outcomes</p> <p>- Although implementation of Safeguards Policies are Government responsibility, it should be monitored more closely to avoid non-compliance during implementation given Government's weak capacity. In addition, early handling of safeguards non-compliance including project's suspension, sends a clear message to the client to undertake remedial measures to meet safeguards policy requirements to expected standards</p> <p>- Capacity building, including hands-on support to the PIU in a context of political instability and weak institutional capacity is a necessity.</p> <p>- It is important to invest in fiduciary capacities of PIU, particularly in procurement, in order to reduce delays in project implementation and ultimately disbursement rates</p> <p>- Political instability and weak institutional capacity require ongoing dialogue with wider stakeholder group to ensure ownership of the final ASA result.</p>
CAS Strategic Objective Three: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators			
PRSP goal 3: Improving access to basic social services while raising human capital			
Country Development Goals: Increased access to potable water			
Issues and Obstacles:			

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of institutional capacity to deliver clean water throughout the country• In the conflict areas, the approach is bottom-up and participatory; thus, increase in access depends on requests received from intended beneficiaries			
CAS Outcome 3.1. Increased access to clean water and sanitation	Both physical connectivity and beneficiary targets were exceeded.	PROJECTS Closed during CAS Period: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Emergency Social Action (P086874, FY05)• Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation (P104497, FY07) Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Urban Water Supply (P091092, FY09)• Eastern Recovery (P145196, FY14) Pipeline: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• AF Urban Water Supply (FY16)• AF Eastern Recovery Project including GLI Regional Displacement Project (FY16) TRUST FUNDS: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• JSDF -Socioeconomic Empowerment – Eastern DRC (P149689, FY16) OTHER PARTNERS DfID, CTB, WHO, MSF, UNICEF, UNDP, USAID	Some of the lessons drawn from implementing reforms in the urban water sector include: (i) the potential usefulness of a performance contract between the Water Utility and the Government, provided all the parties, especially the Government, honor their obligations. In this particular case, the Government consistently reneged on obligations to pay its water bills; (ii) staff reductions can be successfully carried out but buy-in from DRC’s powerful unions has been secured first, to avoid Inspection Panel cases, as happened in the previous CAS; and (iii) Service Contracts with outside contractors to manage a public utility can bring positive change to the utility’s performance. The next CPF could consider: (i) strengthening the Government-REGIDESO performance contract; (ii) support another wave of voluntary staff retirement for those past retirement age since the utility remains overstaffed; and (iii) support continuation of the Service Contract to keep improving the utility’s management.
3.1.1 Percentage of population in the targeted areas with access to potable water <u>Baseline:</u> 43% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 55% <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 58%	The CAS program extended the water distribution network by 786 km, serving 1.88 million additional residents of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, and Kindu with safe drinking water, well above program targets.		
3.1.2 Number of people provided with access to improved water sources in project areas <u>Baseline:</u> 5,292,000 (03/2010) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 6,494,000 <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 7,172,000	This target was achieved through 405 public stand posts and 49,510 private connections, which enabled an additional 1,877,400 people to access safe water.		
Country Development Goals: Improve delivery of primary health care-			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Financial barriers to access health services, especially for the poor			

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor quality of health services • Low government investment in the health sector • Weak supply chain for essential medicines • Inadequate staffing (surplus in some areas, low levels in others) 			
CAS Outcome 3.2. Improved access to health services in targeted areas	The CAS program fully achieved its targets for DPT3 immunization, use of mosquito-nets, and assistance to victims of Gender-Based Sexual Violence. However, targets for assisted deliveries were only partially achieved, and those relating to family planning were not all achieved.	PROJECTS Closed during CAS Period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation (P104497, FY07] • Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support (P088751, FY06) Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Development Systems Strengthening (P145965, FY14) • Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and Women's Health (P147849, FY14) • Health System Strengthening (P147555, FY15) Pipeline: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AF Human Development Systems Strengthening (FY16) (including TF) • Great Lakes SGBV - Phase 2 (FY17) • AF Health Project (FY17) TRUST FUNDS	
3.2.1 Rate of DPT3 immunization <u>Baseline:</u> 85% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 90% <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 90%	The target for the proportion of children in project areas (i.e., 83 health zones), aged 0-11 months, who received the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT3) vaccination was achieved. To facilitate the exercise, 98% of the 83 Health Zones covered under the program were provided with adequate vaccine storage and cold-chain equipment.		
3.2.2 Percentage of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel <u>Baseline:</u> 80% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 85% <u>FY14 Actual:</u> 79%	Nationwide, assisted deliveries averaged 80 percent in 2014 (latest data available), but varied greatly across provinces: 97 percent in Kinshasa, 83 percent in Bandundu, 64 percent in Equateur, 87 percent in Maniema, and 64 percent in Katanga. The percentage of pregnant women enrolled in antenatal care had increased to 87% by 2014.		
3.2.3 Number of women 15-49 new users of family planning <u>Baseline:</u> 6% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 6% <u>FY14 Actual:</u> 2%	The proportion of women in project areas, aged 15-49 years, who are new users of family planning increased from 2% in 2007 to 6% in 2011, but then reversed to 2% in 2014. The decline was due to delays in the effectiveness of the additional financing that was expected to finance this particular activity.		
3.2.4 Percentage of children under age 5	The percent of children under five years of age sleeping under bed nets steadily increased to 66		

<p>sleeping under LLINs (mosquito nets) in targeted areas <u>Baseline:</u> 35% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 70% <u>FY13 Actual:</u> 66%</p>	<p>percent by 2013. However, there was variation across provinces. This rate increased to 92 percent in Bandundu. A combined total of 16.6 million long-lasting, insecticide-treated malaria nets were purchased and distributed. Some 3,640 health personnel were trained, including in integrated management of childhood illness protocols and malaria treatment.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building in Budget Preparation for the Health Sector Project (P126890) <p>ASA Delivered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health Systems and Financing EW (P116349, FY14) Social Sector Public Expenditure Review (P147553, FY16) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact Evaluation of Performance-Based Financing (P150979, FY18) <p>OTHER PARTNERS EC, GFATM, GAVI, KOICA, USAID, DfID, CIDA, Belgium, JICA, GTZ, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS</p>	
<p>3.2.5 Percentage of reported cases of SGBV who receive PEP kits within 72 hours <u>Baseline:</u> 25% (2014) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 50% CY16 Target: 92% FY17 Actual: 92%</p>	<p>The definition of the indicator is "Proportion of SGBV cases who report within 72 hours of an incident of sexual violence who receive a PEP kit divided by the number of cases who report within 72 hours of an incident of sexual violence. As of end-November 2016, 92% of eligible reported cases of SGBV received emergency kits (PEP) within 72 hours with an end target of 50%, and 90% of reported cases of sexual violence received at least two multi-disciplinary services as needed (medical, legal and psychosocial) with an end target of 75%. It should be noted that the current percentages are high since services provided are only by the two Centers of Excellence (Panzi Foundation in South Kivu and Heal Africa in North Kivu) in the area covered by the program. It is expected that the values will decrease once services will be provided at the community level by local NGOs and by Provincial Health Departments that have lower-quality services.</p>		
<p>Country Development Goals: Increase access and equity to the various levels of education, and particularly in basic education, especially for girls</p>			
<p>Issues and Obstacles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial barriers to access of education services for the poor Lack of sustainable financing mechanism for the delivery of education services Low quality of education leading to poor learning outcomes Poor preparation of children to enter schooling (low coverage of early childhood education programs, high child malnutrition rates) 			

CAS Outcome 3.3. Improved access to basic education	Overall, despite shortfalls in meeting enrollment and completion targets, several other output indicators were achieved, as discussed below, which will make it possible to continue making progress in the targeted outcomes.	PROJECTS Closed during CAS Period: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education Sector (P086294, FY07) Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human Development Systems Strengthening (P145965, FY14) Eastern Recovery (P145196, FY14) Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education (P149233, FY15) Pipeline: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF Eastern Recovery Project including GLI Regional Displacement Project (FY16) AF Human Development Systems Strengthening (FY16) (including TF) AF Basic Education Program (GPE Financed, FY17) ASA Delivered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operationalizing Higher Education TA (P128640, FY14) Mainstreaming Gender TA (P109868, FY16) Skills Development Study EW (P123857, FY15) OTHER PARTNERS	<p>-in the context of weak governance and institutions, maintain frank and collaborative communications is important to gain trust from the national counterparts.</p> <p>-stay engaged in order to progressively build collaboration among the sub-sectors and within the sub-sector.</p> <p>-maintain participatory process and do not influence the institutional dynamics among the various stakeholders (administration, technical directorates, partners, etc.).</p> <p>-build-up quality partnership with the Technical and Financial Partners, particularly in the context of GPE-financed operations to leverage a sector-wide development.</p> <p>-engage Government in effective implementation of the decentralization reform including balancing dialogue and financing support between the central and the local governments and supporting sound civil society and beneficiaries' engagement.</p> <p>-maximize outcomes by coordinating with health and nutrition at the early stages of a child development, social protection for vulnerable, skills development programs.</p>
3.3.1 Increased primary gross enrollment ratio <u>Baseline:</u> 92.7 % (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 132.3% Actual (2014): 107% Of which: Girls: 102% Boys: 112%	Gross primary enrollment fell short of the CAS target, reaching 107 percent, or 14.3 percentage points above the 92.7 percent baseline, compared to the projected increase of 39.6 percentage points. Broken down by gender, gross primary enrollment for girls was 102 percent, and 112 percent for boys. Also, about 93 percent of the classrooms were built. Other targets were either fully achieved or surpassed. The gross first-grade intake rate increased from 107.7 percent in 2012 to 133.1 percent in 2014, surpassing the target of 129.8 percent. In some target provinces such as Kasai, the first-year primary school enrollment was more than double the projected number: 497,471 students versus 235,800. In addition, some 38 million textbooks have been distributed, against the projected 25.7 million textbooks. A student-to-textbook ratio of 1:2 was achieved, and each student received one math book and one French book. A teacher-to-teacher guide ratio of 1:2 was achieved, and each teacher received one math teacher guide and one French teacher guide; while 53,230 primary inspectors and school advisors received training in the use of textbooks, achieving the target. National pupil learning assessment mechanisms for grade five of primary school were in place, achieving the target.		
3.3.2 Increased primary completion rate <u>Baseline:</u> 59% (end 2011)	The primary school completion rate increased from 59% to 80%, falling short of the CAS target of 97.8 percent.		

<p><u>FY17 Target</u>: 97.8% as projected in Sector Strategy <u>CY14 Actual</u>: 70%</p> <p>Share of female <u>Baseline</u>: 44% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target</u>: 48% <u>CY14 Actual</u>: Girls: 65%; Boys; 75%</p>		<p>ICR, CRS, EC, CTB, UNICEF, UNDP, USAID, AfDB, AfD, UNESCO, Dfid</p>	
<p>Country Development Goals: Enhance safety nets through improved access to basic social services</p>			
<p>Issues and Obstacles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fragmentation and low coverage of systems to deliver social safety net services • Very low government investment in social safety nets (less than 1percent of national budget) as well as low technical capacity for planning and delivering services • Weak inter-sectoral coordination for safety net programs. With UNICEF and WB assistance, a database for vulnerable children is now in place and available to the government and civil society, though it is fully operational only in Kinshasa • Very weak targeting mechanisms for public social safety net services, and no consistency 			
<p>CAS Outcome 3.4. Strengthened social protection system</p>	<p>The CAS program supported the foundational elements upon which a social protection system would progressively be built. As a result of the program's efforts, there is heightened awareness within Government about the importance of Social Protection. Principal accomplishments included updating the Social Protection Strategy and elaborating an Action Plan for improving the efficiency of safety net programs. Both documents were awaiting formal adoption by the Government. The CAS program was particularly successful in its intervention among street children in Kinshasa. A total of 15,586 street children benefited from at least one service, with an estimated 10,000 of them (41 percent of whom were girls) receiving a holistic package of services. Over 5,000 children (48 percent of whom were girls) reestablished</p>	<p>PROJECTS</p> <p>Closed during CAS Period:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Social Action (P086874, FY05, FY13) • Street Children (P115318, FY10) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eastern Recovery (P145196, FY14) • Human Development Systems Strengthening (P145965, FY14) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AF Eastern Recovery Project including GLI 	<p>-need to continue highlighting the importance of social protection (for example, the Ministry in charge of social protection had allocated only 1 percent of the national budget to SP compared to 4 percent, on average, across Africa).</p>

	contact with their families, with 4,000 actually returning to live with their families.	Regional Displacement Project (FY16) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF Human Development Systems Strengthening (FY16) (including TF) 	
3.4.1 Comprehensive database of safety net beneficiaries established and regularly maintained <u>Baseline:</u> Dataset only contains information on street children in Kinshasa (2012) <u>Target:</u> Dataset includes beneficiaries of other safety net programs, e.g., labor-intensive public works, and is updated at least every six months with input from provinces (2018) <u>FY17 Target:</u> N/A <u>FY17 Actual:</u> Partially Achieved	The database contains information on street children but needs to be updated periodically. Data on other programs also needs to be updated as called for in Government's action plan on safety nets.	TRUST FUNDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prevention and Mitigation of SGBV (P150651, FY15) Support to Establishing a Social Protection System (P150462, FY14) National Social Protection Strategy (FY15-16) ASA Delivered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Social Protection Strategy (P150433, FY15-16) Survey and Poverty Analysis TA (P147171, FY14) 	
3.4.2 Number of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works (share of female) <u>Baseline:</u> 3,192 (30% female; 2012) <u>FY17 Target:</u> N/A <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 830 Plus 62,000 person-days.	The Eastern Recovery Project was supposed to be the main contributor to this indicator, and it was only beginning to gain speed after a slow start. This number was expected to increase rapidly.	Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to Social Protection System TA (P150462, FY16) Poverty Assessment (P149583, FY15-16) Poverty Diagnostic for WASH EW (P154368, FY17) Demographic Study OTHER PARTNERS UNICEF, ILO, DfID, AfD, USAID, WFP	

CAS Strategic Objective Four: Addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces			
PRSP goal 1: Strengthening governance and consolidating peace			
Country Development Goals: Leveraging national policy dialogue to strengthen accountability and effectiveness of state institutions in support of peace consolidation			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National government push back against international dialogue Weak state capacity or budget to provide public services Lack of accountability and clientelist management of public finances Volatile political and security environment Different prioritization between the provincial and national levels 			
CAS Outcome 4.1. Improved management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas	Participatory budgeting was introduced in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces. In addition, the eastern cities of Kalemie, Bukavu, and Kindu benefited from support in investment planning, budgeting, and financial management. Goma is expected to benefit from similar support soon. However, like elsewhere in the country, the level of budgetary transfers from the central government to provincial governments (22 percent) remains below the CAS program's target of 35 percent, affecting budget execution. In addition to erratic and limited central government transfers, provincial governments in conflict affected areas are characterized by weaknesses in forecasting their local revenue streams as well as in budgeting and budget execution processes.	PROJECTS Ongoing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhancing Governance Capacity (P104041, FY08) Eastern Recovery (P145196, FY14) PFMAP (PROFIT Congo) Public Financial Management and Accountability (P145747, FY14) Pipeline: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF Eastern Recovery Project including GLI Regional Displacement Project (FY16) Public Sector Strengthening in Decentralized Environment (PFM/PRCGAP) (FY17) TRUST FUNDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socio-Economic Empowerment – Eastern DRC (P149689) 	
4.1.1 Increased budget retrocession to Eastern conflict-affected province of South-Kivu <u>Baseline:</u> currently receiving 10-20% of its revenues as retrocessions <u>FY17 Target:</u> 35% <u>CY15 Actual:</u> Not Verified	Not Verified. See comments on target 1.1.1 above		The major lessons include: the future CPF program should continue to work with the central government on the decentralization agenda. In addition, indicators for the performance of the CPF program should be limited to activities for which the program has influence.
4.1.2 Number of communities benefitting	Achieved. Annual civil society workshops to analyze the draft Budget Laws have enabled them		This is historic practice of the participation by ordinary citizens in the

from participatory budget planning processes <u>Baseline:</u> 4 districts in South-Kivu <u>FY17 Target:</u> 8 districts (including 4 additional districts in North Kivu) <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 16	to contribute to enrich the debate by Parliament over these draft Budget Laws. Apart from provincial levels, citizen consultations were beginning to take place at the municipal level, in Bukavu, Kalemie, and Kindu.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDTF PFMAP (PROFIT Congo), Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (P145747, FY14) <p>ASA Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICT for Accountability in Education TA (P155840, FY16) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subnational Economic Governance (FY16-17) <p>OTHER PARTNERS Government's STAREC Program, United Nations (ISSSS Stabilization Strategy), EU</p>	budget cycle is gaining momentum and needs to continue to be supported and encouraged in the next CPF.
4.1.3 Reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in conflicted-affected province of South-Kivu <u>Baseline:</u> 51% (end-2011) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 30% <u>FY17 Actual:</u> Not Achieved	See comments on Target Number 1.1.2 above.	<p>OTHER PARTNERS Government's STAREC Program, United Nations (ISSSS Stabilization Strategy), EU</p>	The key lesson is that local governments remain weak, especially in terms of revenue generation. There is, therefore, a need for continued support in this regard under the new CPF.
Country Development Goals: Strengthening societal capabilities and resilience for peace consolidation, and sustainable development in the East			
Issues and Obstacles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complex interplay between economic (lack of employment opportunities, access to land) and political (manipulation of grievances and ethnicity) drivers of conflict • Limited access to services by the population including for holistic services for survivors of SGBV at the community level • Need to combine economic activities with inter-community dialogue and stabilization measures 			
CAS Outcome 4.2. Increased socioeconomic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas	Although the implementation of CAS program-supported activities had only recently started, some progress was realized including construction of 106 social infrastructure (schools, health centers, water points). The initial batch of 830 youths was employed in labor-intensive works in Goma and Bunia. About 1,000 (out of 4,800) ex-combatants were integrated into their communities. Preparations for feeder-road rehabilitation and agricultural input supply were advanced. In Tanganyika province, the first batch of community infrastructure subprojects was	<p>PROJECTS Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urban Development (P129713, FY13) • Eastern Recovery (P145196, FY14) • Great Lakes Emergency SGVB and Women's Health (P147489, FY14) • Support for Conflict-sensitive Program Design 	

	submitted to the Provincial Consultative Committee for evaluation, and support to conflict management and mediation commenced. Works in Beni and Butembo were delayed because of security issues.	and Risk Management ('GLR Conflict Facility', P148907, FY 14)	
4.2.1 Increased number of person-days of employment created in conflict-affected areas <u>Baseline:</u> 0 <u>FY17 Target:</u> 400,000 <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 135,000	Appropriate labor-intensive subprojects were identified and assessed in all five targeted cities, and beneficiaries were selected, respecting quotas for women and other vulnerable groups (IDPs, indigenous people). A total of 830 people were at work in Goma and Bunia (work for 4 months per person, 22 days per month, i.e., 73,000 person-days total). Works in Beni and Butembo were delayed because of security issues and works in Bukavu were delayed by the need for in-depth technical studies. The contract with the entity in charge of providing training to beneficiaries was negotiated. Under the urban development support activities for the CAS, some 1.9 kilometers of roads and drainage have been rehabilitated in Bukavu, creating 62,000 person-days of employment. There were also plans to rehabilitate an additional 1 kilometer of roads and drainage, creating additional labor-intensive works. These works were expected to be completed as planned.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prevention and Mitigation of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in North and South Kivu (P150651, FY15) Reinsertion and Reintegration (P152903, FY15) Goma Airport (P153085, FY15) Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 1 (P151083, FY16) <p>Pipeline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AF Eastern Recovery Project including GLI Regional Displacement Project (FY16) Great Lakes Agricultural Program (GLI regional with national component) (P143307, FY16) Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program – Phase 2 (FY17) Great Lakes SGBV - Phase 2 (FY17) <p>ASA Delivered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DDR III Project Paper TA (P150893, FY15) 	
4.2.2 Number of persons in conflict-affected areas with access to agricultural extension services and improved agricultural inputs <u>Baseline:</u> 0 <u>FY17 Target:</u> 10,000 <u>FY17 Actual:</u> n/a	Because of the belated start of the responsible program activities, the targeted outcomes were not attained within the CAS period. However, preparations were underway: agreements with the various actors to support implementation of the envisaged activities were signed or were expected to be signed. Basic seeds had been ordered for delivery in time for the next agricultural season.		

<p>4.2.3 Percentage of reported cases of SGBV who receive at least 2 services as needed (economic support, psycho-social, legal, medical) <u>Baseline:</u> 50% (mid-2014) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 60 percent <u>FY17 Actual:</u> 90 percent</p>	<p>Since October 2014, support is being provided to the two existing Centers of Excellence, the Panzi Foundation in South Kivu and Heal Africa in North Kivu. Activities focus on providing holistic support to survivors of sexual violence as well as health support to vulnerable women, including fistula reparations. As of November 2016, a total of 10,231 beneficiaries received support of whom 6,377 were survivors of sexual violence; and 92 percent of eligible reported cases of SGBV had received emergency kits (PEP) within 72 hours against a target of 50 percent. Similarly, 90 percent of reported cases of sexual violence received at least two multidisciplinary services as needed (medical, legal and psychosocial), against a target of 75 percent. These proportions are high since such services are only provided by the Centers of Excellence. It is expected the values will decrease once services are also provided at the community level by local NGOs and by Provincial Health Departments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region (P149503, FY16) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the Land Sector Review (P152207, FY16) Strengthening WBG Engagement in DRC TA (P148720, FY16) Urbanization Review EW (P156796, FY17) <p><u>OTHER PARTNERS</u> Government's STAREC, United Nations Agencies (ISSSS Stabilization Program), DfID, USAID, EU; International NGOs</p>	
<p>4.2.4. Percentage of people in conflict-affected communities who report an increase in inter-community cohesion and decrease in livelihoods-related tensions. <u>Baseline:</u> 0 (start 2015) <u>FY17 Target:</u> 20 percent <u>FY17 Actual:</u> n/a</p>	<p>As the project started shortly before the end of the CAS period, some of these activities had not yet taken place. However, things were progressing well. Provincial Consultative Committees in North and South Kivu had validated the conflict maps produced by the Social Fund with the help of specialized NGOs. All community sub-projects were accompanied by conflict scans and by relevant peacebuilding measures such as capacity building, establishment or strengthening of Local Peace Committees, and active support to mediation. All Social Fund and partner NGOs staff were trained in conflict transformation. Particular efforts were concentrated on the Bantu-Pygmy conflict in Tanganyika, including mediation of local authorities, helping communities to produce conflict-</p>		

	management plans, and the production of a radio program ("My neighbor is my brother") aired by local radio stations.		
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Annex 3: Selected Indicators of World Bank Portfolio Performance and Management

As of Date 11/30/2021

Indicator	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22
Portfolio Assessment				
Number of Projects Under Implementation ^a	23.0	20.0	16.0	14.0
Average Implementation Period (years) ^b	5.0	5.0	4.3	4.3
Percent of Problem Projects by Number ^{a, c}	34.8	15.0	6.3	0.0
Percent of Problem Projects by Amount ^{a, c}	41.3	5.6	2.4	0.0
Percent of Projects at Risk by Number ^{a, d}	73.9	60.0	43.8	28.6
Percent of Projects at Risk by Amount ^{a, d}	71.3	52.5	34.0	29.7
Disbursement Ratio (%) ^e	26.5	23.2	23.4	2.9
Portfolio Management				
CPPR during the year (yes/no)				
Supervision Resources (total US\$)				
Average Supervision (US\$/project)				
<hr/>				
Memorandum Item	Since FY80		Last Five FYs	
Proj Eval by IEG by Number	85		8	
Proj Eval by IEG by Amt (US\$ millions)	5,264.6		607.3	
% of IEG Projects Rated U or HU by Number	63.9		50.0	
% of IEG Projects Rated U or HU by Amt	46.1		65.0	

a. As shown in the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance (except for current FY).

b. Average age of projects in the Bank's country portfolio.

c. Percent of projects rated U or HU on development objectives (DO) and/or implementation progress (IP).

d. As defined under the Portfolio Improvement Program.

e. Ratio of disbursements during the year to the undisbursed balance of the Bank's portfolio at the beginning of the year: Investment projects only.

* All indicators are for projects active in the Portfolio, with the exception of Disbursement Ratio, which includes all active projects as well as projects which exited during the fiscal year.

Annex 4: Operations Portfolio (IBRD/IDA and Grants)

As of 10/31/2021

Closed Projects 110

IBRD/IDA*

Total Disbursed (Active)	1,532.19
of which has been repaid(1)	5.73
Total Disbursed (Closed)	7,401.11
of which has been repaid	800.17
Total Disbursed (Active + Closed)	8,933.30
of which has been repaid	805.89
Total Undisbursed (Active)	
Total Undisbursed (Closed)	
Total Undisbursed (Active + Closed)	

Active Projects

Active Projects		Last PSR			Original Amount in US\$ Millions					Expected and Actual Disbursements ^a	
Project ID	Project Name	Supervision Rating		Fiscal Year	IBRD	IDA	Grants	Cancel.	Undisb.	Orig.	Frm Rev'd
		Development Objectives	Implementation								
P173825	DRC - COVID-19 Project	S	S	2020	0.0	247.2		0.0	207.7	2.5	14.8
P166763	DRC - GBV	MS	MS	2019	0.0	100.0		0.0	59.4	17.7	0.0
P147555	DRC -Health System Strengthening Pr	MS	MS	2015	0.0	660.0		0.0	64.4	-361.2	-87.7
P159217	DRC Hydromet	MS	MS	2017	0.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	1.6	1.4	1.6
P168756	DRC Nutrition Project	MS	MS	2019	0.0	492.0		0.0	479.4	205.5	0.0
P172341	DR Congo Emergency Education	MS	MS	2020	0.0	800.0		0.0	699.5	286.2	0.0
P122229	DRC Public Service Reform and Rejuv	MS	MS	2014	0.0	122.0		10.0	22.9	18.0	18.0
P149233	DRC Qual. & Relevance Sec.& Tertiary	MS	MS	2015	0.0	200.0		27.0	26.2	26.5	31.3
P160806	DRC SME Development and Growth Pr	S	MS	2019	0.0	100.0		0.0	50.6	27.5	0.0
P145747	DRC: Strengthening PFMA	S	S	2014	0.0	55.0		0.4	5.8	0.0	0.0
P145196	Eastern Recovery Project	S	MS	2014	0.0	824.1		1.9	621.0	-116.2	110.7
P156208	Electricity Access & Services Expansior	MS	MS	2017	0.0	145.0		0.0	67.2	47.6	0.0
P171141	Kinshasa Multisector Dev and Urban R	S	S	2021	0.0	500.0		0.0	461.1	28.7	0.0
P169021	National Agriculture Development Prog	S	S	2021	0.0	500.0		0.0	498.0	20.8	0.0
Overall Result					0.0	4,745.3	8.0	39.3	3,264.8	205.1	88.6

* Disbursement data is updated at the end of the first week of the month.

a. Intended disbursements to date minus actual disbursements to date as projected at appraisal.

Annex 5: IFC portfolios

Table 7: Statement of IFC's Held and Disbursed Portfolio

As of 10/31/2021
(In US\$ Millions)

FY Approval	Company	Committed					Disbursed Outstanding				
		Loan	Equity	**Quasi			Loan	Equity	**Quasi		
				Equity	*GT/RM	Participant			Equity	*GT/RM	Participant
FY08	ADVANS CONGO	0.00	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY10	ADVANS CONGO	0.00	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY12	ADVANS CONGO	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY16	CILU	0.00	8.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.66	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY05	EQUITY BANK CONG	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY10	EQUITY BANK CONG	0.00	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY21	EQUITY BCDC	50.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY14	NYUMBA YA AKIBA	14.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY15	NYUMBA YA AKIBA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.73	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.73	0.00
FY14	PPC BARNET DRC	50.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY14	TERRA AMCC	16.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	16.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FY16	TIGER RESOURCES	0.00	2.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.64	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Portfolio:		131.03	13.79	0.00	0.73	0.00	131.03	13.79	0.00	0.73	0.00

Table 8: IFC Investment Portfolio

(data as of June 30, 2021)

Client	Product	Description	Commitment Year	Committed Amount (US\$ million)
Manufacturing, Agribusiness and Services (MAS)				
CILU	Equity	Equity investment in a cement company	2016	19.8
Nyumba Ya Akiba	Debt/Guarantee/RM	Debt investment in a cement company	2015/2016	15.3
PPC Barnet DRC	Debt	Equity and Debt investment in a cement company	2015	50.0
PPC Barnet DRC-EQ	Equity		2015	11.2
Terra AMCC	Debt	Debt investment in a milling company	2014	16.4
Financial Markets (FM)				
Baobab RDC	Debt	Debt investment in a microfinance company	2019	0.4
Equity Bank Congo	Equity/Debt	Equity and debt investment in a leading bank	2005/2021	51.3
TOTAL				164.4

Table 9: IFC Advisory Portfolio

(data as of June 30, 2021)

Project name	Sector	Description	Amount (US\$ million)
Country Private Sector Diagnostic for DRC	Economics & Private Sector Development		0.2
Kinshasa VC Ecosystem Diagnostic and Scoping	Disruptive Technologies & Funds	Value chain diagnostic and scoping study	0.1
Kivu Green Energy (KGE) AS Project	Infrastructure & Natural Resources	TA to support a mini-grid player to prepare its Business Plan	0.3
Rawbank Risk Management	Financial Institutions Group	Technical assistance to a bank on risk management	0.6
SME Ventures CASF & ARF	Disruptive Technologies & Funds	Technical assistance to a private equity firm	1.4
TOTAL			2.6

Annex 6: MIGA Portfolio

Table 10: MIGA guarantee portfolio

(data as of November 16, 2021)

Management Sector	Effective Date	Expiry Date	Investor Name	Project Name	Business Sector	Investor Country	Priority Area	Risk Covers	Gross Exposure (\$USD)
MAS	03/17/2016	03/16/2026	Bartrac Equipment GBL	Bartrac Equipment	Services	Mauritius	IDA;Conflict Affected	TR;EXP;WCD	67,500,000
MAS	02/12/2021	06/29/2030	AlIF3 Clean Energy	BBOX Capital DRC SARLU	Services	Mauritius	IDA;Conflict Affected	TR;EXP;WCD	7,436,001
MAS	10/30/2020	11/09/2025	FEI-OGEF LP	BBOX Capital DRC SARLU	Services	Mauritius	IDA;Conflict Affected	TR;EXP;WCD	5,670,233
Grand Total	3 Contracts								80,606,234

Annex 7: PRA Milestones and Monitoring Framework

PRA Eligibility

230. The government, through the office of the President, prepared and adopted (on October 1, 2021) its first National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building (*Stratégie Nationale de Prévention des Conflits, de Stabilisation et de Renforcement de la Résilience des Communautés*). This strategy, which has benefited from cross-sectoral input—also from stakeholders outside government and from international partners—provides an anchor for the CPF and for PRA eligibility in terms of a strong government recognition of, and commitment to, addressing drivers of conflict and violence (identified as factors of fragility in the government’s strategy)¹⁴⁸. It also represents a clear platform for emphasizing the alignment of the CPF focus areas with the key axes of the national approach to conflict prevention (governance, justice, security and stabilization and socioeconomic inclusion).

231. Based on the defined eligibility criteria (see Table 11 below), DRC meets the qualitative and quantitative requirements for eligibility to the PRA, which provides enhanced support for countries at risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence. As such, addressing drivers of fragility and prevention of escalation or re-emergence of conflict and violence are critical aspects of the CPF and the WBG’s engagements in DRC. Thus, PRA eligibility is integral to the CPF.

Table 11: PRA Eligibility Criteria

Eligibility Criteria as per IDA19	Eligibility Background
A quantified indicator identifying countries that are at risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence.	DRC is experiencing persistent medium-level conflict. With close to 5,800 conflict-related deaths in 2020, translating into 6.63 fatalities per 100,000 people ¹⁴⁹ , this level is within the 2–10 conflict-related deaths per 100,000 people required under the IDA19 FCV envelope to access the PRA.
The government must have in place a strategy or plan acceptable to IDA that describes the concrete steps that the country will take to reduce the risks of conflict or violence, and the corresponding milestones the Government commits to implement with support from the PRA.	<p>The government (through the Office of the President) has prepared its own National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Community Resilience Building. Previously most strategies for addressing conflict violence in DRC have been internationally driven in consultation with the national authorities.</p> <p>The government’s strategy addresses the main drivers of conflict and violence and is anchored around four pillars of intervention (governance, access to justice, security and stabilization and socioeconomic inclusion), with a series of realistically ambitious milestones backed by measurable indicators for an initial three-year period.</p> <p>Following consultations with national stakeholders and international partners, the strategy was approved by the Council of Ministers by mid-October 1, 2021.</p>

¹⁴⁸ The process of developing the strategy was led by representatives from the President’s offices and included representatives from the Prime Minister’s office, key line ministries, and decentralized leaders.

¹⁴⁹ ACLED, 2021.

232. **The roadmap for PRA eligibility is founded on strong national commitment.** The process builds on strong commitment from central and decentralized stakeholders and decisionmakers, including the president, to address FCV drivers and in particular ongoing violence and insecurity in the eastern part of the country. In May 2020, the government renewed the mandate of the STAREC, with the intention of potentially expanding its reach to violence-affected areas across DRC¹⁵⁰. The president's speech at the conclusion of national consultations (December 2020) emphasized the need for robust efforts to ensure peace and stability across the territory and to address drivers of FCV. The prime minister has concurred publicly that the new government must bring peace to the east and southeast of DRC. The recent creation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reinsertion and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS), which effectively merged the implementation unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and STAREC, shows continuing government momentum to address drivers of fragility and conflict.

233. **With MONUSCO, a key partner on the stabilization agenda, discussions have been held regularly with the Special Representative of the Secretary General across a range of CPF and PRA related issues.** These include P-DDRCS, the PRA and the MONUSCO transition process, ensuring there is strong dialogue and consistency in strategic approaches and operational activities, particularly for operations in the East and for "Triple Nexus" activities and coordination in the Kasais. Frequent consultations are held with MONUSCO's head of political affairs to stay abreast of current events and any potential impact upon the WBG portfolio.

234. **Specific conversations have taken place with key stakeholders, including government and international partners, in the preparation of the PRA.** These consultations were led by the Coordination of External Resources and Project Monitoring (Coordination des ressources exterieures et suivi de projet, CRESP) within the Office of the President, in close coordination with an Inter-ministerial Technical Committee made up of focal points from key Ministries. Presentations to sector Ministries and other Government bodies on the 2021 National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Community Resilience Building also included discussions on the CPF strategic approach. The government's milestones do not require large amounts of specialized capacity or new systems. Rather they have been conceived to strengthen existing processes, structures, and institutions. Of particular importance is the MONUSCO transition process, which requires a withdrawal of the UN peace-keeping mission that ensures the ongoing protection of civilians, the restoration of state authority, and the strengthening of key institutions, primarily in the security and justice sectors. Key bilateral, international, and regional partners as well as various UN agencies and MONUSCO were consulted in the preparation process of the national conflict prevention strategy. Table 12 below provides an overview of the government's national strategy and its associated milestones – and where key international partners will provide both policy and programmatic support for the strategy's implementation.

Table 12: International partner support for implementing the National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building

Axes/Fragility and Conflict Drivers	PRA Milestones	International Partner Support and Alignment with WBG Program
Governance - consolidation of	1. Increase clarity of the processes allocating financial resources to decentralized levels by	Bilateral partners, UNDP, WBG.

¹⁵⁰ The program, which was launched in 2009, led by the Ministry of Plan, was primarily designed for armed conflict-affected areas, especially in Eastern DRC. Its main goal is to restore State authority while working towards inter-communal reconciliation and improved governance.

state building and restoration of state authority and transparent management of public affairs	publishing the inter-ministerial decree, signed by the Ministers of Budget and Finance, establishing the modalities for the distribution of national revenues to provinces, in application of article 220 and 221 of the 2011 Law on Public Finances.	
	2. Issuance and publication of the Presidential Ordinance appointing the First President of the Court of Auditors. 3. Issuance and publication in the Official Gazette of the Decree on the organic framework and administrative regulations of the Court of Auditors.	Bilateral partners, US.
	4. Enactment of a law on increasing access to public information (adoption and publication).	Bilateral partners (potentially), UN.
Access to Justice (and the fight against impunity)	5. Allocate the necessary budgetary resources to the judiciary.	EU, MONUSCO, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK.
	6. Enactment and publication in the Official Gazette of transitional justice law and determine types of sanctions in support of transitional justice, in particular for SGBV victims.	AU, EU, MONUSCO, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UNDP, UK, US/USAID.
	7. Strengthen the organization and functioning of the Superior Council of the Judiciary.	EU, MONUSCO.
Security and Stabilization	8. Development and finalization of comprehensive National Security Plan.	AU, Belgium, EU, MONUSCO, US, other regional and bilateral partners.
	9. Create and operationalize the National P-DDRCS (Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program).	AU, Germany, MONUSCO, UNDP, UNICEF, IOM, UK, US, WBG, Belgium, EU, UK, Sweden, and other regional and bilateral partners (from Peace and Security Working Group)
	10. Preparation of a comprehensive security sector reform plan.	EU, Netherlands, MONUSCO, UN agencies.
	11. Zero tolerance for abuse and misuse of authority within the Security and Defense Forces through the creation of local community security committees/operationalization of community police.	EU, MONUSCO, Netherlands.
Socioeconomic inclusion – management of land issues and development of the mining sector	12. Implementation of new land policy.	Netherlands, UN Habitat, UNDP, SSU, Switzerland, WBG.
	13. Increasing number and quality of AEZs.	Germany, Netherlands, Norway, UK, UN, US, WBG.

Monitoring of the PRA

235. **The availability of additional IDA resources to DRC under the PRA is predicated on a significant development rationale – that Action Plan for the government’s National Strategy for Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Community Resilience Building is critical to implementing the development agenda and making progress toward shared prosperity.** The government’s prevention and resilience efforts are prerequisites for sustainable poverty reduction and socioeconomic development. Finally, the effectiveness and impact of activities financed from IDA resources in DRC, whether from the PRA or the PBA, are linked to government progress in implementing its Action Plan.

236. **Given the close linkage between the government’s prevention and resilience efforts and the achievement of its sustainable development goals, it is important for IDA and the government to develop and monitor implementation of the Action Plan, in partnership with other in-country stakeholders, including relevant UN agencies.** Such monitoring is also necessary to assess whether the overall FCV environment in DRC remains conducive to achieving IDA’s development objectives and hence whether it remains adequate for the effective deployment of additional IDA resources under the PRA.

237. **The government articulated a framework to monitor progress in the implementation of its prevention and resilience Action Plan.** This framework is part of the commitment that was shared with IDA and it is key to the overall agenda. It includes a set of critical measures that the government is committed to take, and a corresponding timeline (see Table 13).

238. **The government’s framework focuses on a comprehensive set of actions that are critical for the overall success of the Action Plan.** As such, it includes actions that fall within IDA’s mandate and expertise, and that can be supported by IDA resources, including under the PRA; activities that fall outside of the mandate of IDA, which may be supported by other partners; and measures the government intends to take without external support. This is based on a recognition that progress in the prevention and resilience agenda in DRC – and hence the effectiveness of IDA resources available under the PRA – will require the effective implementation of a comprehensive effort that spans across economic, social, political, and security dimensions.

239. **This government framework is an important assessment modality to determine whether the overall environment in DRC remains conducive to achieving the government’s own development goals as well as IDA’s objectives and to allowing an efficient and sustainable use of additional IDA resources.** The commitments and measures in the framework are not conditionalities for further IDA support under the PRA, nor are they binding legal conditions – rather, they provide monitoring indicators to credibly assess whether the country environment remains adequate for IDA-financed activities and resources to support DRC in achieving its sustainable development goals and its prevention and resilience agenda. A country’s access to PRA resources will not be linked to the achievement of any specific measure(s) in the framework, rather, it will be based on a comprehensive and qualitative review of the overall Action Plan’s implementation.

240. **The Action Plan’s implementation will be reviewed annually to confirm continued PRA eligibility.** Based on the IDA 19 PRA framework, progress in implementing the plan (for the reasons stated above) is a critical requirement for a country to continue accessing PRA support. Undertaken in a non-partisan and objective manner, the PRA annual review will cover, among other things: (i) an update about the country’s FCV risks and the government’s approach to mitigating them; (ii) an assessment of the Government’s progress in implementing its plan to reduce the conflict risks and its monitoring framework; (iii) a survey of how PRA resources have been used and progress made in recalibrating the country program; and (iv) any recommended adjustments to the World Bank portfolio, the Action Plan (or its monitoring framework as needed).

241. **The World Bank will coordinate with the government, partners, and other in-country stakeholders to monitor progress under the government's Action Plan.** The World Bank will closely monitor the situation through its dialogue with the government (see Table 13 below). It will also leverage existing monitoring and coordination platforms and partnerships, including with bilateral agencies and the UN system, to support the implementation and monitoring of the Action Plan. Cooperation with partners will play a key role in the monitoring of measures, particularly those that fall outside of the World Bank's mandate. The economic and institutional parts of the Action Plan are comprehensively framed in the ongoing dialogue that the World Bank maintains with the authorities. Other measures that are part of the government's monitoring framework, including with regards to reconciliation and security are under continual review by a range of actors, including MONUSCO, the UN Country Team, EU, AU, and a number of bilateral and multilateral partners, and The World Bank may rely on information they can provide in this context. CSOs may also provide feedback on specific indicators depending on area of expertise.

242. **All PRA milestones are linked to conflict prevention and reduction of violence and respond directly to the RRA analysis.** Achievement of these milestones are expected to (i) increase the consolidation and legitimacy of state authority; (ii) strengthen social cohesion and citizen confidence and trust in the state; (iii) reduce elite capture and manipulation of power; (iv) increase transparency in the allocation of resources; (v) reinforce the structures and framework for conflict prevention and reduction of violence, including GBV and SEA/H; (vi) ensure greater coherence in stabilization and peace building processes; and (vii) reaffirm the primacy of the Congolese Government in addressing conflict prevention, stabilization, and resilience activities—with the strong support of international partners.

243. **By accessing the PRA, the active World Bank program in DRC will be recalibrated toward addressing the identified drivers of fragility and conflict.** This recalibration process takes place within a wider readjustment of the WBG portfolio, where engagements will be concentrated in areas that are affected or have been affected by violence and/or conflict; areas that may see increased levels of conflict or violence; and areas where refugee inflows lead to significant pressures on host populations. During the PRA recalibration of the World Bank portfolio, active operations will be reoriented or adjusted to better address the structural drivers of FCV and support the government's strategy for conflict prevention and escalation. Pipeline operations—either under preparation or yet to be prepared—will be designed as per the principles outlined in the CPF, responding to the underlying causes of conflict and fragility and risk of conflict escalation.

Table 13: Critical measures identified by the government to be part of its monitoring framework

RRA Fragility Drivers	Link to prevention and/or escalation of conflict	PRA Milestone	Timing & Indicators	Responsibility/ Source	Comments
AXIS 1 – GOVERNANCE					
<i>Fragility Driver 3:</i> High levels of exclusion and an utter lack of economic opportunities keeps an extremely poor and young population with very low education levels trapped without prospects for social mobility, creating fertile ground for youth to seek out illicit alternatives or to resort to violence.	Lack of transparency and under-resourcing in resource allocation to local level delivery of basic services, results in local level frustrations/violence (as witnessed in Ebola response) and lack of resources to make stabilization priority investments.	1. Increase clarity of the processes allocating financial resources to decentralized levels by publishing the inter-ministerial decree, signed by the Ministers of Budget and Finance, establishing the modalities for the distribution of national revenues to provinces, in application of article 220 and 221 of the 2011 Law on Public Finances.	<p>FY21: baseline 76% of total budget allocated to decentralized entities being transferred.</p> <p>FY22: greater than 76%.</p> <p>FY23: greater than 80%.</p> <p>FY24: greater than 90%.</p> <p>FY22: modalities published.</p> <p>FY23: the budget execution rate for FY22 published.</p> <p>FY22: Publication of the administrative guidelines, accounting rules and manuals determining the allocations of resources by <i>Caisse Nationale de Péréquation</i> (National Equalization Fund).</p>	<p>Official Journal/ Ministry of the Budget.</p> <p>Budget Monitoring report, Directorate of Budget Saving & Monitoring.</p> <p>Finance Law 2020 (which provides the baseline for FY21, already amended by GoDRC in December 2020).</p>	The inter-ministerial decree once signed and published (recognizing there is a delay between the two and it does not come into effect until it is published) addresses the need to provide reliability and clarity in the process by which financial resources are transferred to the local levels – directly addressing the need to reduce local level unrest and frustration arising from underfunded service delivery.

<i>Fragility Driver 1: A governance system that is based on exercising power downward under the control of a small group of political elites, has hampered the building of a social contract based on a mutually accountable, two-way relationship between the state and citizens</i>	Strengthen the structures, staff and functionality of key institutions dealing with the misuse of public funds - to reduce citizen concerns, unrest and contestation against elite capture and resource extraction that can be a structural driver of the use and escalation of violence.	<p>2. Issuance and publication of the Presidential Ordinance appointing the First President of the Court of Auditors.</p> <p>3. Issuance and publication in the Official Journal of the Decree on the organic framework and administrative regulations of the Court of Auditors.</p>	<p>FY22: Ordinance issued and published in the Official Journal.</p> <p>FY 22: Act of swearing in of the Magistrates of the Court of Audit.</p>	Government/ Official Journal.	Both are critical actions which would indirectly mitigate tension and potential violence associated with citizens' unease around opaque use and management of financial and natural resources
<i>Fragility Driver 1: A governance system that is based on exercising power downward under the control of a small group of political elites, has hampered the building of a social contract based on a mutually accountable, two-way relationship between the state and citizens.</i>	Addressing lack of public access to information on the management and utilization of public finances. Reduces risks of fake information on social media which are often calling for demonstrations leading to violence.	4. Enactment of a law on increasing access to public information (adoption and publication).	FY23: Law adopted and published in Official Journal.	Government/ National Assembly.	The milestone will formalize the transparency framework by providing the country and citizens with a law that deals with public access to information, published online and in time, the budget implementation report, the citizen versions of the budget, the mid-year review, the year-end report and the audit report. The government should also strengthen citizen participation throughout the budget process.

AXIS 2 - ACCESS TO JUSTICE					
<i>Fragility Driver 5:</i> DRC is marked by numerous distinct local conflict systems, reflected in a fragmentation that is often reproduced by political discourse around group belonging and exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems.	Historical grievances and unequal access to justice have fueled conflict and violence which can turn into use of violence as an alternative means for achieving a sense of justice.	5. Allocate the necessary budgetary resources to the judiciary.	<p>Budget allocations to judiciary increased in annual Public Finance Act (passed in Parliament and published in Official Journal).</p> <p>FY21 baseline: 1.99%</p> <p>FY22: greater than 2.5%</p> <p>FY23: greater than 3%</p> <p>FY24: greater than 4%</p>	Government/ Budget Monitoring Status, Budget Preparation and Monitoring Directorate, Budget Ministry.	By increasing the budgetary resources, the government can demonstrate its willingness to supporting both the justice sector and access to justice issues amongst the wider population. This will be achieved by using the resources to properly run mobile courts (indicator). This will take place within the context and framework as outlined in National Justice Sector Reform Policy (2017-2026).
<i>Fragility Driver 4:</i> A legacy of trauma from armed conflict resulting in the normalization and commodification of the use of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, has eroded social cohesion.	Need for national reconciliation and peace and to address trauma and unresolved conflicts that may re-emerge to perpetuate cycles of violence.	6. Enactment and publication in the Official Journal of transitional justice law and determine types of sanctions in support of transitional justice, in particular for SGBV victims (in a manner that ensures due process and prevention of political interference in the judicial process).	<p>FY22: Transitional Justice Law enacted and published in the Official Journal.</p> <p>FY22: Decree published in the Official Journal, creating and establishing the organization and operation of integrated multisectoral services centers to provide holistic care to survivors of gender-based violence and collateral victims.</p> <p>FY22-24: Up to 70% of the cases brought to court concerning sexual violence against</p>	National Assembly/ GBV Magnitude Report, Ministry of Gender, Family and Children.	This is a highly visible milestone actively demonstrating the process of addressing underlying exclusion and the need for reparations for victims of serious atrocities committed during the conflict, by using transitional justice instruments to build the path to national reconciliation and peace. To achieve this milestone support will be required from the UNJHRO, MONUSCO/UNDP Rule of Law Section and other partners active in the justice sector to ensure due process and lack of politization. The proposed decree is one of the sets of regulations under the proposed transitional justice law.

			<p>women by members of the security sector, are adjudicated.</p> <p>FY21 baseline: 57% (Average of the last 4 years (2017: 55%, 2018: 51%, 2019: 59%, 2020: 66%))</p> <p>FY22: 60% of cases are adjudicated</p> <p>FY23: 65% cases are adjudicated</p> <p>FY24: 70% of cases are adjudicated</p>		
<p><i>Fragility Driver 5:</i> DRC is marked by numerous distinct local conflict systems, reflected in a fragmentation that is often reproduced by political discourse around group belonging and exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems.</p>	<p>Addressing the perceptions (and reality) of unequal access to justice which can fuel grievances due to unequal/unfair treatment and a sense of exclusion compared to others (often assigned to elite) which can turn into use of violence as an alternative means for achieving a sense of justice.</p>	<p>7. Strengthen the organization and functioning of the Superior Council of the Judiciary in a manner that ensures due process and prevention of political interference in the judicial process).</p>	<p>Increase in the number of cases sanctioned by the disciplinary chambers.</p> <p>FY21: baseline 268 cases.</p> <p>FY22: 30% increase. FY23: 40% increase. FY24: 60% increase.</p>	<p>Government/Permanent Secretariat, Disciplinary and Ethics Unit, Superior Council of the Judiciary.</p>	<p>The Superior Council of the Judiciary is in charge of the proper functioning of the judiciary, including disciplinary measures of justice sector personnel. The Superior Council of the Judiciary being properly organized and functioning should lead to disciplinary matters being addressed more proactive and thereby increase the number of cases sanctioned in the chambers. This is essential for the proper functioning of the justice sector as today there is a high number of reported infractions of justice sector personnel that is not being addressed (according to</p>

					MONUSCO and UNDP). To achieve this milestone support will be required from the UNJHRO, MONUSCO/UNDP Rule of Law Section and other partners active in the justice sector to ensure due process and lack of politization.
AXIS 3 - SECURITY AND STABILIZATION					
<i>Fragility Driver 5:</i> DRC is marked by numerous distinct local conflict systems, reflected in a fragmentation that is often reproduced by political discourse around group belonging and exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems.	Government-is responsible for reorganization and re-structuring of national security responsibilities in a manner that provides clear lines of accountability and allows for clarity in addressing exploitation and maltreatment of communities by security services (which led to conflict and violence).	8. Development and finalization of comprehensive National Security Plan.	FY22: Council of Ministers approves the National Plan which includes establishment of coordination framework (including roles and responsibilities of the various actors).	Government /MONUSCO/ International partners (US, EU).	The absence of a comprehensive and coordinated national security plan for the country, (that identifies the roles and responsibilities of all organs of the security sector, the way each institution/agency interacts with each other, and the overall framework for command and control both civilian and military) is an urgent necessity for conflict prevention) especially in the context of the MONUSCO transition.
AXIS 3 - SECURITY AND STABILIZATION					
<i>Fragility Driver 6:</i> DRC is situated within an international conflict system with frequent outside interference, using Congolese territory to fight proxy battles for political and financial gain, including through competition for access to land,	The provision of alternative/increased economic opportunities for communities affected by conflict and the structured reduction of armed groups and their weaponry, reducing conflict.	9. Create and operationalize National DDRC-S Program (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Community Recovery for Stabilization).	FY22: publication in the Official Journal of the Ordinance creating the National Program DDRCS and appointment of the DDRCS leadership/co-ordination team. FY23 (flexible indicator): Roadmap	Government (Presidency), MONUSCO (Transition Strategy, Benchmark 4), International Partners – US, EU, World Bank, UK, Sweden,	A much-needed overhaul of the State apparatus for addressing DDR means that Government has an improved national framework for better strategic direction and implementation of all stabilization and conflict prevention activities in the country - that will also serve as the principal basis for

minerals, and other natural resources.			integrating rules and eligibility criteria and implementation process of the DDRCS program – which will include numbers of community members involved and re-integrated as part of the program.	Canada, Belgium), UN Country Team.	<p>coordinating donor support to the DDRCS process.</p> <p>Information on the number of community members involved will be included in the roadmap (currently under development) - precision in figures not possible at this point but is a solid indicator of progress. Will be kept under close watch during annual review process.</p>
<i>Fragility Driver 5:</i> DRC is marked by numerous distinct local conflict systems, reflected in a fragmentation that is often reproduced by political discourse around group belonging and exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems.	Weak capacity to mobilize resources and coordinate reform actions/plans of army (FARDC) and Police (PNC).	10. Preparation of comprehensive security sector reform plan.	<p>FY22: Structure responsible for monitoring the implementation of the reform process, is put in place by the Ministry of Defense</p> <p>FY22: Updated roadmap for implementation of the annual army and police recruitment and release plan.</p> <p>FY24: Publication of framework legislation outlining implementation timetable for the reform of the PNC and of the FARDC.</p>	Government, FARDC, PNC, MONUSCO Transition Strategy (Benchmark 14 and its associated indicators), International Partners – US, EU, WB, UK, Sweden, Canada, Belgium), UN Country Team	<p>It is an important and ongoing requirement to pursue comprehensive reform programs in the armed forces and police, which include restructuring, responsibilities, operational boundaries, retirement, and training. Reforming these organizations will address many root causes of conflict.</p> <p>The structure for monitoring the reforms and the framework legislation governing the timetable for implementation will be provided by partners directly supporting Security Sector Reform in DRC (and which falls under Benchmark 14 in the MONUSCO Transition Strategy).</p>

<p><i>Fragility Driver 5:</i> DRC is marked by numerous distinct local conflict systems, reflected in a fragmentation that is often reproduced by political discourse around group belonging and exacerbated by dysfunctional security and justice systems.</p>	<p>Conflict local and regional - dysfunctional security systems, accountabilities and responsibilities. Lack of trust amongst populations in state security forces, which then can lead people to use alternative, armed means of protection, feeding a cycle of communities arming themselves for protection against the perceived 'other'.</p>	<p>11. Zero tolerance for abuse and misuse of authority within the Security and Defense Forces through the creation of local community security committees/ operationalization of community police.</p>	<p>Number of community safety committees set up by zone (target: 150 CLSPs)</p> <p>FY22: 45 FY23: 60 FY24: 80</p> <p>FY22-24: An increase of more than 50% in the number of sanctions cases brought against members of the defense and security forces, in relation to human rights violations.</p> <p>FY20/21: baseline circa 508 cases.</p> <p>FY22: 30% FY23: 40% FY24: 50%</p> <p>Number of cumulative training sessions on ethics and civil-military relations (baseline: 1 training/ defense zone).</p> <p>FY22: 4 FY23: 8 FY24: 12</p>	<p>Government - central and provincial, UN (Joint Human Rights Office), MONUSCO (Transition Strategy Benchmarks 2, 10 and 11 and their associated indicators).</p>	<p>Stabilization interventions must begin by addressing the structural causes of conflict. This requires building trust and capacity-building for local actors – state institutions and civil society – to promote the peaceful transformation of conflicts. This falls under the peace-keeping mission’s transition strategy and their follow up actions. And that will be signed off by the international community through the UN Security Council.</p>
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AXIS 4 – SOCIOECONOMIC INCLUSION

<p><i>Fragility Driver 2:</i> The non-diversified and poorly redistributive economy strongly favors elite interests and is kept in place by a continuously renegotiated political settlement based on competition for natural resource capture.</p>	<p>New land policy will prevent land grabbing and improper allocation/access of land which leads to retaliation and conflict as one of the major sources for local tensions that can boil over into conflict when no other means of justice is perceived as an available route for resolution.</p>	<p>12. Implementation of new land policy.</p>	<p>FY22: Council of Ministers validates the National Land Policy.</p> <p>FY24: publication in the Official Journal of the Land Law adapted to the National Land Policy.</p> <p>Number of land districts and affiliated administrations with trained agents.</p> <p>FY21: baseline 132.</p> <p>FY22: 145 FY23: 200 FY24: 250</p>	<p>Government, National Assembly, UN Habitat, World Bank.</p>	<p>The provision of an updated and clear policy of land, will address many of the conflict and violence issues around land access, ownership and land utilization.</p>
<p><i>Fragility Driver 2:</i> The non-diversified and poorly redistributive economy strongly favors elite interests and is kept in place by a continuously renegotiated political settlement based on competition for natural resource capture.</p>	<p>Artisanal cooperatives and ZEA creation will allow the prevention of violent attempts to grab artisanal mining sites and subsequent retaliation and conflict</p>	<p>13. Increasing number and quality of AEZs.</p>	<p>Number of AEZs created and approved by Ministry of Mining through a Ministerial Arrêté.</p> <p>FY21 baseline: 367 existing AEZ.</p> <p>FY22: 500 FY23: 650 FY24: 800</p> <p>Number of approved cooperatives.</p> <p>FY21 baseline: 722 existing cooperatives.</p>	<p>Government, US, GIZ, MONUSCO (Transition Strategy Benchmark 16).</p>	<p>This milestone begins the process of improving legal and physical security in mining craft areas by formalizing activity and the supply chain for artisanal miners. Lack of regulation and oversight in artisanal mining leads to smuggling, conflict, and violence. The establishment of an artisanal exploitation zone is by order of the Minister after consultation with the the Specialized Research Organization, the Provincial Governor, the Head of the Provincial Mining Division</p>

			FY22: 900 FY23: 1,100 FY24: 1,300		provincial mining division, the authority of the decentralized and the Mining Registry.
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Annex 8: PRA Recalibration of the World Bank Portfolio

PRA and Portfolio Recalibration

1. **By accessing the PRA, the currently active World Bank program in DRC will be recalibrated towards addressing the identified drivers of fragility and conflict.** This recalibration process takes place within a wider readjustment of the WBG portfolio, where engagements will be geographically concentrated in areas that are affected or have been affected by violence and/or conflict; areas that may potentially see increased levels of conflict or violence; and areas where refugee inflows lead to significant pressures on host populations. The recalibration process within the CPF's overall vision seeks to address thematic and technical areas of interventions—that is what the WGB is doing—together with where the WGB will focus (most fragile provinces) and how the WGB will deliver its support.
2. **During the PRA recalibration of the World Bank portfolio, active operations are reoriented or adjusted to address the structural FCV drivers and support the government's strategy for conflict prevention and escalation.** Pipeline operations—either under preparation or yet to be prepared—will be designed as per the principles outlined in the CPF, responding to the underlying causes of conflict and fragility and risk of conflict escalation (see Tables 14 and 15).
3. **Twelve ongoing operations are aligned with the government's national conflict prevention strategy, addressing the key strategic goals, and incorporating a differentiated geographical approach by conflict risk profile of concerned subregions.** These operations have been retained for their strong focus on improving key governance dimensions, inclusion, resilience building, targeting of vulnerable groups, including a specific focus on women and girls, and addressing imbalances across the territory and between groups. They focus on the provision of infrastructure and basic services as well as on strengthening the framework for decentralization and increasing the capacity of provincial and local governments. They also address climate risk and environmental management, support to livelihoods (particularly in agriculture), and natural resource management, including a specific focus on forestry, as a way of addressing challenges related to the management and ownership of land and ensuring the protection of community land rights and associated benefits for local communities (see Table 15 for further information regarding adjustments to the portfolio, and details regarding projects that are already in line with the PRA, and which ones need to be recalibrated). Of the remaining active operations in the portfolio, two will reach their closing date in the first half of FY22. These operations will not be subject to recalibration.
4. **Five projects, of which four are national and one is regional, will be adjusted or restructured to address key drivers of conflict and fragility, as outlined in the RRA, and in support of the key axes of the government's national conflict prevention strategy.** A main line of adjustment will be to further strengthen the overall coherence and complementarity of multisectoral engagements from a geographical and thematic perspective with the pipeline operations—that deliver portfolio-wide impact as opposed to program-restricted impacts. As such, the SME Development and Growth Project will be restructured to strengthen support in conflict-affected areas and to vulnerable populations, building on its currently tested approach. The Regional Great Lakes Integrated Agriculture Development Project is being restructured to further focus on how social safeguards project staff can support issues in land administration and how to improve implementation in conflict-affected areas by decentralizing implementation structures to the provincial level.
5. **In the Human Development cluster, the Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project will be adjusted to address acute food insecurity, provide flexible and rapid nutrition responses, and expand community-based nutrition and agriculture activities.** The Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project will be extended by two years, to continue its contributions to

strengthening the health services delivery systems, working in tandem with the two recently approved COVID-19 related health operations. The Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education Project will also be extended by two years, to include a critical school rehabilitation activity in the Kasai Central province, contributing to social cohesion and conflict resolution in one of the focus provinces.

6. **The pipeline (see Table 14) has been designed to ensure that operations complement one another in terms of sectoral focus, per the underlying conflict prevention and fragility challenges.** Although operations will not seek to intervene in specific areas that are experiencing high levels of active conflict (e.g., the “ADF triangle” in North Kivu or some CODECO “controlled” areas of Ituri), flexibility will be built into the design of operations, enabling rapid deployment into areas that have seen a cessation of hostilities and where sufficient security prevails. New operations are also being designed to address the root causes of FCV by location.

Table 14: Lending approved FY20-22, aligned with the 2021 RRA

CPF Focus Area	Project	RRA FCV Driver	FY20 (US\$M)	FY21 (US\$M)	FY22 (US\$M)
1. Reduce risks to conflict and violence and increase resilience	AF STEP 3 (WHR: US\$135M additional)	3, 4		115	
	Kinshasa Multisectoral Urban Development and Resilience Project	2, 3, 4	500	500	
2. Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital development	DRC COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project	3	47.2		
	COVID-19 Vaccine Purchase and Distribution Project	3, 4		200	
	DRC Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education	3, 4	800		
3. Strengthen economic management for increased private sector investment	National Agriculture Development Program, SOP1	2, 3, 4		500	
	Enhanced Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project	1, 2, 3			250
TOTAL			1,347.2	1,315	250

Table 15: PRA recalibration of the active IDA portfolio in DRC

Project ID	Project Name	Closing Date	Total (US\$million)	RRA Focus Area	Strategic Goal – alignment with CPF Focus Area	Project status in relation to PRA	How project addresses or will be adjusted to address drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence
National Projects							
P128887	DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project	31-Dec-2022	55	GOV/ PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	in line with PRA	Focuses on improving community livelihoods and forested landscape management at the local level to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (note: TF project, GEF).
P160320	Purchase/Sale of Emission Reductions (ER) to be generated under the Mai Ndombe ER Program		55	GOV/ PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	in line with PRA	Note: sale of emission linked to Forest Improvement Program.
P149049	Forest Dependent Communities Support Project	31-Dec-2022	8	GOV/ PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	in line with PRA	Focuses on strengthening capacity of vulnerable, often marginalized communities, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Specific support to PRA indicator on land administration. (note: TF project, REDD+).
P145196	DRC Eastern Recovery Project (STEP1, 2, 3 WHR)	26-Feb-2024	774	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of	in line with PRA	Focus on vulnerable, violence affected people (including displaced, host communities, ex-combatants). Community based approach. Latest AF adds further focus on refugees and

					conflict and violence		host communities. In non-target area but with strong justification. Complementarity to new stabilization project.
P156208	DRC Electricity Access & Services Expansion (EASE)	31-Oct-2022	145	GOV	Strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment		New project under preparation in alignment with PRA.
P157922	DR Congo - Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)	30-Dec-2022	100	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	in line with PRA	Complementarity to main Education engagement EESSE by focusing on quality of service delivery and technical assistance to ensure (perception of) inclusion and thereby positive state presence.
P159217	Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Services	30-Jun-2022	8	GOV	Strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment	in line with PRA	important focus on sector governance to improve quality of the Government of DRC's targeted hydro-meteorological and climate services (note: TF).
P166763	DRC - Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project	30-Jun-2023	100	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of	in line with PRA	Focus on vulnerable, violence affected people, addressing trauma. Community based approach. Complementarity to new stabilization project. Mostly in focus provinces

					conflict and violence		with exception of Maniema and Tanganyika.
P171141	Kinshasa Multisector Development and Urban Resilience Project	31-Jul-2026	500	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of conflict and violence	in line with PRA	Focus on vulnerable, violence affected populations, building shock resilience and improving access to urban services. Including focus on psychosocial support.
P169021	National Agriculture Development Program		500	GOV	Strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment	in line with PRA	During implementation: strengthen geographic complementarity to Government conflict prevention, MONUSCO transition and Nexus strategies; in AF/next phase: land administration pilot.
P172341	Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project	31-Dec-2024	800	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	in line with PRA	Strong focus on sector governance, transparency, inclusion. Clear alignment to 10 focus provinces. Provincial level TA planned.
P173825	DRC COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project (SPRP)	30-Jun-2022	247	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	see notes	Emergency project under corporate MPA. Linkages to health system building; resilience; and inclusion/legitimacy.

P160806	SME Development and Growth Project	28-Dec-2023	100	GOV	Strengthen economic governance for increased private sector investment	to be adjusted	Proposed AF will further expand project into remaining focus provinces, expand into microentrepreneurs, support social entrepreneurship, support rural entrepreneurship in rural stabilization priority areas.
P168756	DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project	4-Jul-2024	492	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	to be adjusted	Substance of project aligned with PRA, may need adjustment on operational side to speed up implementation and make it more flexible in light of the fragility context. Implementation of CRW-ERF for food insecurity through CERC activation underway.
P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project	30-Jun-2023	660		Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	see notes	Addresses drivers of fragility by extending basic health services to all people in DRC, thereby extending the reach of social services and building greater trust in the country's health system.
P149233	Quality and Relevance of Secondary and Tertiary Education Project	31-March-2022	200	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	see notes	Project extended to accommodate for a request to rehabilitate a 18,000-student school in Kananga. The project extension will support objectives of conflict resolution and social cohesion through increasing access to schooling of primary and secondary students.
P171762	Enhanced Collection of Revenue and	31-Dec-2026	250	GOV	Strengthen economic governance	prepared in	Supports key PRA milestones on resource repartition between national and provincial level, resource

	Expenditure Management Project				and PFM systems	alignment with PRA	allocation to Government conflict prevention priorities, land and mining. Specific support to PRA milestones on Increased transparency in the amounts and processes allocating financial resources to decentralized levels and on artisanal mining.
Regional Projects							
P151083	Great Lakes Trade Facilitation	30-Jun-2022	79	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of conflict and violence	See notes	Next project phase under preparation in alignment with PRA.
P167817	Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Project Phase IV	31-Jul-2024	280	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	YES	Strong linkages to the overall health system strengthening objective of the HNP portfolio, while also investing in sustainability, transparency/ accountability, and preparedness for recurrent outbreaks.

Table 16: World Bank Pipeline Projects (FY22 and FY23) and Relationship to PRA


Project ID	Project Name	Bank Approval	Total (US\$ million)	RRA Focus Area	Strategic Goal – alignment with CPF Focus Area	Project status in relation to PRA	How project addresses drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence
National Projects							
P161877	Transport and Connectivity Support Project, SOP1	31-March-2022	600	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of conflict and violence	prepared in alignment with PRA	Clear articulation on choice of national roads in accordance with stabilization priority areas, balance between focus provinces in the Kasais & Eastern DRC.
P173506	DRC Electricity and Water Access and Governance Project	10-March-2022	500	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	prepared in alignment with PRA	Strong focus on sector governance & transparency, provincial level TA for transparency and accountability, opportunity in rural areas that are priority for stabilization
P175834	Stabilization and Recovery in Eastern DRC	Q3 FY22	250	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of conflict and violence	prepared in alignment with PRA	Focus on vulnerable, conflict affected communities, complementarity to key partners, in priority stabilization areas. focus on key actions on DDRCS structure and framework. Potential to include land & mining issues in next phase. In 3 of the focus provinces. could expand into others in Kasai in a next phase. Specific support to PRA milestone on National DDRCS structure and program.

	Girls' Empowerment and Learning Project	FY23	250	PEOPLE	Strengthen systems for improved service quality and human capital	prepared in alignment with PRA	Support to girls' long-term inclusion into education systems and society, including employment; addressing long-standing inequalities in access to services and opportunities.
	Women's Empowerment and SME Support Project	FY23	300	PEOPLE, GOV	Support women's empowerment and economic and financial integration	prepared in alignment with PRA	Follow-up and extension of ongoing SME support project. Will be scaled up geographically and in terms of support to women.
Regional Projects							
P155329	Great Lakes Trade Facilitation and Integration Project – phase 2	Q3 FY22	(total US\$150M, with US\$100M regional IDA))	CONFLICT	Reduce immediate and future risks of conflict and violence	prepared in alignment with PRA	Focus on vulnerable, conflict affected communities. contribution to the regional dialogue and integration agenda (dialogue to reengage with Rwanda and Uganda). governance focus on border transparency and governance dimensions (anti-smuggling, counter illicit financial flows etc.) important for conflict prevention regionally.

Annex 9: Data Gathering and Monitoring and Evaluation

- 1. There is a significant data gap in DRC, which may compromise the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of development assistance strategies.** The last population census was in 1984 while the national household survey for poverty estimation was completed in 2012. The country remains one of the few countries where the sampling frame is outdated, especially considering extensive population movements associated with the numerous conflicts. The national Statistical Capacity Indicator (SCI) was estimated at 41 in 2019, which is lower than the SSA average, estimated at 59. The lack of data affects the statistical system and reduces the credibility and targeting of development planning and management. Poverty and equality data collection will be supported under the technical assistance project for improved public financial management (ENCORE).
- 2. The Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) will continue to be leveraged for enhanced project monitoring and supervision in DRC.** GEMS builds the capacity of clients to use open-source digital tools for in-field collection of structured quantitative, qualitative, and multimedia geotagged data that automatically feeds into a centralized M&E system. Most active projects in DRC portfolio are leveraging GEMS to further strengthen their portfolio-level M&E systems, to integrate beneficiary satisfaction surveys, and to create easily shareable databases that map socioeconomic infrastructure. The recently closed Urban Water Supply Project (PEMU) used GEMS to map all new household water supply connections and supported potential pandemic hotspot mapping in Kinshasa under COVID-19. In the Electricity Access and Services Expansion project, tools such as Kobo Toolbox are used to verify private sector results to trigger disbursements from its results-based fund. The forthcoming Eastern Stabilization project will build on GEMS technology to develop a Poverty Targeting Index and collaborate with DRC Crisis Observatory for high-frequency surveys.
- 3. To further strengthen portfolio-wide monitoring, a new interactive portfolio dashboard is under preparation** (see Figure 2 below). The dashboard will be built on an enhanced GEMS portfolio mapping questionnaire to capture key project results, alongside safeguards and fiduciary concerns. This new portfolio-wide questionnaire will also support further spatial analysis according to the territorial development criteria set out in this CPF. In the future, the dashboard could also further facilitate coordination efforts with development partners.

Figure 16: DRC Interactive Portfolio Dashboard



4. **Information generated daily by social media platforms, in parallel with traditional media monitoring and field-proven data collection, will be utilized to inform World Bank-supported operations.** In DRC, Social Media Monitoring (SMM)—a tool that leverages Artificial Intelligence to aggregate and analyze a large volume of information emanating from social media to show trends—was first tested and used through a retrospective analysis of DRC High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project (Pro-Routes). It was found that SMM can also be used to help assess incidences of GBV more quickly. The tool was expanded to other projects and a broad range of environmental and social impacts and topics, including the Ebola crisis and misinformation associated with the response. The exercise produced maps showing the progression of the Ebola epidemic and helped analyze community sentiment regarding the health response. Lessons learned from using SMM showed benefits from just-in-time information gathering to inform and adjust to responses.

5. **To further develop the potential of SMM in DRC, the World Bank faces two main challenges: reliance on external firms is costly in a resource-constrained environment; and close controls are needed to uphold data privacy and ethics standards.** To respond to these challenges, the World Bank is exploring how to connect various corporate workstreams (e.g., DEC, FCV, Equity and Poverty GP, ECR, and ITS) to build SMM capacity internally. This could help build the capacity needed to monitor the public's reaction to societal topics in real-time and provide insights into conflict dynamics and other operational constraints. Combined with other supervision tools, such as GEMS, IBM, high-frequency surveys, and geospatial analysis, this would provide in-depth knowledge as to the operational context in DRC.

6. **Rigorous impact evaluations (IEs) will be used throughout the CPF period to generate and promote data and high-quality evidence to increase operational effectiveness, including with support from the Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) department and the Africa Gender Innovation Lab (GIL).**¹⁵¹ IEs examine the causal impacts of programs on intermediate and final outcomes and are used to

¹⁵¹ The Gender Lab has also undertaken impact evaluations in DRC.

inform evidence-based design, adjustments to ongoing and pipeline operations, and to credibly measure program effectiveness. DIME will support select operations in DRC, working closely with task teams and counterparts, including in the implementation of the Stabilization and Recovery in Eastern DRC Project; the National Agriculture Development Program; and the Empowering Girls and Enhancing Learning Project. DIME will also continue to work to generate evidence and document effectiveness of programs led by key development partners in DRC, including FAO, the UNICEF Joint Resilience Programme (social protection), the UNICEF National Healthy School and Village Programme (water and sanitation), and the WFP.

Annex 10: Gender and Women's Empowerment in DRC

Summary of Gender Trends in DRC

1. DRC ranked 175th out of 178 countries in the 2021 UN Gender Inequality Index. This index benchmarks national gender gaps using economic, political, education, and health criteria. Similarly, the Gender Development Index is currently 0.845, reflecting that women's human development is about 84 percent that of men's (UNDP 2020)¹⁵².

2. Across DRC, girls and women face profound and interconnected disadvantages. National-level indicators across the four "E's" conceptual framework of the World Bank's 2019 Africa Human Capital Plan show that girls and women in DRC are highly disadvantaged in terms of: (i) empowerment and agency over life choices; (ii) access to enhanced health services to enable family planning; (iii) education, particularly at the secondary level and beyond; and (iv) employment, in terms of both labor market participation and earnings.

Government Priorities and Commitments on Gender:

3. DRC has signed and/or ratified several regional, sub-regional, and international legal instruments on gender and human rights, including: the SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Gender and Development; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Maputo Protocol (The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa); UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The authorities have also supported the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR1325). Implementation of policies remains a challenge due to difficulty in awareness raising because of inaccessibility to reach large areas of the country due to poor infrastructure and continuing conflicts, insufficient budget allocation by government to implement, limited capacity of public agencies to implement and enforce, and low levels of literacy and formal education in relevant populations.

4. A Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo was developed by the authorities in coordination with MONUSCO in April 2009. Thereafter, a National Strategy on Combating Gender-Based Violence (NSCGBV) and related five-year National Action Plan were put in place (November 2009) under the leadership of the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (MGFC). The NSCGBV sets out a framework for the implementation of comprehensive GBV prevention measures and for the provision of multisectoral support services for survivors in the context of continued instability and conflict. It also outlines the role of various line agencies, civil society organizations and humanitarian actors at local and national levels¹⁵³.

5. The NSCGBV is complemented by a set of legal instruments to promote gender equality. This includes the Constitution (2006); The Law Against Sexual Violence (2006) which broadened the definition of sexual assault, criminalized rape, sexual slavery, sexual harassment, and forced pregnancy; and the Child Protection Act (2008). In addition, a 2018 Public Health Law allows women access to family planning services and legally protects women's right to use family planning even if her spouse objects. This law repeals a colonial era law that prohibited any form of action against, or prevention of, procreation.

6. Further, the 2016 Family Code removed a variety of discriminatory provisions and paved the way for improving gender equality in DRC. The code includes reforms that offer protection against GBV, such as the increase in the minimum age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18. But the reforms under the

¹⁵² <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD>.

¹⁵³ DRC – Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project.

Family Code go beyond addressing GBV and have the potential to increase women's economic empowerment. The Code allows married women independent access to finance, property rights, and expands the working age and professional options for women. It removes earlier requirements that a married woman seek the authorization of her husband to undertake certain business activities such as registering a company, opening a bank account, or seeking a loan.

7. Other recent legal reforms that are predicted to influence women's economic empowerment are the provision for maternity leave to be paid by the government, rather than the employer, and the equalizing of retirement ages for women and men. The government also developed a National Gender Policy (2017-2021), which aims to achieve gender equality and social empowerment. Five strategic axes were selected for its implementation: (i) consolidating gender equality and the empowerment of women; (ii) strengthening the role and place of women and girls in the economy and employment; (iii) increasing access of women and girls to decision-making spheres; (iv) fighting against forms of sexual violence; and (v) strengthening the institutional mechanisms for implementation of the National Gender Policy.

Gender-Based Violence

8. GBV rates in DRC are high. Data reveals that 52 percent of Congolese women have experienced physical violence and 27 percent of all women report experiencing sexual violence in their lifetimes. Additionally, 57 percent of women report experiencing intimate partner violence (IPV)¹⁵⁴. High prevalence rates are linked to underlying social and cultural norms and values that perpetuate power imbalances between men and women.

9. This risk dynamic is further exacerbated by conflict. In 2019, documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence increased by 34 percent from the previous year, where most perpetrators belong to non-state and state armed forces¹⁵⁵. This is especially true in the eastern provinces and more recently in the Kasai and Tanganyika¹⁵⁶. It is also true in the context of food insecurity associated with the ongoing humanitarian crisis¹⁵⁷. In addition, labor inflow associated with large investment projects, taking place in a context where social norms and values may include high acceptance levels of GBV can further expose vulnerable groups to sexual assault, transactional sex, rape, and forced or early marriage.

10. The Government of DRC recognizes the burden that gender inequality, including GBV, places on social and economic development. The government's commitment to addressing GBV is reflected in the abovementioned Comprehensive Strategy and NSCGBV and its related five-year Action Plan established in 2009. The National Strategy and Action Plan have subsequently been updated. The NSCGBV lays out the following five areas of intervention: protection from and prevention of GBV; ending impunity; security sector reform; assistance for victims of violence; and data collection and mapping. The NSCGBV further highlights the challenges in implementing GBV prevention and response programs in a context of continued insecurity and lays out key gaps in terms of service provision as well as challenges in coordinating the response to GBV.

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic:

11. In line with emerging worldwide evidence, women in DRC have been disproportionately affected by the health and socioeconomic impacts of measures applied to control COVID-19. In particular, the informal sector, where most women are employed, has been heavily affected by border and market closures and restrictions on movement. Similarly, rising food prices, declining incomes, and

¹⁵⁴ World Bank Group, 2021: Democratic Republic of Congo Gender Diagnostic Report.

¹⁵⁵ World Bank Group, 2021: Democratic Republic of Congo Gender Diagnostic Report.

¹⁵⁶ DRC – Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project.

¹⁵⁷ DRC – Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project.

an increase in the USUS\$ exchange rate limit women's ability to meet basic household needs, including food for children. COVID-19 has also had an adverse impact on women's health and nutrition, as well as protection. Accentuated economic vulnerability and the disruption of education, due to COVID-19 restrictions, have increased the risk of women experiencing GBV, and have compounded the situation of early marriage and childbearing among adolescent girls, particularly in the East¹⁵⁸.

Gender Focus Across DRC CPF and the WBG Portfolio:

12. In support of the government's commitments and priorities on gender, gender will be integrated into all activities and engagements across the WBG portfolio in DRC. The CPF is focused on translating recent advances in the above-mentioned national gender equal policies in DRC into results on the ground by helping women access equal opportunities to develop skills, gain employment, generate income, and have their voices heard. This is done by integrating gender into sectoral CPF objectives, including gender disaggregation.

13. There will be a specific focus on addressing GBV as a project implementation risk in non-GBV specific engagements as well as addressing it more broadly through dedicated components or engagements focused on GBV prevention and response. This latter approach is actioned, for example, through DRC's Gender-Based Violence Prevention and Response Project, which is providing US\$100 million to increase participation in GBV prevention programs, using a multisectoral response services for survivors, and providing immediate response in the event of a crisis or emergency. Additional projects include the Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project, the Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal Child Health Results Project, the Eastern Recovery Project (STEP), and a proposed Girls Empowerment and Learning project.

14. The approach to gender in the CPF and WBG portfolio is informed by a range of gender analyses, in line with OP/BP 4.20, and a continuing focus on rigorous analytics, listed below, that cover multiple sectors. This analytical work will provide greater breadth and depth of understanding on some of the most critical gender gaps to help better identify the most suitable interventions to address these gaps. The CPF has also been informed by a range of past and ongoing Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA) that include gender-related issues, including the 2021 DRC Gender Diagnostic Report. Additionally, data has been gathered from the following sources/datasets:

- The 1-2-3 Survey, the first national household survey in DRC focusing on Employment, the Informal Sector and Household Expenditures.
- The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (second wave, 2013/14), which is designed to provide data for monitoring the population and health situation in DRC.
- Growth Poles survey, which uses the baseline survey of the World Bank Western DRC Growth Poles project impact evaluation, conducted in the province of Kongo Central in December 2015. The impact evaluation was led by the World Bank's Africa Gender Innovation Lab.
- Childcare Pilot Survey, conducted as the baseline for the impact evaluation of community-based childcare centers within the Kongo Central province of DRC. Both the impact evaluation and intervention were led by the World Bank's Africa Gender Innovation Lab, in partnership with the Congolese NGO REPAFE, Save the Children US, and DRC's Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Technical Education (EPST).
- EMAP survey collecting baseline data for the impact evaluation of the Engaging Men through Accountable Practice (EMAP) project in 2016. EMAP was designed and implemented by the International Rescue

¹⁵⁸ CASS, the impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak response on women and girls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and REACH, Indicateurs pertinents pour la réponse au COVID-19.

Committee (IRC), with funding from the World Bank. The impact evaluation was a collaboration between the IRC and the World Bank's Africa Gender Innovation Lab.

- Findings from a qualitative case study of women's economic activities in Goma.

Africa Gender Innovation Lab: The work of the Gender Innovation Lab has included several impact evaluations, which will help inform the design of future WBG engagements in DRC:

- Personal initiative training can have an impact on women entrepreneurs, especially when it is provided to couples;
- The Great Lakes Sexual and GBV Project: Narrative Exposure Therapy was explored to support survivors of assault with psychosocial well-being, economic empowerment, and social functioning and participation;
- Engaging Men Through Accountable Practice and its impact upon the prevalence of intimate partner violence and gender equity;
- Agricultural Rehabilitation and Recovery Support Project, examining the impact of extension component and/or the price subsidies for improved seeds on agricultural output and nutrition, health and education outcomes; whether impacts differ depending on whether the interventions target women or men; whether impacts differ depending on the village context, household structure, access to land, and household social position; and how and under what conditions there is any technology diffusion, with a focus on the information network structure in villages and how it differs by gender.

A Gendered Impact Evaluation of the Social Response to the Ebola Program. The IE looks at the gendered impacts of the public works program that is part of the project's Ebola response, including impacts on intrahousehold decision-making, women's economic empowerment, gender norms, and social cohesion.

Annex 11: DRC Development Partner – Mapping of Sectoral Priorities

The below is a mapping of development partners and multi-lateral organizations actively participating in the GCP. It is not exhaustive.

Sectors	BILATERALS											MULTILATERALS					T O T A L
	Belgium	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	USG/USAID	AfDB	EIB	EU	IMF	WBG	
GOVERNANCE																	
Peace, security, conflict management	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x		x	13
Provincial/regional support	x	x	x		x				x	x	x			x		x	9
Human rights	x			x		x	x	x	x	x	x			x			9
Democracy, democratic institutions, leadership		x						x	x	x	x			x			6
Anti-corruption, transparency	x	x						x	x		x				x	x	7
Public finances	x		x							x	x			x	x	x	7
Civil society, citizen engagement, media	x								x	x	x			x		x	6
Police					x						x			x			3
Justice								x			x			x			3
SOCIAL SECTORS																	
Health	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x			x		x	12
Gender & GBV	x	x		x				x	x	x	x			x		x	9
COVID-19 pandemic	x		x		x				x	x	x	x		x		x	9
Food security, nutrition	x	x	x					x	x	x	x			x		x	9
Support IDPs, returnees, refugees, child soldiers	x							x	x	x	x			x		x	7
Cultural (language, exchange progs, art, sport)	x		x		x				x		x						5
Education	x		x							x	x					x	5
Social protection	x										x					x	3
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT																	
Climate Change	x	x			x	x	x	x		x	x			x		x	10

Environmental protection, conservation	x		x	x		x		x		x	x			x		x	9
Sustainable natural resource management	x				x	x	x	x			x	x				x	7
Agriculture	x		x				x	x		x	x	x		x		x	9
Forestry	x	x	x	x	x					x	x						7
ECONOMY AND POVERTY REDUCTION																	
Job creation	x			x				x	x	x	x					x	7
Business environment, private investment	x					x				x	x		x	x	x	x	8
Financial inclusion, micro-finance		x								x	x					x	4
HUMANITARIAN																	
Emergency assistance, crisis response	x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x					x	9
INFRASTRUCTURE																	
Water & Sanitation	x			x							x		x		x	x	6
Transport	x		x		x							x	x	x	x	x	8
Telecommunications/ICT		x	x													x	3
Energy	x			x						x	x	x				x	6

Note: Due to the special status and mandate of UN agencies, these are not included in the mapping.

Annex 12: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo

